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This study attempts to identify the causes of Ghana's development problems, and 
determines the extent to which these problems can be eliminated through Ghana's 
institutional capacity building programme - the NIRP. The study examines the role of 
Ghana's public sector institutions in managing national development and argues that in 
order to manage development effectively, it is important to examine the institutional 
factors that underpin the process. The study evolves on the premise that, structural 
constraints and lack of skills in the public sector has led to the sector's under 
performance, and this has consequently caused Ghana's under-development. The public 
sector under-performance relates to the sector's inability to function effectively at the 
development policy process especially at the policy implementation stage. This provides 
the rationale for Ghana's public sector capacity building programme that seeks to 
accelerate and enhance the nation's development. The Ghana-Vision 2020, which is 
Ghana's development policy with a 25-year duration and the NIRP, which is a capacity 
building programme are selected as case studies. The study explores whether the NIRP 
will be effective enough to build the capacity needed to implement the Ghana-Vision 
2020 and thereby enhance national development. The NIRP has adopted a strategy in the 
form of six component programmes to address public sector management lapses in order 
to enhance the chances of successful implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020. This 
strategy is intended to turn the public service into a productive and motivated service. 
This outcome is intended to be achieved through structural transformation, human 
resource development, transformation of the governance framework, and attitudinal change 
towards the private sector and the civil society. The study has identified a number of 
constraints and inadequacies to the implementation processes of both the Ghana-Vision 
2020 and NIRP that threatens the entire development process. The study gathered data 
from interviews, documentary evidence, and observation (at seminars and meetings) from 
five public sector institutions, the DFID and the Secretariats of the NIRP and its 
component programmes. The report concludes that firstly, Ghana's under-development is 
not only a factor of structural inefficiencies and the inadequate skills in public sector 
institutions. It shows that there are other equally serious and fundamental problems 
involved in Ghana's public sector institutions' management of the development process. 
Secondly, the efficacy of the NIRP to enhance and accelerate the development process is 
uncertain because both programmes are being operated concurrently. Thus, the Vision 
2020 implementation would be half way through by the time the NIRP builds the needed 
capacity for the public sector and folds up. The study argues that by then a lot of issues 
may have gone wrong already with the Vision 2020 implementation. 
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1.1 Profile of Development Management in Ghana: An 
Introduction 
This study center on the question that Ghana's incapacity to progress in her development 
is caused by structural inefficiencies and insufficient level of skills in Public Sector 
Institutions. In what way can the National Institutional Renewal Programme mitigate 
these lapses to ensure sustainable development? " The background to this question is: a 
relatively weak national capacity in terms of skills and institutional structures in Public 
Sector Institutions (PSIs) has persistently had negative impact on Ghana's development 
since the late 1960s. This is a problem that lies at the heart of Ghana's development 
challenge (Jaycox, 1993: 3). The situation became more acute from the 1970s onwards, 
and the inadequacies have led to perpetual failures in development policy and 
consequently, development management. This phenomenon has been created by 
institutional and individual ineptitude in several dimensions of national life ranging from 
corruption to irresponsible practices. Consequently, this level of ineptitude provides a 
basis for the need to build national capacity for policy analysis and development 
management. This concern has taken the center-stage of capacity building efforts in 
Ghana since the late 1970s. 
At independence in 1957, Ghana in its embryonic stage of development had a relatively 
good reservoir of skilled and properly trained manpower base, as well as efficient and 
effective public sector structure to manage the country's development. During this 
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period, hopes were widely entertained that Ghana would be the showpiece of African 
economic development and model for others to follow (Huo, 1989: 1). Thus with these 
conditions, the post-independence development scenario offered a promise of hope for 
continuous progress. However, this promise of hope turned into despair and 
despondency as the mid-1970s onward saw a rapid quantitative and qualitative decrease 
in the range and scope of services offered by PSIs and the resultant degeneration of the 
Ghanaian economy to unprecedented levels. 
Nevertheless, the post-independence period in Ghana marked the start of capacity 
building process for development in Ghana. These capacity-building efforts unfolded at 
a period when high-level decision-making and the policy process depended very much on 
technical inputs from a relatively efficient and effective but somewhat less development 
oriented public service bequeathed by the British colonial administration. During this 
time the high quality of Ghana's capacity for policy analysis was manifested in the policy 
content and the efficient structures and processes for policy making, implementation, and 
monitoring. This scenario of public sector capacity continued until the early 1960s (that 
is, during the First Republic). But the political and its consequent economic instabilities 
that occurred from this period onwards started a severe degeneration process of the public 
sector capacity for policy analysis and further deteriorated the development management 
practice. This was caused by a marked change in government development strategy that 
emphasized centralization of policy-making. This situation was made more difficult by 
the departure of the remaining British colonial technocrats in the public sector and the 
increasing dependent of government on foreign experts for economic policy advice. 
These practices reduced Ghanaian ownership of development policy and also distorted 
the policy process in PSIs. Paul (1983: 8) has also attributed this capacity problem to the 
form and practices of the colonial government. His argument is that almost exclusively 
expatriate personnel filled public sector posts in the colonial era whereas training 
3 
infrastructures were extremely limited in scope and those that existed were rudimentary 
in nature. Even the few rudimentary training facilities that existed reflected the systems 
and practices of the colonial government and had no recourse to indigenous social and 
cultural systems. Nkrumah (1964: xiv) has remarked that the colonial government at 
independence took every record of the colonial administration away with them and left 
empty offices, some of them even without furniture. Hence the present writer holds an 
opinion that Ghana's capacity for policy analysis and development management started 
crumpling at independence. 
However, one of the evidence for the shift in government development strategy in the late 
1960s was the use of public enterprises as the main vehicle for the promotion of rapid 
development in what was considered a mixed economy. Significantly however, the 
government's macro-economic policies evidently failed to achieve the desired results of 
economic growth. The question (which is also asked today about the failures of 
development policies in Ghana) therefore was, are these policy failures the result of weak 
capacity for policy analysis in PSIs? The answer for the immediate past policy failures 
and for that matter for Ghana's underdevelopment is unraveled in detail in the subsequent 
chapters. But for the historical aspect of it, it can be said that Ghana's bureaucracy in the 
early 1960s had the capacity to offer good policy advice. This was demonstrated by the 
work of both Ghanaian technocrats at the Planning Commission and the Bank of Ghana 
(BoG) as well as the use of foreign expert advice'. Given the quality of Ghana's macro- 
economic policies and the support from foreign expertise in the domestic capacity 
building efforts, it can be argued that the policy failures may have been caused rather by 
the lack of consultation in the policy process and the neglect of institutional requirements 
for policy analysis (Akuoko-Frimpong, 1994: 6). One school of thought has added that 
' The 1963 Seven-Year Development Plan had substantial policy inputs from both Ghanaian technocrats and foreign 
experts like Nicholas Kaldor, Dudley Seers and W Arthur Lewis. 
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the degeneration from the halcyon and prosperous immediate post independence period 
to the rather gloomy and difficult development period after the mid-1970s is attributed to 
the ineffectiveness and degenerated capacity of PSIs. Before this period, PSIs pursued 
bad and irreversible policies and in certain cases, these institutions abdicated their policy- 
analysis responsibility. This problem was made more acute by the lack of institutional 
base to analyze and offer policy options to government (Dotse, 1991). Consequently, 
Ghana's weakened capacity for policy analysis undermined the subsequent development 
policies in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Thus, there have been all together eight 
national development policies in Ghana since Independence but implementation of these 
polices have not been very successful (Erbynn, 1995: 8). 
The political and economic instability that was associated with the period between 1960 
and 1970 also stretched unduly for about a decade, the policy analysis paralysis of PSIs. 
Consequently in the late 1970s, the problem of weak institutional capacity became an 
issue for concern especially as the economy declined remarkably. Varying intensity of 
high inflation, declined productivity and exports, political instability and flourishing 
kalabule also characterized this period2. During this time, there was a gradual decline in 
per capita income, which caused widespread poverty. This situation was accompanied by 
disparities in income distribution, unemployment and the emigration of skilled 
professionals (Bank, 1984: xv). The loss of capable professionals in all sectors of the 
economy also undermined further, Ghana's efforts at capacity building for policy analysis 
and development management, especially as the country's universities and research 
institutions experienced a marked decline in their research capacity'. For example by the 
mid-1970s, the Department of Economics at the University of Ghana had built a 
2 "Kalabule "is a Ghanaian term for a mix of corrupt practices and other forms of illegal activities. This term may 
literally be translated as 'cheating on your neighbour'. It is a term that is still used in Ghana. 
3lnadequate funding was partly the cause of this problem apart from the income disparities that created the exodus of 
senior members of staff from the country. 
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substantial research and training capacity on the strength of about 85% of its full 
establishment at post but by the early 1980s, the staff strength at the Department was as 
low as 21% (Akuoko-Frimpong, 1994: 25). This is evidence that the large reservoir of 
skilled and well trained personnel that Ghana had by the late 1960's had been reduced 
significantly by the early 1980s as a result of the exodus of these personnel to other 
countries with relatively better living and working conditions (Bank, 1984: 1). This 
phenomenon has had a negative impact at capacity building efforts in the successive 
development years in Ghana. For example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Ghana 
embarked on the Economic Recovery Programme - Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ERP-SAP) policies. Although these policies have been argued as successful, they 
encountered a number of implementation difficulties that shows that PSIs lack adequate 
capacity for policy analysis. One of the weaknesses of the ERP-SAP strategies was that 
it did not take account of the debilitating effects the policies had on the morale and 
performance of PSIs. This was a serious error because it became clear from the 
implementation process that an inefficient public sector would constrain the nation's 
development process (Sai, 1997: 1). 
As a result of this lack of capacity, a good number of donor agencies have made inputs to 
the national efforts at building capacity for policy analysis and development 
management. Since the launch of the ERP in 1983, various efforts have been made to 
build Ghana's capacity, notable of which is the Civil Service Reform Programme 
(CSRP). But these capacity building efforts were narrow particularly as they focused on 
financial and administrative reforms, and improvement in the management of State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and thus neglected the human resources, governance and 
attitudinal components of the problems. These reform efforts were therefore not 
completely successful. This policy failure points to the seriousness of the outstanding 
institutional capacity issues as these did not help to sustain the ERP-SAP. These 
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outstanding issues show that the capacity building programmes concentrated on policy 
contents and neglected the institutional prerequisites for policy implementation. That is, 
Ghana's low success rate at development may be attributed to an inherently weak 
institutional capacity to accommodate policy changes, and the necessary administrative 
and financial systems needed to implement development policies. To illustrate the above 
argument, Lisk (1996: 53) has remarked that the failures in development policy 
compounded by the effects of a protracted economic crisis do inter alia contribute to 
under-development. He argues that the persistence of development problems in Sub- 
Saharan Africa is caused by the weakness and instability in the institutional framework 
for development management. 
The arguments advanced so far sets the context for the purpose of this study, and that is: 
to determine the causes of Ghana's under-development, and to examine how effective 
current capacity building policy intervention can mitigate Ghana's development problems. 
The study seeks to provide an understanding of how Ghana's institutional capacity 
building programme will improve performance in policy analysis and development 
management. The study therefore investigates the role of institutions in development 
management, and the variables required to make these institutions effective at this remit. 
The underlying assumption to the enquiry process is that, the impact of a nation's 
development depends on the quality of institutions responsible for planning and 
implementing development policies and programmes. Secondly, the institutional 
framework provides the medium for articulating and prioritizing development issues, 
defining and accomplishing inter-sectoral complementarity, and serves as the intervening 
factor for harnessing and mobilising human resources for development. For these 
reasons, it is important to examine the institutional framework when the development 
process encounters problems and obstacles. 
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This report is divided into five parts with eight chapters. Part one is the introductory 
chapter and it provides a historical profile of development management and capacity 
building programmes in Ghana. The chapter also discusses the research problem, defines 
the thesis and stipulates the purpose of the study. Part two discusses the background 
theory and the conceptual framework of the study. These consequently lead to a 
discussion in part three about the methodology and methods. Part four contains two 
chapters that deal with the report and analysis of the research findings, and part five has 
two chapters that concentrate on the summary and conclusions of the research. The 
concluding chapter also discusses significance and limitations of the study. There are 
two ancillary sections that deal with the bibliography and appendices. 
1.2 Under-development of Ghana: The Research Issue 
The above account of the development management process in Ghana point to one main 
problem that centers on the structural bottlenecks in PSIs and the insufficient level of 
skills, and how these impede Ghana's development as indicated in the research question 
posed at the beginning of the chapter. This is re-stated as "Ghana's incapacity to 
progress in her development is caused by structural inefficiencies and insufficient level of 
skills in Public Sector Institutions. In what way can the National Institutional Renewal 
Programme mitigate these lapses to ensure sustainable development? " 
The Institutional Framework 
As discussed earlier, Ghana's development management process has suffered immensely 
from poor capacity building due to the lack of dynamism in public sector management. 
These have had such consequent problems as poor accountability, policy discontinuity, 
and inability to develop the nation's human resource endowment. Ndegwa et. al. (1987: 
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28) have argued that development creates a growing need for higher levels of effective 
management which according to Salmon (1992) and McGill (1995) is realized through 
institutions. However, PSIs in Ghana have failed to appreciate the link between effective 
management and development. This situation has resulted in distortions in the 
fundamental framework of institutional structures, processes and procedures, and human 
resource management. This phenomenon has created bizarre institutions marginalised in 
the policy process and a legacy of decrepit development process. Secondly, this situation 
has bred a generation of demoralized and dispirited professionals who perform poorly in 
PSIs. These have resulted in over regulation, ineffective accountability systems, over 
centralization, administrative in-capabilities, institutional indiscipline and authoritarian 
practices that have fomented fertile grounds for corruption, apathy and lack of 
commitment to work in the Public Administration System (PAS). These anomalies have 
militated against efficient development management and consequently against 
development in Ghana. It has also rendered the development management process bereft 
of ownership and direction. 
These enervating variables have also caused the policy process to malfunction in the 
sense that Ghana's development policies usually concentrate on the policy content, 
whereas the institutional and technical aspects like good governance and implementation 
management are neglected. Until recently however, the institutional prerequisites for 
development policy analysis received less attention. This situation occurred because 
policy experts and decision-makers took institutional capacity building for granted and 
gave little attention to it. They envisaged that the capacity building process would 
empower the workforce and the masses and thereby erode their power base. Thus the 
political leadership in Ghana has been intolerant of opposing views on national policies 
from various sections of the masses. Quite recently however, there have been some 
improvements towards mass participation in the development process. In spite of these 
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improvements, the top-down policy making practices have until now excluded a sizable 
number of Ghanaians from the development policy process, whose contribution would 
otherwise be valuable4. 
Secondly, Ghana's development process is saddled with short-term crisis management 
which Ndegwa et. al. (1987: 28) calls a development bug. Their argument is that the 
development of nations very often results in complex economic and social systems that 
call for higher levels of management abilities and skills that will put management always 
ahead of evolving situations rather than merely responding to crises. Hence development 
policy interventions initiated locally or even with external assistance like the ERP-SAP 
have failed to realize their development objectives and to promote sustainable progress. 
Thirdly, the failures of these intervention policies are evidence that the increasing 
involvement of foreign technical experts in national development is not a panacea to 
development problems. This is because development is about people and it can only be 
carried out successfully with their participation, and ownership (Ndegwa et. al. 1987: 18; 
Picard et. al. 1994). Thus, Ghana's PSIs have performed poorly because institutional 
processes and for that matter the development process are bereft of those aspects of 
Ghanaian culture that will enhance productivity. This situation has occurred due to the 
over-indulgence of these institutions with donor agencies that offer technical assistance 
programmes pre-packaged with western values and standards. As a result, the 
development process is devoid of strong national roots, which is a sine qua non for 
sustainable development. The seriousness of this problem is exposed by the South 
Commission Report (1990: 45) which argues that culture is a vital pillar of development, 
and although capital formation and technical progress are essential elements of 
development, a society's culture provides the environment for their effectiveness. 
This culture of exclusion pertains to the development period in Ghana until January 7,2001 when the new 
democratically (National Patriotic Party) government was sworn into ofce. 
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Fourthly, Picard et. al. (1994: 2) have explained development in terms of an interwoven 
series of complex activities that is performed by both public and private sector 
institutions. This argument emphasizes the importance of public-private sector 
complementarity as well as networking among institutions in the development process. 
In Ghana however, PSIs use public policy to impede private sector growth and 
development, and this has created a restrictive rather than an enabling environment for 
the private sector in the development management process. Within the public sector 
itself, institutions do not normally coordinate their policies and programmes. Thus, there 
is no proper framework for institutional networking and channels of communication, but 
these are prerequisites for accelerated development. Ndeqwa et. al. (1987: 27) have added 
that the rate and manner at which a nation's development takes place depend on how 
institutions are organized and mobilized to achieve set goals, as well as on the specific 
general policies designed to guide the entire process. These policy guidelines for inter 
institutional organisation and mobilization are generally absent in Ghana and this usually 
result in programme duplication. Thus, the lack of institutional coordination has 
contributed to the continuous decline in the standards of institutional effectiveness and 
efficiency in development policy implementation for example. This shows that 
managerial performance in Ghana has been inadequate. 
These problems have caused PSIs inability to negotiate effectively with donor agencies 
on policy interventions, as was the case with the SAP-ERP. For these reasons, Bade 
Animode (1993) has emphasized that the negotiations that take place between the World 
Bank- International Monetary Fund (IMF) and African governments are negotiations 
between unequal partners. He argues that programmes like SAP come as impositions 
rather than negotiations because instructions are sent down from Washington as 
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conditions for aid to African countries'. The South Commission (1990: 2) also adds in 
support of the above arguments that the perceptions and policies of governments of the 
North, and multilateral institutions increasingly dictate the development policies of 
countries in the South, like Ghana. However, the intervention policies designed by these 
donor agencies and foreign governments, the continued use of overseas facilities and 
expatriate technical personnel have had unfavourable results on Ghana's development. 
That is, these donor interventions have not been effective at transferring the highly 
refined managerial skills that are so critical to building capacity for development. These 
have perpetrated a system that has kept Ghana dependent on international resources 
including expatriate technical experts to meet her development management needs, rather 
than ensuring that these skills are developed locally. In order to shift this paradigm of 
development, Cochrane (1986: 1) long ago advised that more resources from the donor 
community should be devoted to improving national institutions. This would facilitate 
development policy implementation. But Jaycox (1993a: 3) rejects this idea because 
from his experience, donors design a programme and soon afterwards find a huge 
mismatch between the programme design and the local capacity to implement the 
programme. Jaycox continues that in the hope of alleviating this problem, lots of funds 
and technology assistance are committed to the programme on the assumption that this 
gap will be bridged, but it never is. 
Human Resource Management Problems 
The above problems have added in part to the human resource crisis in Ghana apart from 
the brain drain that started in the 1970's and caused mainly by economic and political 
5Professor Bade Animode is a Nigerian Economist. He made these remarks on a British Channel Four Television 
Network documentary programme called "Out of Africa" in 1993. The import of his argument is that the World 
Bank is an undemocratic institution much as all other institutions inherited from the Bretton Woods system are 
unjust and unfavourable to African economies. He sees policy intervention from these institutions as a political 
programme to re-colonize Africa. 
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conditions in Ghana. This loss of capable professionals in all sectors of the economy 
undermined Ghana's effort at capacity building (Picard et. al. 1994: 25), and also caused a 
practice of filling up vacant positions with less qualified professionals. This has in part 
contributed to the poor management problem in the public sector, which would have 
improved if PSIs had devised a meaningful Human Resource Development (HRD) 
programme to improve skills (The World Bank, 1991: 7). To a great extent this problem 
has not been dealt with comprehensively and it is important for PSIs to have the capacity 
to develop processes and personnel appropriate for development management (Picard et. 
al. 1994: 14). The NDPC (1994: 35) has added that the efforts of Ghana to develop have 
partly been impeded by the lack of skilled human resources and insufficient resources to 
fund massive educational and training programmes. 
As discussed earlier, poor managerial performance has also led to indiscipline in Ghana's 
PSIs. Indiscipline exists on a variety of fronts ranging from absenteeism from work to 
corruption. These lapses have combined with nepotism, gender and tribal exclusions to 
deny PSIs of the quality of human resource required for capacity building and 
consequently for development. Until recently in Ghana, the human resource requirement 
for development was not given any attention as key groups and individuals were often 
excluded in the development process. At issue here is the fact that any developing 
society is one in which many conflicts take place and those societies that succeed in 
moving ahead steadily and smoothly are those in which such conflicts are successfully 
faced and resolved as they occur (Ndegwa et. al. 1987). In Ghana however, such 
conflicts have resulted in exclusions of groups and individuals from the development 
policy process6. The present writer agrees with the observation by Ndegwa et. al. (1987) 
that this has eroded cooperation and support that are fundamental to the development 
This is a country where the weaker side of the countervailing forces is usually marginalized. 
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management process, especially policy implementation. These exclusions tend to impede 
good governance practices because it has compromised openness, transparency and 
accountability as well as the legal and institutional framework for the development 
process. 
The problems discussed so far have made PSIs inefficient at managing national 
development. They show that PSIs capacity to manage development is at its lowest ebb 
and to a large extent, this is the cause of the country's under-development. This 
argument is sustained by such evidence as the break down in planning, the inability to 
relate policy to development needs, the scarcity of appropriate and needed human 
resources for policy analysis and management, and lastly the prevalent problem of staff 
training and retention. Summarily, this evidence suggests that the failure of Ghana to 
achieve the nation's development goals under past programmes such as SAP and ERP I 
& II, is related to poor institutional structures and processes, and inadequate human 
resource base. 
In the light of these problems and past policy failures, the Government of Ghana (GoG) 
in association with the World Bank saw the need to embark on a capacity building 
programme to remove these problems that constrain the public sector in the early 1990s. 
They consequently created the National Institutional Renewal Programme (NIRP) to 
drive the capacity building policy. However, one issue of interest is how the NIRP can 
effectively build public sector capacity to manage the country's development. This is the 
crux of the problem being investigated in this study. 
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1.3 Aims and Purposes of the Study 
The key aim of this study is to provide an understanding as to how the capacity building 
initiative in Ghana's PSIs will enhance the country's development. In order to achieve 
this objective, the study seeks to investigate the nature and extent of the development 
management problems and how these impact Ghana's development. Using the NIRP as a 
case study, the research examines the efficacy of the capacity building programme in 
mitigating these lapses and the programme's impact on Ghana's development. To 
achieve the above goal, and therefore the overall purpose of the study, the under-listed 
objectives are used as guides: 
a. to show that PSIs play a pivotal role in managing Ghana's development. Hence the 
importance of strengthening policy implementation and management capacity in 
PSIS. 
b. to discover the causes of Ghana's underdevelopment and assess whether the TARP 
has adequate strategies to amortize these constraints. 
c. to affirm that Ghana's human resource endowment is the fulcrum for the country's 
development. For this reason, it is important for decision-makers to pay attention to 
skill development in the attempt to build capacity for national development. 
Emphasis is put on the fact that HRD as part of any Institutional Development (ID) 
efforts is vital to a national development policy process. 
d. to re-affirm the need for the donor community to function effectively in 
complimenting the efforts of local institutions in managing Ghana's development as 
well as the capacity building programme with emphasis on facilitating indigenous 
participation and ownership. 
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1.4 Operational Definition of Terms 
Most of the terms and concepts used in this study are defined as they are introduced in 
the chapters. However, the exceptions below have been made to set the frame for 
understanding subsequent chapters. 
1. Development Management 
Development Management in this study refers to public sector management of the 
development policy process. The development management process involves such 
activities as planning, policy formulation and implementation as well as monitoring and 
evaluation. The development management system on the other hand refers to the 
framework within which these tasks are harnessed. 
2. Institutions 
The concept of institutions in the current study encompasses public organizations at the 
country level. These include public units such as Ministries, Departments and 
Implementing agencies (MDAs). These are public policy management units that are also 
responsible for development policy analysis. 
3. Sustainable Development 
The concept of sustainable development refers to the kind of development that persists 
over time and also based on the aspirations of the society. The meaning in the context of 
this study has nothing to do with ecology or environment as the concept defined by the 
United Nations. 
4. Structural Inefficiencies 
This refers to the distorted procedures, processes, governance framework, legislative 
framework, statutes, values and practices in PSIs. This does not refer to physical 
structures like office buildings but rather the way of doing things in the public sector. 
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5. Insufficient Level of Skills 
This is the inadequate manpower requirement for the development management process. 
It encompasses the lack of education and training, brain drain, professional practices and 
the practice of rejecting postings to remote regions. 
6. Governance 
Governance refers to the exercise of legal authority to manage national affairs, for 
example the development process. The concept does not necessarily mean governing or 
government. It centers on the legal framework for mobilising human and material 






Perceptions and Practices of Capacity 
Building for Development 
2.1 Introduction 
To expand the research question and relate it to the research methods, the present writer 
explores the welter of literature that exists on the subject of development management. 
There is a pool of constantly emerging theories on the fledgling discipline of capacity 
building with emphasis on ID as an aide to the development management process. There 
has also been a lot of debate both within and outside the development community on 
donor-sponsored capacity building programmes in developing countries. The debates 
concern the form and nature of the capacity building process, the role of international 
development agencies (IDAs) in the process as well as whose capacity these agencies are 
committed to building. The debates are attempts to put institutional processes and the 
human resource endowment of developing countries in an analytical perspective to 
determine the panacea to Third World development management inefficiencies. 
Adamolekun (1990: 5) has explained that IDA's are committed to these efforts because 
"institutional weakness... constitutes a roadblock to development in developing countries". 
This problem of institutional weakness according to Adedeji (1991) and Adamolekun 
(1990) is very severe in sub-Saharan Africa. However, the monolithic manner in which 
capacity building programmes are conceived and devised has engendered debates that 
question the actual objectives of these programmes. That is, are these policy interventions 
tailored to address country-specific institutional bottlenecks? Secondly, is the design 
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intended to build the capacity needed to manage local development? Mutahaba and 
Bologun (1992: 55) have argued that ID and for that matter capacity building perspective in 
development management has not yet received the attention it deserves. 
This chapter essentially discusses the theory, practices and perceptions of the role of PSIs 
in development management and why it is important to build public sector capacity through 
ID programmes to manage development. In order to develop detailed research questions, 
the chapter is divided into six sections. The first section introduces the theme of the 
chapter discussions. Section two discusses the concepts and theories of development 
management. This discussion links up with a discourse on theories of building capacity 
through ID in part three. Section four looks at the urgency of making institutions effective 
in the ID process and part five discusses the role of IDAs in Third World capacity building 
programmes as well as the rationale for their involvement. The last section summarizes the 
main arguments in the chapter. 
2.2 Dynamics of Development Management 
Development management involves the practices of development planning and 
development policy analysis. Griffin et. al. (1987: 185) holds a view that the dynamics of 
the concept of states convey an idea that development management is one of the most 
important and fundamental functions of states. Wuyts et. al. (1995) support this position 
and argue that the subject of "development" was enacted on the assumption that the state 
will act as the main lever for bringing about development. This has far reaching 
implications for the relationship between the state and society where the state has the 
responsibility to bring about development, and the civil society is required to offer its 
services to the state to make development possible. The underpinning assumption of these 
two positions is that no country can be managed effectively without a responsive and 
efficient machinery of government that is manned by well-trained and motivated men and 
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women. Winkler (1996: 3) also argues that much of the development management 
activities require a strong and efficient state role. This is the economic nationalist argument 
that conveys the idea that the state is required to provide leadership in national 
development. 
White (1995: 27) has said however that the 1980s saw the rise of a new orthodoxy about 
the developmental role of the state that criticised the developmental states of the post- 
colonial era for excessive economic dirigisme and advocated for a reduction in the role of 
the state. It also emphasised freeing up markets and private enterprise along neo-liberal 
lines. This criticism according to White extended to political dirigisme in the 1990s, which 
shifted the emphasis to the rise of another orthodoxy that focused on the developmental 
role of political regimes. This new orthodoxy emphasised the developmental deficiencies 
of authoritarian regimes. According to White's perspective, by mid-1990's, these two 
critiques converged into a comprehensive strategic vision of both political and economic 
probity. This strategic vision emphasised that development can best be promoted through a 
`market-friendly' state that is presided over predominantly by capitalist economy in a 
liberal democratic polity. This is the neo-liberal persuasion and it provides a different 
perspective to the developmental role of the state by challenging the idea that development 
should be led by governments (see Hettne, 1995; Commins, 1988: 2). 
Kaul (1996: 132) agrees with White on the position that government' role in the planning 
and management of development has in recent years undergone fundamental re- 
assessment. He advances the neo-liberal argument by stressing that the over-riding concern 
with economic growth has led to a refocusing and narrowing of government institutions 
and responsibilities. For this reason, Kaul (1997: 14) continues that most countries now 
seek models of government that avoid the errors of central and corporate planning 
approaches because they have recognised the need to make changes in the functions of the 
state as a route towards better development. He argues that this has caused the role of 
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government to change from acting as the principal vehicle of development to a guardian 
and facilitator of development - what is now called providing an enabling environment for 
development. The neo-liberal view puts emphasis on private sector leadership because this 
will better serve the purpose of promoting development (Wuyts et. al., 1995). The view is 
also based on the idea that the activities of modern governments have become so diverse, 
complex and big in scope the world over, that even in small states, government business 
cannot be conducted through the use of monolithic organizations (AAPAM, 1984: 129). 
Hence, this perspective calls for a rapid decrease in the role of the state in development 
management. 
It is however important to put developing countries' socio-cultural circumstances into 
perspective before making any judgment on these two views, because the socio-cultural 
environment is critical to a nation's development path. The social structures of some Third 
World Countries do not permit the state to leave the responsibility of development 
management to the private sector. A United Nations (UN) report (United Nations, 1981: 
12) has argued that in spite the two views discussed so far, and in view of the socio-cultural 
factors in developing countries, the state has the responsibility to provide the blueprint for 
the development process. Thus from the point of view of the current writer, the private 
sector in most developing countries is not well developed and therefore not dynamic. 
Hence the private sector cannot be entrusted with the responsibility of leading national 
development. In most of these countries, the state has also not laid down any effective 
framework to delegate this role to the private sector. This has necessitated the state's role 
in managing development. Accordingly, the GoG has argued that even in a liberalised 
economy, the government does not have to do withdraw completely from economic 
activities because it has a catalytic role to play in national development (MESW, 1996: 15). 
For the state to perform this role effectively however, it requires its institutions to act as 
agents of development and to be responsible for development policy analysis including 
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planning and implementation. According to Evans et. al. (1985: 50), this is achieved 
through Max Weber's bureaucratic organization because it is the most effective way by 
which states organize massive development administration activities. The view may be 
challenged because Weber's management model is intrinsically `top-down' and it is argued 
that this model characteristically stifles initiative (see Grindle et. al. 1991). Besides, this 
model of management has been criticised as one of the factors that contribute to the 
distortions in development management. 
The discussion so far has shown the critical role of the state in the development 
management process and it provides the rationale for the role of PSIs as agents of the state 
in the development process. This is the core of the research question and it is discussed in 
details below. 
2.2.1 Role of State Institutions in Development Management 
PSIs act as agents of the state in the development management process. Hence, these 
institutions are responsible for planning and implementing development policies. This is 
the basis for McGill's (1997) argument that institutions are the conduit of policy analysis, 
and therefore they are fundamental to the development management process. One 
important requirement for PSIs to fulfill this task effectively is for the various institutions 
to be responsible for specific tasks in the development management process. Thus, there 
must be functional differentiation of roles for specific institutions. 
Ndegwa et. al. (1987) have added that in the overall inter-relationship between the state and 
management of the development process, political leaders must assume the role of 
managers with the responsibility of overseeing and making decisions regarding the 
development of the society. In view of the fact that development management is an on- 
going managerial process, the management team must be efficient at responding to 
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emerging situations spontaneously to enhance rapid development. Ndegwa et. al (1987) 
and Sandhu et. al (1989) have added that public servants who also form part of the state 
management team support the government's role of coordinating the focus of development. 
They claim that a crucial indicator of efficiency and effectiveness of the development 
management process is the level of interactions and working relations between the state and 
public servants - where confidence is maintained in one another. Together, the state and 
public servants are required to create the requisite state machinery for managing the 
development process, and an enabling environment for people-centered development 
(Ndegwa et. al., 1987; Hill, 1997; and Evans et. a., 1995). Thus, the process must create an 
atmosphere of participation by the masses. 
Ndegwa et. al. (1987) continue that in managing development, state institutions must act as 
providers, facilitators and partners of other development agents. These functions show 
state institutions as the bastion for the development management process, and they enjoin 
these institutions to facilitate development delivery, create the enabling environment for 
private sector participation and collaborate with donor agencies. 
Cavanagh et. al. (1994: 9) however provide a caution regarding this view of development 
management. Their argument is that state institutions should not be seen as a panacea to 
development problems. They rather advocate for a perpetual vibrancy of community 
organisations to be central to development management in order to make development 
sustainable. The current writer however holds a view that, it is important for the 
governments to play the important role of facilitating the transfer of development initiatives 
into a national reality and therefore state institutions are needed to mobilise these 
community organisations. Cavanagh et. al. (1994: 9) agree that state institutions can 
perform this task by: helping to build up an economic infrastructure and an internal market; 
creating a network of social services; and setting the rules for the country's integration into 
the world economy. Cavanagh et. al. (1994) draw on lessons from South Korean and 
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Taiwanese experiences, which indicate that governments should not be taken out of 
economic development. They argue that strong government standing above vested interests 
is essential to create the social and political infrastructure for development. That is, strong 
public institutions are needed to create a dynamic private sector. This is especially urgent 
in developing countries where the state cannot delegate this function to the private sector 
due to the exploitative nature of the sector and where the sector is not well developed to 
lead the development process. But Ndegwa et. al. (1987) have also added that due to self- 
interest and the consequent conflicts in the state, public institutions are needed to play a 
coordinating and balancing role. These two perspectives emphasise that development 
management should not be abdicated to the private sector and other interests to manipulate 
it. However, this characterization of the private sector as a self-seeking and conflict-prone 
and therefore incapable of providing leadership to the development process is contentious 
because the public sector cannot be absolved from this characterization either. PSIs in 
developing countries are equally self-seeking and are prone to conflicts as the data in 
chapter 5 will reveal. The self-seeking and conflict-ridden nature of Ghana's PSIs has been 
the cause of policy coordination problems in the country's development. Ndegwa et. al. 
may have recognised this fact and therefore have suggested that the supervision of PSIs by 
senior political managers must be made a condition to ensure probity, accountability and 
efficiency in the operations of these institutions (Ndegwa et. al., 1987: 33-6). 
Ndegwa et. al. have also suggested the use of PSIs to carry out some defined development 
tasks and have shown what should constitute an appropriate balance between public sector 
and private sector responsibilities. Their argument is that for the state to accomplish its 
development objectives, it must develop an appropriate mix of public-private involvement 
to reflect the forces and influences that are capable of effecting change in the society. 
Cavanagh et al. (1994) support this position by emphasising that without effective 
government institutions in South Korea that stood against the policies of international 
agencies and big business interest, the foundation of heavy and high-tech industries for 
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world-class high value-added commodities would never have been laid. Ndegwa et. 
al. (1987) therefore assign the responsibility for articulating the operational concept of 
development to PSIs, and a facilitating climate for private sector operations to the 
government (Ndegwa et. al., 1987: 15-16). The current researcher holds the view that 
government must extend this to define an operational framework for the voluntary sector 
and IDAs to operate. 
This responsibility of the government requires efficiency and strong ethical practices in 
PSIs management of the development process. The state must also have the capacity to 
define clearly what the national development policy objectives are. This will enable PSIs 
to undertake their programmes in such a manner to bring coherence and fulfill the national 
objectives (Ndegwa et. al., 1987). Thus, the research seeks to show that PSIs have 
identifiable roles to play in managing development and these must compliment one 
another. Secondly, this research intends to emphasise that the state has a responsibility also 
to create an enabling environment for other sectors and community organisations to pursue 
productive activities because these are the productive agents in the development process. 
The arguments advanced thus far on the importance of PSIs in the development 
management process forms an element of the broad question being investigated in this 
research. This is stated in 4.2 (i) as "PSIs play an important role in managing the national 
development process. How have these institutions performed this role, and within the 
framework of the NIRP, how are they required to function in the overall national 
development environment? " 
2.2.2 Good Governance Practices for Development Management 
Brautigam's (1991: 1) idea that the exercise of power and authority lies at the heart of 
governance emphasizes the current researcher's contention that governments use their 
power and authority to establish and maintain institutional framework for development 
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management. This also enables the state to enforce the laws on accountability, 
transparency and probity in the development management process. The institutional 
framework also enables governments to interact with the citizens to determine the 
preconditions for a thriving or declining development. These assumptions suggest that the 
imperatives of good governance, such as openness, transparency, accountability and best 
practices for policy analysis that are needed for accelerated development hinges on the 
good and effective use of power and authority. This suggest that corruption and other mal 
practices that associate the development management process in developing countries are a 
product of bad governance through ineffective use of power and authority. Sandhu et. al. 
(1981) best illustrates this position by stating that in Singapore the state has since 
independence adopted good governance practices that are advanced through the effective 
use of power and authority. This has made effective the rule of law in Singapore. This 
practice according to Sandhu et. al. 's argument has unleashed a disciplined workforce with 
best practices for development management. According to their argument, systemic 
indiscipline is non-existent in Singapore and this has facilitated the efficient working of 
institutions and the development environment it serves. The above illustrates the argument 
that institutional practices for development management is made effective partly by laying 
the foundation for effective rule of law. Thus, the rule of law in any country is vital to the 
country's development management process. The imperatives of good governance are 
generated into a research question in 4.2 (ii). The question seeks to explore how Ghana 
intends to address such good governance values that are currently non-existent, to enhance 
the development management process. 
In Ghana, the distortions in the legislative processes have created managerial problems for 
the country's development. But Ramphal (1979) has declared that development is all 
management and therefore good public management is vital to development. He shows 
that if other pre-requisites are present to a sufficient degree, and if public management is 
generally good, then there will be developmental progress. However, if these other pre- 
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requisites are present but public management is poor, there will be less progress and 
perhaps none at a117. Hence the World Bank (1982) has stressed the need for PSIs to build 
capacity for development policy management. In Ghana, public sector management of the 
development process has been inadequate due to lack of innovation, dynamism, and the 
failure to mobilize the available material and human resources to manage development 
efficiently. Consequently, ineptitude such as over-regulation, the lack of public 
accountability, and over-centralization has impeded the development management process 
in Ghana. These have in turn acted as catalysts for corruption, cultural and human resource 
management distortions, and exclusions in Ghana's PSIs. 
a. Corruption 
Stevens and Gnanaselvam (1995: 102) have argued that the poor development performance 
of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is linked to corruption. Their argument suggests that in 
order to make the development policy processes effective, it is important to eliminate 
corruption because it breeds inefficiency. Gould et. al. (1983) and Rose-Ackerman (1996a) 
have argued that the evidence for corruption is seen in increases in the cost of goods and 
services, the promotion of unproductive investments and the decline in the quality of public 
services. According to this perspective, any nation with this background will perform 
poorly at development except the situation is intervened. This underpins the need for 
Ghana to build its public sector capacity to eliminate lapses like corruption. This will 
consequently lead to an increased national capacity for development. This argument is 
captured as an element of the research question in chapter four and it stresses the negative 
impact of institutional ineptitude on development management. 
This is an idea from the valedictory address by the Commonwealth secretary-general at the 18`h World Management 
Congress held in New Delhi on 8 December 1978. 
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When lapses like corruption become institutionalised as it is in the case of Ghana, it renders 
the development management system fragile and incapable of handling the development 
process. PSIs then perform poorly because the laws governing the development process 
are weak. These institutions will then lose the chemistry for development management. 
This accounts partly for the contradictions in the development processes in most 
developing countries. 
Figure 2-1 
A development model of the national integrity system 




It then becomes imperative for countries engulfed in corruption but who also want to 
develop to establish a development model of a national integrity system that will seek to 
make corruption a high-risk and low-return venture. Stapenhurst et. al. (1997) have noted 
that such approach will seek to change systems rather than concentrating on individual 
officials. Stapenhurst has identified eight pillars of a typical national integrity system. 
They recount these as public sector anti-corruption agencies; public participation in 
democratic process; public awareness of the role of civil society; accountability of the 
judicial process; the media; the private sector and international co-operation. Find in 
figure 2-1 (above) a development model of national integrity system that is an 
improvement on Stapenhurst and Langseth's eight pillars of national integrity system (see 
Stapenhurst et. al., 1997: 319). 
In figure 2-1 the national integrity system provides the platform for effective development 
management and consequently the medium through which development is sustained. The 
figure also shows that this assumption is upheld by the rule of law whereas the national 
integrity system itself is upheld by nine pillars, namely: the people, administrative 
efficiency, watchdog agencies, legislature, the media, judiciary, and institutions from the 
public-, private- and voluntary sectors. The figure also shows a mutual support 
mechanism between the rule of law and the national integrity system because in Third 
World societies, individuals wielding the force of the gun can hijack the rule of law. This 
is therefore necessary to enable public officials deliver their responsibilities without any 
fear of intimidation. 
b. Cultural Distortions 
Development in any country is sustained by the country's cultures. This is because culture 
is a major determinant a nation's values. To ensure maximum effectiveness of PSIs' role in 
the development management process, the state must generate among its citizens, 
consensus on a set of dominant values covering all areas of development discourse. Such 
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dominant values may include national integrity systems that will seek to eliminate 
undesirable practices like corruption, discrimination and nepotism that are inimical to 
development. A development process require a set of rules, an ideology to justify these 
rules, and a conscience in the citizens which makes them strive to carry out these rules. 
These result in legitimacy and support for development programmes and the stronger the 
appeal, the greater the support for the programme. Culture provides the framework for this 
conscience in the citizens and an institutional base for the development process to continue 
even when there is a change in government. The cultural imperative of the development 
process reflects the research question (see 4.2 (vii)) that seeks to explore Ghana's strategy 
for eliminating the cultural problems that have set the development clock back. 
c. Manpower Development 
The quality of a nation's human resource endowment is a vital element in the development 
management process. This assumption is emphasised by Nancy Baster (1972: 96) who in 
her Technological-education model of development has associated technical knowledge 
and skills with development. Her argument is that the human resource endowment of the 
nation is made efficient through education and training. She continues that apart from 
imparting knowledge, education is also instrumental in the development process through 
other intervening variables such as the inculcation of national values, national consensus 
and higher levels of homogeneity in the population (Baster, 1972: 141). Baster's argument 
emphasizes the usefulness of education and training to the development management 
process. Where these are lacking, the nation may be forced to trade up its competitiveness 
and import skilled labour from other countries. This practice will eventually work against 
the development of the importing nation. Currently, most countries have learnt from the 
mistakes of the United States and will in fact attempt to hold back the economy of the host 
country by transferring limited expertise (to the local partners in the host country). For 
example, Japan is determined not to repeat the American mistake. For this reason Japanese 
companies transfer strictly limited expertise to their local partners in Thailand, Malaysia 
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and Indonesia to forestall the sort of competitive backlash that Japan unleashed on 
American industries after its post-war acquisition of American technology8. Consequently, 
countries that are currently supplying developing countries with their experts will in certain 
terms adopt this strategy. The current writer therefore contends that it is imperative for 
developing countries to develop its own needed human resource to avoid any attempts to 
hold back their economies through the importation of expatriate skills. Kamoche (1997) 
endorses the above argument by stressing that the practice of developing expertise from a 
nation's human resources endowment plays an indisputable role in the efficient running of 
institutions and consequently on development management. 
This position is very well illustrated by the human-capital theory that sees education and 
training as social welfare improvement and an investment that contributes to future 
development by improving the quality of labour (Sandhu et. al., 1989: 172). This theory 
enjoins states and its institutions to invest in personnel training and development to 
engender such skills and expertise that are best suited for making institutions effective at 
development management. The current writer argues that this require an educational 
system that would serve national development needs, rather than one that is modeled on 
foreign systems, otherwise the investment will not reap its full benefits. The current writer 
has observed that in most developing countries, a counter theory that see such investment 
in education as a consumption good underpins the national policy on education and 
training. The consumption good theory holds the view that the cost of making such an 
investment will undermine economic growth because it competes directly with productive 
investments for scarce resources. Consequently, most developing countries have cut 
subsidy on education. This has resulted in a poor and unfavourable educational system 
with grave implications for manpower development. These two perspectives are reflected 
in a World Bank view, which maintains that education must be considered as an investment 
8After World War II, America made Japan benefit from its technology to re-build the Japanese economy. From the 
1970s however, Japan developed its industries to a level of competitiveness to American industries. 
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consumption good (The World Bank, 1982). The World Bank's argument suggests that 
educational cost must be balanced against potential private and social benefits and has 
therefore recommended to Third World governments to cut subsidy on education. It is 
important however for developing countries to re-consider these educational policies to 
enhance their manpower development efforts. This review must subject the policies to 
proper cost-benefit analysis and to evolve an educational system that is responsive to 
national needs. The reason being that without laying the appropriate foundation for 
training and education, IDAs and donor governments will continue to supply developing 
countries with expatriate experts to the detriment of the host country's development. The 
present writer makes a point here that in order to make manpower development 
comprehensive, training and education must go together with better working conditions 
else, the training programme may be frustrated by brain drain problems. These human 
resource problems that underpin the development management process constitute one of 
the questions that this study seeks to explore (see 4.2 (iv)). The question indicates that the 
human resource crisis in Ghana has had a negative impact on the development management 
process. The study therefore sets out to investigate how these problems are being 
addressed in the capacity building programme. 
d. Inclusion 
The concept of managing diversity at the workplace recognizes the fact that the 
workforce usually consists of a diverse population of people. Diversity itself entails 
visible differences which includes factors such as gender and class differences. 
McDougall (1996: 64) has said that harnessing these differences will create a productive 
environment in which everybody feels valued, where their talents will be fully utilized 
and organizational goals will be met. A lot has been said in the literature about the 
exclusion of women in the development process. Schuurman (1993) has observed that 
women need to be integrated into the development process because the role played by 
women in society is an important element in the process. Schuurman's argument calls 
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for equal representation of women in all areas of a nation's development. But Moser 
(1989) sees this equity approach as problematic to development management. His 
argument is that gender issues in the context of development management must involve 
enhancing opportunities for women to play their expected role in development 
management alongside their male counterparts rather than a strict adherence to the 
equality approach. Secondly, the strict adherence to equality will require increased 
education and training for women which may take a little while to be achieved and would 
not necessarily mean that equal women and men must be educated. According to the 
present writer, this is not demographically possible. 
There also exist groups of classes in developing countries with varying interests that often 
lead to conflicts in the development process. Coordination of these interests in a manner to 
enhance support for the achievement of the national development objectives is vital for 
sustained development. In Ghana for example, the growth and maturation of participatory 
development management and effective support institutions have been inadequate and 
these have had an enormous setback on the country's development. The building and 
maturation of participatory structures and effective support institutions must be accorded 
with urgency in the development management process. This inclusion problem is captured 
as a research question in 4.2 (iii) and (viii). These questions seek to explore how diversity 
issues are being addressed under the capacity building programme. Secondly, the study 
seeks to investigate how sectional interests are being managed in the new development 
management system in Ghana. 
2.3 Capacity Building Programme: Key to Effective 
Development Management 
The discussion in this section relates to the second part of the broad research question 
regarding the NIRP's impact on Ghana's development process which is re-stated as ".... In 
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what way can the NIRP mitigate these lapses to ensure a sustainable national 
development? " Dia (1996: 25) has stressed on the urgency of capacity building to the 
development management process and remarks that capacity building is no longer an issue 
of controversy to development. Lisk (1996: 153) and Dia (1996: 25) have argued that the 
importance of capacity building is related to the ability to manage the development process 
including policy analysis in order to attain the development objectives. According to Lisk, 
building capacity for development refers to a comprehensive process involving the ability 
to identify constraints and to plan and manage development. The process of attaining the 
above objectives usually involves the development of human resources, institutions and a 
supportive policy environment. The present writer holds a view that Lisk's description will 
also require existing capabilities and resources to be improved upon, and it is important to 
use these efficiently in the development management process. 
Lisk (1996: 54) has noted however that the issue of capacity building has more recently 
been the focus of attention by the international community. This is why Jaycox (1993a) 
has described capacity building as the missing link in Africa's development. Lisk adds that 
the United Nations' agencies spearheaded by the UNDP have been active in promoting 
capacity building as a major requirement for attaining sustainable development. This 
action coincided with the introduction of the programme approach to development by the 
UNDP. This UN idea emphasizes the centrality of national development programmes as 
the hub for integrating UN technical assistance activities with national efforts. The UN 
approach according to Lisk, also emphasizes the use of national skills in the development 
process. This approach suggests that the overall responsibility for managing UN supported 
development activities and accountability remained with the government and other state 
institutions that are the beneficiaries of these programmes. Lisk turns to the World Bank's 
activities in capacity building and argues that the Bank's interest in capacity building 
across Africa is more closely linked to the need to develop administrative and technical 
capacity at the national level for policy analysis and development management. 
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Definitions 
The capacity building-development management linkage as discussed above has been the 
basis for Berg's (1993: 58) definition of capacity building as "the practice of strengthening 
sustainable indigenous capacity to manage economic change and growth". Morgan (1993) 
has also defined capacity building as "the ability of individuals, groups, institutions, 
organisations and societies to identify and meet development challenges over time". 
Morgan's definition suggests that it is not enough to only acquire the capability to manage 
development but it is equally important to equip institutions with the capability to 
anticipate what problems are likely to come up in the development management process. 
However, Morgan's definition is time bound and this puts some limitations on the essence 
of capacity building. That is, it may be argued that capacity building is also a process that 
continually improves the capabilities of individuals, groups, organisations and societies to 
manage the national development process. Mentz (1997: 13) calls such a process a 
sustainable development process. Mentz has argued that the size, scope and performance 
scale of the entire development management system, that is both output and input systems, 
must be included in any definition of capacity building and this must be related also to the 
efficient implementation of development policy. Mentz continues that capacity building 
refers also to rationality in the sense of exercising reason and sober judgments in the 
development management process. This view of capacity building is close to the Weberian 
concept of bureaucracy, which is an unpopular concept in development administration (see 
Peters, 1995). A more comprehensive definition of the concept is provided by the 
Economic Commission of Africa (ECA) in a framework document submitted to its 1994 
conference of Ministers. The ECA's definition identifies three broad areas of capacity 
building as the human, institutional and infrastructural development. A number of 
problems however associate this definition and these relates to the absence of any fine 
distinctions between specific policy objectives and the capacities needed to attain them, or 
between factors which promote these objectives and those which impede capacities in any 
given area. 
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Some other perceptions focus the concept on skill development. Cohen (1993: 26) has said 
that 
"capacity building seeks to strengthen targeted human resources (for example, managerial, 
professional and technical) in particular institutions and to provide those institutions with 
the means whereby these resources can be marshaled and sustained effectively to perform 
planning, policy formulation and implementation tasks through government on any priority 
topic". 
He remarks that the capacity building process is problem solving in orientation. This 
definition however overlooks the urgency of building the capacity of other public servants 
that are equally needed to ensure continuity and institutional learning. Besides, these 
personnel can also upgrade their skills to reach managerial level and that is the basis for 
experience. In fact, this is the reservoir from which senior officers are drawn and the 
process of upgrading skills constitutes a part of the essence of capacity building. 
Hiderbrand and Grindle (1994) who see capacity building as "the ability to perform 
appropriate tasks effectively and efficiently" discuss this shortfall in Cohen's perception. 
This definition is broad enough to involve all categories of personnel whose skills are 
required to manage the development process. Bologun (1997: 78) perceives capacity 
building beyond HRD. His definition of capacity building also takes into consideration the 
material, financial and organisational resource development and argues that these are 
essential for the successful management of the development process. Bologun argues that 
capacity building Excludes the development of skills that are either not relevant or not 
properly harnessed. 
Elements of Capacity Building 
A number of theorists have attempted to categorize the concept of capacity building on the 
basis of specific activity or task for which the capacity is needed, and this determines what 
these theorists see as the elements of capacity building. Dia (1996: 27) has discussed the 
idea of increasing the supply of skills and transferring new technology, methods and 
systems to institutions. He calls this process technical capacity building. Dia's perspective 
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may be equated to training, education and technical assistance that complements local 
efforts in the development process. He however distinguishes technical capacity building 
which he see as the supply side of capacity building from institutional capacity building 
which he describes as the demand side of capacity building. Institutional capacity building 
according to Dia's argument focuses on the ability of a country to make optimal use of the 
existing technical capacity and resources in a sustainable fashion. 
Mentz (1997: 11-15) has identified two layers of capacity building, which he calls personal 
capacity and non personal capacity. He says that personal capacity has to do with people 
in the sense that people staff institutions and it is their innate capacities which ultimately 
determines service delivery and the general performance of institutions at development 
management. Mentz stresses that the non-personal capacity is the framework for managing 
the capacity building process and this provides the context in which personal capacity is 
developed. Batnargar et. al. (1992: 112) also adds another dimension to the capacity 
building discourse by identifying 'group capacity'. They argue that group capacity may be 
divided into internal capacity and external capacity. They describe internal capacity as 
learning how to manage resources collectively. The external dimension is learning how to 
negotiate with and make claims on other agencies. 
Morgan (1993) has outlined what he see as the main elements of capacity building as: 
wider and holistic, a contribution to the institutional environment, related to HRD and 
training, a response to some of the major development theories, a sustained activity over a 
longer period of time, beyond administrative techniques and project implementation, and 
accelerating interaction between organisations and their environment. Loubser (1993) has 
also argued that any capacity building programme must: 
i. have specific objectives that deals with vision, values, policies, strategies and 
interests, 
38 
ii. emphasize variables such as will (that is the motivation and drive), energy, 
concentration, work ethics to attain efficiency, 
iii. possess capabilities like intelligence, skills, knowledge and mental sets, 
iv. have basic resources including human, material, technological, cultural and 
financial resources, and 
v. have a framework of activity schedule. Such a framework must include planning, 
designing, sequencing and mobilizing. 
Loubser's views on what constitutes the elements of capacity building differ fundamentally 
from Mentz's. However, both views are very important because the relevance of each 
position depends on the context for building the capacity in question. This shows that 
definitions and classifications of the concept of capacity building are determined by the 
development challenge for which the capacity is being sought. Bologun has noted that 
until an operational meaning is given to the concept of development and precisely what 
kind of capacity is needed to ensure development, nations cannot respond meaningfully to 
the analytical and practical problems encountered in the process of formulating, managing 
and reforming development policies. 
Conditions for Successful Capacity Building Programmes 
In order however to make capacity building effective at dealing with development 
challenges, certain minimum conditions must be achieved. Bologun (1997) has identified 
these minimum conditions as: 
a. the strength of political institutions and their ability to formulate and sustain the 
capacity building programme 
b. the commitment of policy makers to national capacity building as reflected in their 
readiness to support capacity building programmes and user institutions, and to 
overcome internal and external resistance to change. 
c. the credibility of formal capacity building institutions and their effectiveness in 
undertaking policy analysis, institution building, ID, and HRD activities. 
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d. the preparedness of agencies in PSIs and the private sector (formal and informal) to 
implement innovative management initiatives, and 
e. the extent to which a culture of accountability, efficiency and responsiveness can be 
developed in place of patrimonial and rent-seeking tendencies frequently 
encountered at different levels of officialdom. 
These managerial issues form the background to one of the questions under investigation in 
this study (see 4.2 (v)). The question acknowledges the retrogressive impact of managerial 
performance on the development management in Ghana and therefore seeks to explore the 
NIRP's strategies for addressing these managerial problems. 
Institutional Development: A Jewel in the Crown 
Lisk (1996) has stressed that capacity building is different from ID but identifies ID as a 
part of the capacity building process. Berg (1993: 62-3) has added that capacity building as 
defined above is broader than ID because capacity building involves all types of skill 
development and procedural reforms that extend beyond the boundaries of a single 
institution and one development programme. This suggests that capacity building involves 
a number of activities including ID. According to Berg, the skill upgrading component 
includes general education, on the job-training, and professional deepening in crosscutting 
skills such as accounting, policy analysis and information technology. The procedural 
improvement on the other hand refers to functional changes or system reforms such as 
introduction of new budgeting arrangement or replacements of ex ante controls over public 
enterprise by greater autonomy and ex post supervision. Both Lisk and Berg emphasize 
however that the concept of ID focuses on particular or selected institutions and the process 
involves the development of the human and material resources, organisational management 
and administrative capacities of these selected institutions. This study explores how these 
ID imperatives are being applied to Ghana's capacity building programme under the NIRP. 
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Berg (1993: 62-3) has argued that capacity building is less comprehensive than ID as 
broadly defined because capacity building excludes the specific goals of changing social 
norms and creating societal support for capacity-creating changes. Thus according to 
Berg's argument, ID has a much deeper and more complex objective. The present writer 
however contends Berg's argument on the grounds that his assumptions are based on the 
context of his analysis and cannot represent all capacity building situations. For example, 
if country x decides to build a capacity for human resources, this capacity building policy 
may require specific goals like changing the existing social norms and practices. The study 
therefore seeks to investigate which specific norms and practices Ghana is seeking to 
change under the capacity building programme. 
2.3.1 Institutional Development and the Development Process 
More (1995: 90-91) has remarked that a large academic literature exists on the subject of 
ID but the positions taken on the subject by the various writers are fundamentally 
divergent. These disagreements according to More, dates as far back as the 1950s when the 
subject was first debated. Berg (1993: 60) has also pointed out that there has been no 
general consensus on the exact meaning of ID despite the numerous and complex literature 
on the subject. He argues however that there is a modicum of agreement on certain 
fundamental ideas on the subject. Berg's (1993: 61) idea on the subject is that, ID means 
more than just structural or functional changes in institution. According to this perspective, 
ID involves fundamental social change, and the transformation of patterns of behaviour that 
are specific to the institution. He argues that ID is a much more profound process than 
organizational development. The assumption is that ID seeks to improve significantly, the 
outputs and impacts of institutions concerned with development management, public 
administration (including project management), enterprise development etc. in both public 
and private sectors (see Lisk 1996: 53). The current study therefore seeks to explore the 
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strategies being used by the NIRP to improve the outputs and impacts being made by 
Ghana's PSIs on the nation's development. 
North (1993: 3) and Adamolekun (1990) have argued that the dictates of economic theory 
and cliometric history underpin the need to promote the awareness of and to appreciate the 
role of institutions in development management. For this reason, North calls for an 
analytical framework to integrate institutional issues into the development discourse. The 
UNDP (1989: 35) has also shown the urgency of this analytical framework by pointing out 
that the ID components of many of its programmes were ignored or sometimes dealt with 
superficially. These, according to Commins (1988: 41) normally cause a number of 
setbacks to the management of the programmes. The UNDP's perspective attributes the 
institutional gap to programme designs. They show that the ultimate objective at the time 
of designing these programmes was to achieve their technical goals. It was assumed then 
that as a matter of consequence, this would lead to greater institutional capacity. In practice 
however, this expectation was not achieved. According to the UNDP, the lessons 
unleashed by the setbacks to these programme designs have shown that, ID has to be 
judiciously integrated through reforms to make development policies successful. ID and 
for that matter capacity building has therefore remained a very vital imperative of UNDP 
project design and it emphasizes the idea that capacity building is a key determinant in the 
success or failure of development policies (see United Nations, 1972: 37). This 
observation from the UNDP is evidence that ID is an important component in the 
development processes of Third World countries. This evidence emphasizes that efficient 
and dynamic institutions are a sine qua non to the effective management of development. 
Hence, the present writer maintains an opinion that ID programmes must reflect the culture, 
value systems and the institutional needs of individual societies. The present writer argues 
further that ID activities need to focus on providing governments with information base, 
analytical tools and decision points to facilitate the development process. Paul (1990: 2) 
has also identified three major objectives of the ID process. He has listed these as: 
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a. facilitating the development policy implementation, 
b. contributing to the sustainability of the development policy (that is contribution of 
the benefits beyond the programme period), and 
c. supporting the development of sector or sub-sector level institutions and the 
linkages among them. 
These objectives are also emphasised by the UNDP's view on the subject, but Paul's 
perspective does not focus on the entire spectrum of development management. The 
present writer maintains that the ID process should not be limited to the implementation or 
sustainability of specific policies. It must have a broader objective that encompasses the 
efficient management of the entire development process of a nation. The study therefore 
seeks to investigate the scope of the NIRP objectives. 
Elements of ID 
Paul (1990) has outlined what should constitute the basic elements of an ideal ID 
programme. He says that these should consist of institutional restructuring and 
strengthening, building a policy and planning capacity, as well as regulatory and procedural 
reform. The present writer see these elements as necessary but also add that the process 
will require efficient and well-equipped manpower base to make the ID process successful. 
This gap in Paul's argument is discussed by McGill's (1997: 258) revealing emphasis on 
HRD when he defines ID as the act of strengthening the technical capabilities of cadres of 
personnel, both technically and managerially. According to McGill, this is achieved 
through a gambit of training programmes including overseas training for personnel. 
Picard et. al. (1994: 119) have also noted four elements as necessary to the ID process and 
consequently for managing development. According to their perspectives: 
i. the roles for the various institutions and actors must be clearly specified. 
ii. institutions must be provided with adequate resources and training for policy 
analysis. 
43 
iii. processes need to be developed to improve communication among the 
different sector institutions to facilitate policy coordination, and 
iv. appropriate processes must be used to ensure effective monitoring and 
evaluation for timely identification of problems in order to take the appropriate 
remedial action. 
McGill (1997) see the above as inadequate and has argued that the specific nature of ID 
needs to center on five concepts. Blaise (1986), Honandle (1982), Uphoff (1986), 
Brinkerhoff et. al. (1989), and Israel (1987) also endorse these concepts. The ID 
programmes according to their argument must focus on: 
i. the functional role of values in distinguishing institutions from organizations where 
the value of these institutions transcends the immediate tasks. 
ii. making sustainability the test of development. That is, the development process 
must have the capacity through ID to induce a process for self-sustaining activities 
that seek to improve human well being. 
iii. making exploration the key to ID practice because all development initiatives are 
real world experiments. 
iv. making learning an essential aspect to ID such that the feedback mechanism must 
represent an experimental solution. 
v. creating a special unit and making it responsible for institutional effectiveness. 
The third element raises a problem regarding the strategic nature of the ID process. It may 
be argued that the ID process must be approached with a clear set of objectives and goals, 
and with clear strategy for attaining these goals and objectives (Hill, 1997: 99-101; 
Tinbergen, 1964; and Keohane, 1984), what Hill (1993: 35) calls a logical path of policy 
making. 
The World Bank (1993: 4) has also added three aspects of ID that are predominantly 
required to accelerate development. These changes must: 
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a. de-emphasize top-down management for an interactive one. This will shift 
controlled economies to a new model in which the state will guide the growth of the 
economy through indicative planning 
b. emphasize a shift from public-private competition to partnership; and 
c. emphasize decentralization and devolution of responsibilities. 
Berg (1993: 61-2) has outlined seven elements of ID that are somewhat distinct from 
Picard et. al. and McGill's ideas on the concepts. He sees these as: changing the incentive 
structure for individuals and institutions to induce personal and bureaucratic behaviour that 
is responsive to development needs; enhancing skills through training and education; 
strengthening institutional performance; reforming procedures or systems of coordination 
between institutions; increasing financial capabilities (that is, the command over 
resources); nurturing societal support; and cultivating new norms and values like 
abhorrence to corruption, participatory styles of management and delegation of authority. 
These elements constitute the background of the issues being investigated in this research, 
especially in chapter six. 
ID as a Pre-requisite for Effective Development Management 
Cooke (1998) has argued that the distinctive purpose of ID is to achieve good management 
of social and economic development through better institutions. From the present writer's 
point of view, this will require the ID process to equip institutions with the capability to 
emphasise the right thing at the right time to adjust appropriately should circumstances 
change. These are crucial requirements in development management because in the 
development process, it is impossible to do all desirable things concurrently, and the 
inability to adjust to changing circumstances in time often lead to enormous policy 
implementation problems and difficulties. Hyden et. al. (1979: xv) who perceived 
development management as increased differentiation of roles to effectively deal with 
change, inequality in the allocation of society's resources, and enhanced capacity for 
institutional performance supports this argument. They continue that development 
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management implies increased choice and enlarged opportunities in the decision-making 
process. These are however sustained or better performed by building the capacity of 
institutions that have responsibility to carry out these tasks through the ID programmes. 
Most PSIs in developing countries have demonstrated through their inadequate 
performance that they lack the capacity to meet the challenges of their national 
development. This provides the raison de eire for the numerous debates on ID 
programmes in these countries. The most popular ideas on these debates are those used by 
the Inter University Research Programme on Institutional Building Scholars (see Blaise 
1986: 332). This perspective suggests that the ID process involves planning, structuring 
and guidance of new or reconstituted institutions. According to Blaise (1986: 332) 
therefore, the ID process embodies: changes in values, functions, physical and social 
technologies; the establishment, fostering and protection of normative relationships and 
action patterns; and the attainment of support and complementarity in the ID environment. 
The emphasis here is that ID processes encompass the instruments, standards and objects 
for performance. This perception however discounts the quality of human resource 
endowment needed to make the ID process functional and it constitutes a gap, which is 
discussed by Paul (1990), McGill (1997) and Israel (1987). Paul (1990: 7) provides an 
operational checklist for a typical ID programme. His idea on the subject require the ID 
process to incorporate the analysis of manpower inadequacies, including skills; 
coordination problems; gaps in planning, monitoring and evaluation systems; weak local 
capacity; the need to restructure and decentralize institutions; problems of financial 
management that is, cost recovery and support systems, budgetary controls; constraints, 
compensation and incentive structures; and autonomy issues. 
McGill (1997: 26) and Israel (1987: 1) who have explained ID as a process of improving 
the ability of institutions to make effective use of human and financial resources share the 
views above. Horberry et. al. (1991: 385) have also contributed to the perceptions of ID by 
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stressing that its main objective is to create or strengthen the capacity to manage 
development and to develop structures which will strengthen the development 
responsibilities of institutions. Horberry et. al. 's perspective also calls for an ID 
programme that seeks to improve the quality of human resource. This argument shows the 
need for ID programmes to provide incentives for individual and collective action. The 
present writer believes that this view of ID requires a long-term policy process where ID 
programmes are tailored to suit the local political, economic and cultural conditions, but 
these must be preceded by institutional assessment (see Appendix A for a sample analytical 
framework for institutional assessment). Horberry et. al. (1991) has argued that it is 
important to tailor the process to suit local conditions especially in developing countries 
where institutions are unique, complex and deeply traditional. It is inferred from Horberry 
et. al. 's argument that in the final analysis, a wholesale ID programme importation will be 
ineffective at building capacity for development management. This argument is important 
in two ways for the current research. These emphasise harnessing and integrating a nation's 
culture and value systems into mainstream institutional processes for development 
management. The second aspect relates to the origins of the capacity building programme 
in Ghana. These issues put donor agencies and their contribution to the capacity building 
programme in Ghana under a microscopic assessment and this is reflected in the research 
question (see 4.2 (viii)). This question explores how the NIRP is seeking to remove the 
distortions that accompany donor involvement in the capacity building programme in 
particular and the development process in general. 
Conditions for Successful ID Programmes 
Paul (1990: 1-2) has said that the effectiveness of ID is influenced by five factors. These 
include: a macroeconomic policies that provide a positive or enabling conditions for ID 
efforts; the fit between the project and the relevant strategy including the directional 
changes being planned on the institutional front; the responsiveness of the policy to its 
clients that is facilitated either by competition in the environment or by strategies to 
47 
. ý' RSITY 
A ýIt-ýT o eýý.. ew 
mobilise demand for the policy; the capacity of actors to effectively organise their internal 
structure, functions, systems and skills; and adequate resources and leadership to manage 
the programme and create the organisational values and institutional linkages. Paul (1990: 
2) goes on to say that projects that benefit from all of the above factors are likely to 
perform better than those that are affected negatively by the weaknesses in one or more of 
these factors. These factors also influence the ID process over different time frames, 
namely; short, medium and long-term time frames. 
Buyck (1995: 5) has broadened the dimension of the concept by saying that an ID process 
is the creation or reinforcement of the capacity of institutions to generate, allocate and use 
human and financial resources effectively to attain development objectives, public or 
private. McGill (1997) has pointed out that Buyck's perspective includes not only building 
and strengthening institutions but also retrenchment or liquidation of institutions in the 
pursuit of institutional, sectoral, or governmental-wide rationalization of expenditure to 
enhance the development process. Both writers agree however that the flaw in current ID 
practice is the emphasis placed on planning, policy, investment and appraisal without 
regard to policy implementation. Buyck suggests that operationally, the ID process must 
seek to improve and strengthen the following aspects of institutions: internal organizational 
structures; management systems, including monitoring and evaluation; financial 
management (budgeting, accounting, auditing procedures) and planning systems; personnel 
management, staff development and training; inter-institutional relationships; institutional 
structures of sectors and sub-sectors; legal framework; and government regulations and 
procedures (Buyck, 1995: 5). Gray et. al. (1990: 12) have also set some benchmarks that 
converge with Buyck's checklist but they depart on Gray et. al. 's argument that ID means 
more than the mere strengthening of institutions to facilitate policy implementation. 
According to this perspective, ID also means strengthening the: legal and para-legal 
systems; internal organization and distribution of functions; physical and financial capacity 
for project implementation; personnel policies and reward systems; and competency and 
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skills levels in the institutional environment. The study seeks to explore how the NIRP is 
incorporating these ID imperatives in Ghana's capacity building programme. 
The UNDP has also suggested that institution building strategies should tackle key 
functions like applied analytical capabilities, planning and programme design capacities, 
management and implementation capacities as well as monitoring and evaluation capacities 
through standard policy interventions which emphasise changing management strategy. 
The UNDP's perspective advocates for improved management efficiency and 
effectiveness, changing systems and structures, matching programmes to environmental 
demands, and changing management structures (UNDP, 1991: 51-2). The UNDP's 
position can be understood on the basis of their experience in managing particular 
development programmes. The present writer holds a view that the UNDP's argument to 
apply standard policy interventions is contentious for such reasons as variations in the 
cultures, value systems and local circumstances of individual countries. McGill (1997) 
has elaborated on this position by saying that it is not a good practice to prescribe or 
impose a standard model of ID programme in any country. The present writer suggests that 
the practice of applying standard policy interventions is one major reason for policy 
failures in developing countries. This idea is captured by the research question in 4.2 (viii). 
The question seeks to investigate how the NIRP intends to remove this donor practice and 
how this practice affects the NIRP itself. McGill has added that as far as possible any ID 
programme must seek to create the enabling environment for local managers to construct 
the country's own ID programmes (McGill, 1997: 27). Paul (1990: 1) illustrates this point 
by remarking that the role of indigenous institutions in the development management 
process is very critical to the development process. The argument also underpins Moore's 
(1996: 4) view that the long-term objective of the ID process is to increase the capacity for 
self-determination. 
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Blaise (1986: 335-39) has described five variables that are critical for successful ID 
programmes. These are leadership, doctrine, programme, resources and internal structure. 
Blaise's variables underpin the problems that associate public sector capacity in most 
developing countries. Blaise stresses that institutions' relationship with the environment is 
fundamental to ID and therefore it is always important to build institutional capacity that 
respond to the development environment it is supposed to serve. McGill (1997: 28) notes 
that the institution-environment relationship connotes a feedback mechanism that enables 
institutions to respond or learn accordingly. Blaise has explained these feedback processes 
that associate ID. He argues that institutional response to the environment through a 
feedback mechanism shows an important shift in development management practice in 
developing countries due to the top-down nature of the policy process. He stresses that 
most of the early literature on ID placed emphasis on social engineering and a top-down 
approach to development management whereas recent literature is centered on a 
participatory, bottom-up approach and the learning process approach (Blaise, 1986: 401; 
Uphoff, 1986: 192; McGill, 1997: 254). Israel (1987) and More (1995) have warned that 
in spite of all of these arguments, ID is a low specific activity. Their reasons are that there 
is: the absence of a well developed idea as to how ID is best achieved; no guideline or work 
plans that those responsible for such programmes should follow; no precise techniques for 
increasing progress; and no automatic mechanism through which failures or poor 
performance will have a major, intense or immediate impact and stimulate investigation for 
corrective action. 
2.4 Institutional Effectiveness and the ID Process 
The concept of institutional effectiveness is a useful variable in explaining the ID process. 
It emphasizes that all institutions that acts as units of the development management 
process need to achieve an optimal level of effectiveness in order to play their part in the 
development management process successfully. The basis for this argument is that 
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effectiveness leads to efficiency. Powelson (1972: 39) has described three criteria for 
measuring institutional effectiveness. He calls these identification criterion, rules 
criterion and consensus criterion. The identification criterion considers the institution's 
capacity to identify problems within its domain, provide solutions to the problem and to 
appreciate the precise consequences of the solution. The rules criterion emphasizes the 
capacity of institutions to establish and enforce rules so that similar problems are dealt 
with in predictable ways. The consensus criterion stresses the acceptability of institutions 
and their mandates to all persons or groups that have a stake in the institutions' remit. 
The present writer believes that in order to establish effective institutions in the ID 
process, it is also important to consider the variables listed below as important 
benchmarks for the process. These are: 
a. Efficient Administration 
The present writer believes that efficient administrative processes are important 
prerequisites for institutional effectiveness. In his Administration Theory, Beuchner (1968: 
4-20) log ago identified four major approaches to administration that is functional to 
development management. These he calls traditional, behavioural, decision-making, and 
ecological approaches. 
According to Beuchner's argument, the traditional approach emphasizes institutional form 
and scientific management. The institutional form is expressed in an organizational chart 
in a form of a pyramid, with executives at the top and others with different levels of 
responsibility at the bottom. Information flows from the base towards the apex, and 
instruction flow downward. Only crucial information reaches the top where only crucial 
decisions are made. Thus in this process, less crucial information are deliberated upon at 
the bottom where most decisions are also made, even though the executive remain in 
charge. The scientific-management element in this approach is concerned with the issue of 
whether there is one particular way of organizing institutions and performing the functions 
required of it. It also seeks to determine whether the organizing process is universally 
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optimal in a manner that effectiveness is automatically maximized when that form is 
adopted. Critics of this approach have said that despite the inter-system similarities, the 
behavioural and environmental impacts on the various institutions are so distinct and for 
that matter peculiar to each. According to the argument, this is proof that universal optima 
are illusions. Secondly, this approach reflects top-down management (see 3.5.1), which 
has become unpopular in policy analysis for the constraints that they put on the policy 
process. 
The behavioural approach according to Beuchner's theory focuses on the effect of the 
diverse characteristics of human behaviour on management. This perspective provides a 
framework for measuring effectiveness or the lack of it in an institution on the basis of 
variables like definable cultural attributes of employees. Thirdly, the decision-making 
perspective stresses that, institutions are units consisting of many decisional situations in 
which the administrator is the decision-maker. Under this perspective, Beuchner argues 
that one test of efficiency in any institution is whether right decisions are made at the 
right places. This requires the officers in-charge at each level to have the right number of 
staff with the proper amount of training and perception. Lastly, the ecological approach 
stresses the role of the environment in determining organizational forms and processes. 
Beuchner explains that the differing pressures from interest and sectional groups on the 
administrative system as well as the expectations from these institutions determine the 
kind of structures and operational procedures that is adopted to maximise effectiveness. 
The present writer contends that for institutions to be effective, it is not sufficient to only 
adopt any of these four models of institutional effectiveness. It is important to back the 
model up with practices such as joint consultation, research and development, 
empowerment and structured work ethics. 
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b. Integral Value Systems 
The utility of value systems to the development management process is one important issue 
that the current research seeks to investigate. This issue is captured by the research 
question in 4.2 (vi). The question explores how the absence of strong value systems in 
Ghana's development management process has distorted the process, and also seeks to 
investigate how the NIRP intends to correct this problem. In order to make institutions 
effective in developing countries, ID programmes must incorporate value systems such as 
openness, high levels of transparency, accountability, and the appropriate legal and 
institutional framework for policy planning, implementation and monitoring. Secondly, it 
behoves on the ID programmes to clearly define and integrate these values in public sector 
practices. To make these values operational and effective, it is important also to develop 
the manpower base that can identify with these value systems. To achieve this, developing 
countries need to build a superstructure management that is able to oversee and check any 
abuses in the development process. Such a superstructure management system is expressed 
in what Stapenhurst et. al. (1997) calls the national integrity system. Ndegwa et. al. (1987) 
illustrate this position by defining development management as a superstructure 
management involving managing the managers of individual productive enterprises and 
performing governmental functions (Ndegwa et. al., 1987: 18). The superstructure 
management process require a high calibre manpower base to act as custodian of the 
development management process. According to Stapenhurst et. al. (1997: 311), these 
issues regarding the national integrity systems have largely been ignored in ID programmes 
until recently. 
Another dimension of value system for institutional effectiveness is inclusion. Inclusion 
has attracted a wider attention in the literature because participatory structures and effective 
support institutions are very important in contemporary development management. The 
present writer therefore argues that the ID process must build the capacity of institutions to 
coordinate class interests and to ensure that all stakeholders in the policy outcomes have 
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equal chance of participating in the process. The South Commission (1990: 13) has argued 
that the prime objective of development must be to end poverty, provide productive 
employment, and to satisfy the basic needs of the people, and to share fairly, the nation's 
resources. This objective of development shows that development is about people. For 
this reason the citizens must be made to participate and facilitate the attainment of 
development. Cavanagh et. al. (1994: 11) have added that the democratic participation of 
people at all stages in the formulation and implementation of development policy is crucial 
to determine the viability of the policy. Cavanagh et. al (1994: 121) concludes that 
inclusion of the local population is of crucial importance to strengthening a nation's 
capacity for development. The inclusion problem in Ghana's development is investigated 
in the study and it is captured by the research questions in 4.2 (iii) and (vii). 
Picard et. al. (1994: 8) support the above position by revealing that top-down governance 
practices create powerful central political and administrative elite whose contacts with 
donor agencies alienates the masses and renders the policy-making process bereft of 
popular participation. According to this perspective, the historical nature of the policy- 
making process and the dynamics of donor-recipient relationships in post-colonial Africa 
also accounts for the setbacks to development in terms of popular participation. They draw 
a lesson from Ghana's 1987 decentralization programme and show that in this programme, 
the decentralization policy focused on restructuring institutions and processes to enhance 
the participation of people at all levels of administration, and creating efficiency and 
productivity in institutions. They argue that, the Provisional National Defence Council's 
(PNDC) government through this restructuring sought to expand popular participation in 
decision-making" (Picard et. al., 1994: 30-31). They illustrate this point with the "success" 
of Ghana's district assembly programme. The alleged success of the District Assembly 
programme is disputed by Odei-Tettey (1990) who has argued that the programme was ill 
conceived due to the nature of the selection process. Thus, it is true that one of the cardinal 
values of the PNDC's decentralization policy in the late 1980's and early 1990's was to 
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expand popular participation in the decision-making. However, whereas the programme 
sought to include people from the grassroots, the policy also excluded educated and 
professional people because the revolutionary government official policy saw these 
category of people as the privilege few in the society who are responsible for the country's 
under-development. The decentralization process therefore excluded these "privileged 
few" from presenting themselves for elections to serve on the Assemblies. Secondly, the 
District Assembly system could not contain the few of the "privileged people" who got 
elected and their less educated counterparts in the Assemblies because there were clear 
disparities between their levels of perception and analysis and this led to antagonism. 
Hence in as much as the programme had good objectives, the means to achieving these 
objectives were not properly planned. This is the reason why the process started 
disintegrating in the mid 1990's. 
Sandhu et. al. (1989) draws another example from the Singaporean experience. They claim 
that in the national development planning, Singapore used the strategy of tripartism, which 
is a concept based on the collaboration of government, labour and management. This has 
remained the main pillar of development management in Singapore. The concept places 
emphasis on the fact that no matter how people are aggregated, that is as labour, 
government or management, all are ultimately co-owners of the nation, and therefore co- 
determinants of its welfare and destiny. It is therefore important for every stakeholder to 
participate in the development process. They argue further that, right after independence 
the government of Singapore enlisted the support of civil servants. This facilitated the 
subsequent planning and implementation of development policies resulting in rapid 
development and progress for Singapore in subsequent years (Sadhu et. al., 1989: 93-9). 
c. Human Resource Development 
The South Commission (1990) has described development as a process that enables human 
beings to realize their potential, build self-confidence, and lead lives of fulfillment. 
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According to the report, development also frees people from the fear of want and 
exploitation. That is, a movement away from political, economic, or social oppression 
(South Commission, 1990: 10). This idea of development suggests a process of growth in 
human aspirations but runs contrary to the concept of development in the post-Keynesian 
and Marxian economics where the concept is considered as a process of capital formation 
as determined by the level of investment (Hettne, 1995: 15). 
This classification of development also disregards the micro aspects of Third World 
development goals and rather concentrates on the macro elements. The prerequisites of 
development in these countries involve structural transformations which presuppose 
cultural, social, political and economic changes with growth as the central element (Hettne, 
1995: 15). This perspective implies improvement in individual lifestyles and collective 
self-reliance. Ndegwa et. al. (1987: 6-7) have also said that development must be defined 
in relation to the development of the individual. This perspective prescribes a development 
environment in which the citizens identify and perceive development as happening to, by 
and through them over a period of time. It also means the right for the individual to make 
choices and decisions. This view of development states that development occurs with the 
knowledge that people have a duty to the society in the context of social, economic and 
political organization (Ndegwa et. al., 1987: 7). The urgency of citizens' participation in 
the development process makes a case for the effective mobilization of the masses for 
productive ventures. These concerns have brought awareness in Africa that effective 
human resource management plays a vital role in effective institutional performance 
(Kamoche, 1997: 268). This is because the human resource endowment of any nation is 
the cornerstone of the nation's wealth (Damachi et. al., 1978; Harbison, 1973). Besides, the 
learning process approach to development management is dependent on human capacity 
which reflects Uphofs (1986) view that even though ID seems to refer to things such as 
structures, procedures and abstract performance capabilities, it should always call to mind 
people, their skills, motivation and personal efficacy. He stresses that when one talks of 
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ID, it is necessary to understand how the talents and energies in the relevant population can 
be enlisted, upgraded and committed on a regular basis to improvements in the operations 
of institutions. For this reason Uphoff argues that any ID initiative requires particular 
attention to the human aspects of institutional capacity. 
Uphoff s (1986) argument calls for the mobilization and training of all levels of personnel 
and putting citizens who have the capability to work in productive employment. In most 
developing countries however, HRD programmes focus mainly on top-level management 
and occasionally on middle-level management. The skills of personnel at the bottom of the 
ladder are usually left undeveloped (see also Kamoche, 1992). They explain that the 
underlying assumption for this approach to HRD is that it is cost-effective to impart new 
skills through formal training to those officials engaged in managerial and middle- to 
senior-level administrative duties. It was felt this kind of training would have a cascading 
effect on the lower level staff whose training had hitherto been ad hoc. Kamoche (1992) 
has pointed out that this practice is increasingly typical with private sector institutions in 
Africa. The present writer argues however that this HRD practice can also be identified 
with public sector institutions in Africa. Horwitz (1994) has observed that managerial 
development schemes are saddled with problems. He argues that these pitfalls relate to the 
design of the management schemes that put emphasis on development. These training 
schemes are essentially the development of individual manager's needs rather than 
institutional needs. Kamoche (1992) has added to this catalogue of pitfalls by indicating 
that development management is prone to political patronage. 
Singapore has provided a modern demonstration of how the state can effectively forge its 
development process through the careful creation, allocation and utilization of human 
resources (Aryee, 1994; Sandhu et. al., 1989). Developing its policies based on the human 
capital theory, Singapore's economic progress is largely attributable to the utilization of its 
scarce human resources, especially due to the proactive shaping of skills, knowledge and 
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abilities (Sandhu et. al., 1989; Kamoche, 1997: 270). Sandhu et. al. (1989) acknowledges 
that in the development process, Singapore has paid detailed and particular emphasis to the 
development of its human resources through training (Sadhu et. al., 1989: 129-39). 
Kamoche (1997) extends the debate in another dimension by rejecting the notion that 
sending officials on training courses is in itself a panacea to institutional capacity building" 
(Kamoche, 1997: 271). Jones (1990) supports Kamoche's argument because he has also 
refuted the assumption that training is "an act of faith" capable of solving all institutional 
problems. Schaffer (1974) says that this notion has created a spectre of "trainingism" 
which Kamoche (1997: 271) defines as "a pervasive ideological support for training". 
Drawing a lesson from the Singaporean experience, Kamoche (1997) has called for an 
alternative approach to HRD that seeks to create a pool of expertise to correspond with the 
requirements for productive activities in the ID process across Africa. 
The present writer contends that the ID programme must more importantly be geared 
towards developing the skills and expertise of workers to manage development effectively 
in developing countries. Usually, managerial inadequacies in these countries' PSIs lead to 
poor management of development because the system fails to mobilize and harness the 
nation's human resource for development. Ndegwa et. al. (1987: 28) have expressed that 
development creates an increasing demand for higher levels of effective management 
because the development process results in more complex development structures and 
systems which require management to be ahead of evolving situations rather than merely 
responding to crises. Thus, the present writer argues that effective management in PSIs is 
the emotive force for effective institutional performance. This means that ineffective 
management creates ineffective institutional performance. This underpins Ndegwa et. al. 's 
(1987) argument that many of the weaknesses in the development process, both at the 
planning and implementation stages are the products of poor management in the sense of 
poor managers and incomplete or unsound managerial processes. Ndegwa et. al. (1987: 
15-16), Kamoche, (1993) and Kiggundu, (1989) have further indicated that a lack of 
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agreed operational definitions for development in Africa also contributes to ineffective 
management. Added to this are limitations in infrastructure, personnel development and 
the restrictions on innovation imposed by bureaucracy (Ndegwa et. al., 1987: 16). 
According to Nti (1989) these have created difficult problems of weak and inefficient 
decision-making processes. Okereke et. al. (1995) has noted also that the absence of 
dynamic leadership in African institutions have been the cause of limited progress for 
which reason the development of managerial skills must be given a top priority. This 
managerial problem is a central theme to the broad research question and therefore the 
study seeks to investigate the extent to which the HRD programme under NIRP will aid the 
successful implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020. 
d. Consultative Processes 
Several recent studies have also shown that inter-organizational and macro-social factors 
such as regulatory pressure, and the more traditional intra-organizational factors like 
performance through networking, influence the likelihood of imitating institutional 
innovations. This position is evidenced in the works of Baron et. al. (1986), Davis (1991), 
Palmer et. al. (1993). These literature emphasise the importance of institutional 
cooperation and networking process. The current research will therefore investigate 
networking processes in the context of the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP to establish 
the extent to which these are aiding the implementation processes. Network theorists have 
argued that networking can have an enormous influence on institutional effectiveness 
through position- and cohesion-based mechanisms. Those theorists who focus on position- 
based mechanisms suggests that networks provide a basis for social differentiation of 
institutions into status groups on the basis of their position or importance in relation to the 
national agenda for development. Burt (1987) has therefore suggested that institutions of 
similar status are more likely to imitate each other. This perspective suggests that 
communication ties or networking encourage mimetic isomorphism through the 
dissemination of information about legitimate practices, and where normative pressures are 
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exerted for conformity (Galaskiewics et. al., 1989; Haunschild, 1993; Palmer et. al., 1993). 
Under this theory, the ID process requires a forum for heads of institutions to meet on a 
regular basis to develop and compare strategies to remove the challenges that face the 
respective institutions in the development management process and how to manage these. 
This is also a place where important decisions are made on support incentives and 
information sharing. Network theorists who ascribe to the cohesion-based mechanism 
maintain on the other hand that information flows through network ties through cohesion 
rather than position. This forms the fundamental basis for network diffusion (Westphal et. 
al., 1997). This perspective argues that communication ties facilitate "a match between 
technology and organization" through helping decision-makers to learn about innovations 
that fit unique institutional needs and opportunities (Levitt et. al., 1988: 330). 
In spite of their differing arguments, both perspectives see the utility of networking as a 
vehicle for social learning which leads to institutional efficiency. Network ties facilitate 
knowledge transfer about what procedures satisfy specific institutional objectives and 
which one exploits the focal institution's distinctive capabilities and resources. Networking 
under the two theories benefit from the efficient utilization of resources as these processes 
lead to the avoidance of programme duplication. The present writer holds a view that this 
brings coherence and consistency in the overall national development policy and the 
management of this, and it is also useful for collective bargaining. The reason being that 
within the networking framework, institutions become aware of the kind of development 
they are required to serve and as a result they focus on the nation's expectation of them. 
Networking and co-operation also have the added advantage of participation from all 
stakeholders in the development process. That is the expertise required for managing 
national development is made available through consultation, networking and co-operation. 
It is important to note however that networking can be used as a tool for mismanagement. 
For this reason, the legal framework must be effective and should have provisions that 
make such practices a high-risk activity in the networking process. 
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e. Institutional Processes 
Evans et. al. (1985: 51) have argued that an effective ID process must re-shape the goals, 
priorities, and commitments of members of the institution concerned. The ID process 
must also inculcate shared assumptions and expectations on which a common rationality 
can be based. This idea of the ID shows that the process transcends individual rational- 
instrumental behaviour. That is, the ID process must build enforceable statutes to 
regulate institutional practices. 
Okereke et. al (1995) have argued that distortions in institutional processes such as the lack 
of accountability systems, and corruption have contributed to the development 
management problems in developing countries. McGill (1997: 253) has argued that in such 
circumstances, policy interventions are required to serve as corrective mechanisms. He 
uses the World Bank SAPs as an example of such policy intervention but the present writer 
argues that the implementation of the SAPs were not completely successful. Stapenhurst 
et. al. (1997: 311) has also noted that the World Bank-IMF SAPs prescribed for a lot of 
developing countries have not been effective at building the capacity they originally 
intended. They show that whereas the SAP emphasized effective and efficient use of 
public resources by effective and efficient PSIs, ID activities in developing countries have 
immensely focused on: 
a. capacity development where public institutions lack the requisite capacity and 
expertise to adjust the market economy. 
b. introduction of results-oriented management which emphasizes the importance of 
monitoring performance and measuring results, and 
c. public participation in the reform process, underscoring the need to tap into 
the valuable resources and creativity of civil society. 
Stapenhurst et. al. (1997) have shown that institutional processes are better sustained 
through the promotion of a national integrity system that is also the anchor for any 
successful ID (see figure 2-1 for a typical national integrity system). 
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Figure 2-2 
Making the National Integrity System a part of the ID process 
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According to Stapenhurst et. al. (1997), the issues of capacity development, result 
orientation, public participation and the promotion of national integrity must be addressed 
holistically to make PSIs efficient and effective, and to enable them create the enabling 
environment for private- and voluntary-sector participation. They rest this argument on the 
theory that mal-functioning institutional practices inhibits performance and the optimal use 
of resources. They argue therefore that the national integrity system must work in tandem 
with ID programmes. Stapenhurst et. al. (1997) has provided a model of how the national 
integrity system must be integrated into the ID programme. See figure2-2 (above) for this 
model. 
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Stapenhurst et. al. (1997) have shown that wrong practices like corruption has a militating 
effect on ID processes and consequently on development. A number of factors including 
over-centralization, administrative in-capabilities, over-regulation, ineffective systems of 
public accountability and top-down management processes engender these wrong practices. 
Stapenhurst et. al. (1997: 312) and Rose-Ackerman (1996b) have added three factors that 
engender corruption. They list these as: the nature of the overall level of resources at stake, 
the risk inherent in corrupt deals, and the relative bargaining power of the briber and the 
bribed. Stapenhurst et. al., (1997: 312) also claim that corruption is effected where there is 
congruence between opportunity and inclination. According to Stapenhurst et. al. (1997) 
and Rose-Ackerman, (1996a), when corruption is endemic in a nation, it imposes a 
disproportionate high cost on the society where the heaviest cost is typically not the bribes 
but the underlying economic distortions they precipitate. Hence corruption has a crippling 
effect on institutional effectiveness and therefore the ID process must adopt strategies to 
eliminate the practice. Stapenhurst et. al. suggests that corruption must be eliminated 
through a systematic ID exercise that seeks to minimize the opportunity for corruption, 
while reducing the inclination through effective enforcement of deterrent mechanisms 
which reflects the national integrity system. As part of a programme to fight corruption in 
the attempt to develop institutions, it is important for the ID programme to start when a 
framework and rules of the national integrity system is well defined. 
f. Effective Management of Diversity 
McDougall (1996: 64) admits that the concept of managing diversity connotes an 
environment in which a society's workforce consists of a diverse population of people. 
According to this view, diversity entails both visible and non-visible differences which 
include factors such as sex, age, individual background, race, disability, personality and 
work style. She explains that these are founded on the assumption that harnessing these 
differences will create a productive environment in which everybody feels valued, where 
their talents are fully utilized and in which institutional goals are met (McDougall, 1996: 
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64; Kandola et. al., 1994: 8). Gender and tribal issues have plagued the development 
management process in most developing countries, and institutions have done very little to 
evolve practical solutions to deal with the problems. In environment like these, the 
procedures for recruitment and personnel development are often disregarded. Personnel 
are usually selected by ascription instead of recruiting people who are imbued with the 
required skills and are best suited for institutional needs. These issues about diversity if not 
properly managed will incapacitate institutional performance. This is an issue of concern 
to the current study and is therefore pursued in the enquiry process. 
The utilization of individual talents to meet institutional goals will to a large extent be 
attained when ID programmes are designed to ensure that training is tailored to respond to 
the need of institutions, and without regard to gender or tribe. According to Kamoche 
(1997), this notion of improving individual skills to correspond with changes in task and 
job requirements is an important element in managing diversity and essential ingredient in 
development management. Collins et. al. (1990), Montgomery (1986) and Jones (1990) 
have disputed the empirical link between the nature and value of training and its propensity 
to improve individual and institutional performance in the manner suggested by Kamoche 
(1997). Their argument emphasizes the fact that the utility of training is realized if the 
institution's core strategic activities are allowed to determine the requisite skill levels rather 
than merely filling the gaps in these levels. Jacobs (1990) also says that there is a 
conceptual difficulty in identifying the tangible benefits derived from training. 
Kamoche (1993) and Fombrun et. al. (1984) have indicated that socio-cultural factors like 
orientation to work, demographic issues, employer-employee relations and educational 
levels are elements of diversity and they have enormous influence on the availability and 
quality of labour. It is important therefore to take diversity issues seriously in the design 
of any ID programme. 
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2.5 Role of Donor Agencies in Institutional Development 
The study acknowledges the role played by donor agencies in Ghana's development but 
also notes that donor involvement has contributed to the distortions and under- 
development in Ghana. The research question (see 4.2 (viii)) therefore seeks to explore 
how this problem can be eliminated in Ghana through the capacity building programme. 
McGill (1997: 255) has noted that ID programmes in developing countries are externally 
driven through World Bank and other donor policy intervention but not necessarily 
through government action. He argues that such programmes are often used as 
conditions for securing loans. This donor practice leaves developing countries with no 
choice than to accept and implement the programmes. The current writer holds a view 
that this practice has been possible because developing countries have increasingly 
shown weak institutional capacity in terms of human and financial resource inadequacies 
to manage development. However, to make development sustainable and to end the 
donor involvement in Third World development, donor agencies should be committed to 
impart the skills of their expatriate technical experts to indigenous managers. This will 
require both donor and local institutions to create the enabling environment for 
indigenous managers to acquire these skills and expertise. This is very important to ID 
programmes because it will remove the distortions and waste that accompanies donor 
policy interventions. Picard et. al. (1994: 8) have observed that a cardinal contributing 
factor to the failures of past donor policy-interventions is the inadequate framework for 
formulating and implementing these policies. They attribute this inadequate policy 
framework to the lack of local inputs to the policy initiative. Segasti (1995: 601) adds to 
this argument by stating that knowledge plays an important role in development. He 
defines development in terms of the capacity to generate, acquire, disseminate and utilize 
knowledge, both modern and traditional. According to Segasti's argument, knowledge is 
the instrument for effective management of development, especially if the forces of 
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development essentially spring from within the developing society. Segasti does not 
suggest total exclusion of donor agencies from the development management processes. 
Rather, he advocates for a culture in which development is conceived and managed by 
indigenous people with donor assistance if required. This perspective suggests that the 
foundation of any country's development must be its own material and human resources 
fully used to fulfill its aspirations. This point is well established by the South 
Commission's (1990: 13) argument that although external assistance may promote 
development, this level of support need to be consolidated into the national effort and 
adopted to suite the purposes of those it is intended to benefit. The Commission bases 
this argument on the assumption that sustainable development is driven by self-reliance 
and it is self-directed. 
Secondly, Picard et. al. (1994) makes the point that, cultural differences have rendered 
western management systems incompatible with African management requirements. They 
argue that in the face of the challenges posed by this environment, it will be inappropriate 
for governments and international donors to confine their efforts at development to policy 
analysis, infrastructural investments and technological assistance. Esman et. al. (1984) 
have suggested that development programmes must be extended to include institutional and 
HRD activities that according to Picard et. al. (1984) also accommodates the norms of the 
society. Picard et. al. add that donor intervention programmes that seek to ameliorate the 
deficiencies in development management will not succeed unless there is a sustained 
commitment to this brand of ID. The basis for this argument is that African development 
require a: 
"satisfactory level of donor and national commitment of resources, a cadre of LDC 
administrators who can take control of technical assistance program, and an institutional 
capacity for organisations to plan and implement HRD activities" (Picard et. al., 1994: 7). 
The idea is that a cadre of indigenous personnel can best relate the cultural norms of the 
society to the development process. This process will also aid the local capacity building 
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efforts. Picard et. at. acknowledges the contradiction in the Ghanaian situation where 
expatriates are increasingly being substituted for Ghanaian managers and administrators, 
and in the meantime, no serious effort is being made to train indigenous manpower to 
assume the ever-increasing managerial responsibilities. The World Bank (1991: 5) has 
consequently commented that the replacement of indigenous personnel with expatriate 
officials have no long-term solution as in the final analyses, there can be no substitute to 
Africa having its own indigenous capacity. 
McGill (1997: 256) has identified four key interventions in World Bank prescribed reform 
programmes. He argue that these interventions are to tackle: excessive public sector wage 
bills; the surplus of civil servants; the erosion of public service salaries; and wage 
compression. McGill, (1997: 256) and Dia (1993: 4) see this World Bank's policy 
intervention as inadequate in dealing with Third World development management 
problems. Dia therefore provides alternative framework for intervention with emphasis on 
governance. Dia's perspective has some similarity with McGill's idea of doing less but 
better, yet they differ in terms of the targets of intervention. Dia's model targets: 
a. institutional performance which encompasses changes in governance procedures, 
that is the role of the state, the rule of law, and public accountability 
b supportive incentive performance including the rewards and sanctions 
involved in encouraging personnel to perform 
c. performance in national economic and policy management with implications for 
resource mobilization, budgetary process, and regulatory framework, and 
d. the quality of service delivery which should be the end product of the preceding 
three interventions. 
Picciotto (1995: 12) provides a third perspective to donor policy intervention. He calls this 
perspective institutional economics that seek to enhance the impact of development 
programmes. Institutional economics calls for ID programmes that is based on institutional 
remits. Picciotto argues that, this will ensure balance among the remits of the various 
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institutions and engender a positive interplay between the public-, private- and the 
voluntary sector- institutions. Thomas (1996: 6) has taken a less optimistic stance on these 
perspectives of ID programmes. He argues that the changes sought under ID efforts are 
only: 
i. products of politics than management 
ii. popular models of organisational change derived from the experiences of small 
samples of private firms rather than the complications involved in managing change 
in the public sector. 
iii. the mistaken belief that there is one best way for management in the public sector, 
and 
iv. the false notion that the fundamental institutional change is inherently uncertain, 
risky and likely to create conflict. 
2.6 Summary of the Debates 
The chapter has discussed the dynamics of development management and argued that in 
order to manage development effectively, it is important to examine the institutional 
implications. This may require either an introduction of new institutional structures or 
changes to the existing ones. The discussion has consequently examined at the various 
debates on the models of ID programmes and established that it is a wrong practice to 
apply a standard model of ID in any country due to the socio-cultural differences in 
various societies. There is an argument that most IDAs, especially, the World Bank and 
IMF have followed this practice by persuading developing countries to adopt 
standardized ID programmes that are also conceived outside the socio-cultural 
environment. The implementation of such programmes has normally failed. This 
phenomenon questions whose capacity these IDAs are seeking to build. The discussions 




Implementation Theory: A Conceptual 
Underpinning of the Research Question 
3.1 Introduction 
Hill (1993) has said that the implementation process is complex and as a result, 
implementation researchers are not in agreement about what constitutes the subject of 
their enquiry. O'Toole (1986) and Hill (1993) have discussed this complexity and 
differing conceptions of the subject and concluded that a welter of arguments abounds 
regarding the principal components of policy implementation and how the process 
operates. The present writer has therefore put together a number of perspectives to 
construct a model implementation theory as the interpretative framework for this study. 
That is, the concept of implementation is used as a framework data analysis in this 
research. 
The chapter is divided into six sections beginning with an introduction in section one. 
Section two provides an overview of the subject while section three discusses some 
important assumptions about the concept. Section four examines what the elements of a 
perfect policy implementation are. Section five discusses three main models of the 
concept namely, the top-down, bottom-up and interactive models and determines which 
of the three models will be suitable for analysing the research data. Section six draws on 
systems analysis to explain the dynamics of managing the implementation of complex 
policies such as the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP using the interactive model. 
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3.2. Overview of the Policy Implementation Process 
Jordan (1982) has described the implementation process as a means to goal achievement 
which are normally defined in the context of policy initiatives like the Ghana-Vision 
2020 or the NIRP. According to this argument, the policy implementation process is 
subject to a variety of outcomes such as success, failure, and implementation logic9. 
These outcomes are factored on the capacity of policy makers to understand the location, 
strength, stakes and strategies of attempts by those affected by the policy to promote, 
alter or reverse the policy. Grindle et. al. (1991) have added that, time, complexity and 
demands of the implementation process affect the performance of implementers and for 
that matter are great determinants of the outcome of any implementation effort. Another 
crucial determinant of policy implementation is the ability to bring together institutions, 
men and material in a cohesive organisational unit and motivate them in such a way as to 
carry out the policy objectives (Williams, 1971: 144; Flingstein, 1985; Burt, 1987; 
Palmer et. al., 1993). Secondly, it may be argued that the implementation process is 
inextricably knit to policy and therefore the level of policy-implementation linkage also 
impacts enormously on the outcome of the implementation process. The policy- 
implementation linkage is usually influenced by such variables as policy standards and 
objectives, policy resources, inter-organisational activities, characteristics of 
implementing agencies1°. This linkage is further influenced by factors like economic, 
social and political conditions (such as resources, nature of public opinion and interests 
groups support), as well as disposition of the implementers. 
9Implementation logic may be defined to include such things as strategies for the implementation process, mechanisms 
for delays, motives of individual implementing agencies and coalition building to fix the outcome. 
The Characteristics of implementing agencies include variables like staff size, degree of hierarchical control, 
Organizational ability and validity etc. 
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A pioneering work on the subject by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) suggests that 
sometimes the implementation process become a means of subverting policy goals. Their 
work takes as its premise the ways in which institutional and inter-institutional forces 
tend to transform policy and it shows that the relation between implementing agencies 
and implementation issues explains this behaviour. This situation normally occurs under 
conditions of 
a. evasive and non-supportive behaviour in terms of involvement with the process. 
This may not be a sign of weakness or sabotage only but a reflection of 
institutional response to political and economic constraints (Aryee, 1992); or 
b. compliance supportive behaviour which indicates cooperation and participation in 
the context of institutional response to reward systems. 
Pressman and Wildavsky show that the policy implementation process is fundamentally 
based on policy interpretation and response by implementing agencies. Thus the 
implementing agencies must have the ability to appropriately interpret the policy and to 
coordinate and manage the various elements required for attaining the intended policy 
outcomes (see 3.3 for a discussion on these elements). The present writer holds a view 
that, the implementing agencies' ability to interpret and respond well to policy is 
influenced by factors like the level of information that is available about the policy, the 
psychological characteristics of actors, their perception based on training and experience, 
the degree of change that is required to implement the policy, style of intervention, and 
interests of implementing agencies. From the point of view of the present writer, the 
subjective nature of these perspectives shows that policy interpretation and the 
consequent response to it by implementing agencies are sometimes bereft of rationality. 
Barret et. al., (1981) therefore argues that, it is dangerous to assume that policy 
implementation is based on rationality which can be understood scientifically. This 
underlines the idea that the policy implementation process does not produce any specific 
rules by which the process can be moved. Thus, in the implementation process many 
actors pursue sectional interests, and these determine their support or opposition to the 
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policy. It is important therefore for policy makers to estimate these dynamics of the 
policy implementation process to enable them plan effective strategies for the policy 
implementation process. This imperative suggests that it is important to make 
implementation estimates a part of policy analysis to examine the dynamics of the 
implementation process. This must include analysis of such intervening factors as 
compliance, resistance, costs, resources, strategies, etc. According to Hargroves (1975), 
implementing agencies must be capable of analysing these alternatives by conventional 
cost-benefit analysis. The logic of implementation estimates is that if it is identified that 
it is going to be very difficult to achieve the targeted policy objectives, it becomes 
imperative to put in extra efforts find alternative ways of accomplishing these. The 
implementation estimates connote both a theory of how problems will develop and steps 
needed to remedy the problems. This requires an understanding that very simple 
sequences of events depend on complex chains of reciprocal interaction. As a result each 
part of the chain must be built with others in view. This makes it improper therefore to 
separate policy formulation from implementation (see 3.3.1). This position is strongly 
shared by Pressman et. al. (1973) and Hill (1993). On the basis of the above discussion, 
the study seeks to investigate the implementation processes involved in two major 
development policies in Ghana to explore the answers to Ghana's development problems. 
These two polices are the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the National Institutional Renewal 
Programme. 
3.3 Elements of Policy Implementation 
The present writer holds a view that the elements of any policy implementation process 
are factored on what is being implemented because policies differ in content and context 
and are complex phenomena. It is therefore generally inconceivable to have a set of 
elements that may be universally applicable to all policy implementation cases. 
However, it may be argued that certain variables are very basic to almost every 
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implementation process irrespective of the context, content and complexity of the policy. 
These basic variables are: 
3.3.1 Policy Orientation 
It may be argued that the implementation process is policy oriented and this idea provides 
an opportunity for the research to explore the policies associated with Ghana's 
development and to investigate the implementation processes involved in these policies. 
Pressman et. al. (1973: xiv) have argued that "a verb like `implement' must have an 
object like policy", and Ham et. al. (1984: 96) see implementation as a process of putting 
policy into action. In order to put policy into action, the policy process must among other 
things define the actors and agencies and their interactions because these provide the clue 
as to who is influencing what, how and why. Besides, the policy to be implemented must 
have clear goals against which to judge implementation. These are important causal 
factors in the implementation process. 
It is debatable however, whether one can set "clear goals" in the policy process. Ham et. 
al., (1984: 101) have argued that policies are complex phenomenon that consists of a web 
of interrelated decisions and these are normally vague. This perception about policies 
therefore makes it difficult for implementers to work with policy. It may be inferred from 
the above argument that, most implementation difficulties are caused by the nature of the 
policy-making process which may have excluded some stakeholders in order to reach a 
stance. However, if one accepts the definition of policy making as a means of translating 
a stance, as for example building the capacity of Ghana's PSIs or a commitment to reduce 
the size of the public sector, or making Ghana's private sector the engine of national 
development, then all stakeholders who either do not favour or were excluded in taking 
that stance will oppose its implementation. 
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Lane (1987), Hargroves (1975), Parsons (1995), Pressman (1973) and Ayee (1992) have 
argued that implementation processes are built around an asymmetric relationships 
between the formulators of policy and the implementers because implementation theory 
suggests that public policy becomes a legitimate concern for implementers once it has 
been decided on formally. This means that very often implementation considerations are 
discounted during the policy making process. This practice creates implementation 
problems that normally lead to series of contradictory policies that distort the entire 
policy process. Thus since 1975 (Hargroves, 1975) till recently (Parsons, 1995), the idea 
of fusing implementation and policy making has been a missing link in policy analysis. 
This is a procedural problem in the policy process that normally puts policy 
implementation at risk". Thus the canons of policy implementation suggests that there 
must be no sharp divide between policy making and policy implementation because what 
happens at the implementation stage is determined usually by the policy making process. 
Hogwood et. al. (1984) have therefore argued that policy formulation and implementation 
must be interdependent. To ensure effective implementation, policy makers must be 
involved in the implementation process and vice-versa. They show the importance of this 
idea by stressing that in the policy process there is always the need to follow the policy 
through - to cover loopholes and fill in the details during the implementation stage. 
Elmore (1979) has argued that if this link is kept in policy analysis, policy makers will 
usually arrive at a better policy (see also Majone et. al., 1978; Barret et. al., 1981). The 
above argument provides the basis for this study, and that is to investigate the extent of 
this practice in the implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP and what has 
been its usefulness. 
Thirdly, it is important to classify policies into distributive and regulatory types so that 
the classification can be used as a basis for analysing the implementation process because 
"Policy is usually said to be put at risk when it pertains to the following causes: bad execution; bad policy; and bad 
luck 
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each category will generate different types of reaction to the policy. The classification 
process also provides a useful tool for estimating the dynamics of the implementation 
process. Hargroves (1981) and Davies et. al. (1982) have suggested that re-distributive 
policies are more difficult to implement than distributive ones, and secondly, the success 
of regulatory policies may rest on the extent to which they have re-distributive 
consequences. Van Meter et. al. (1975) have also said that it is important to take account 
of the content or type of policy in implementation analysis because the effectiveness of 
implementation will vary across policy types and policy issues (see also Davies et. al., 
1982). Thus the idea that different kinds of policies evoke different sets of participants 
and levels of participatory intensity is helpful to understand the policy implementation 
process. 
Moreover, the canons of policy implementation require policy makers to make certain 
crucial but appropriate decisions during the policy making stage. This means that 
effective policy implementation depends on knowing what one wants to do, the 
availability and ability to mobilize and control required resources, communicating what is 
required with implementers, and monitoring their performance. According to Lane 
(1987), Pressman et. al. (1973) and Barret et. al. (1981) however, such decisions are often 
left to the implementation process for reasons such as the: 
a. inability of policy makers to resolve conflicts during the policy-making stage, 
b. ability to make key decisions only when all the facts are available, 
c. fact that professional implementers are better equipped to make the key decisions 
than anyone else, 
d. fact that little is known in advance about the actual impact of the new measures, 
and 
e. recognition that day to day decisions will have to involve negotiation and 
compromise with powerful groups. 
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Pressman et. al. (1973) and Barret et. al. (1981) have further stressed that policy-making 
is a process that continues during implementation. This process may require continuing 
flexibility and a process of back and forth movement between policy and action. Thus 
most policies normally fail because policy makers usually underestimate the complexity 
and difficulty of coordinating the tasks and orientating agencies involved in 
implementing policies. This is evidence that implementation is a policy-action 
continuum in which interaction and negotiation processes take place over time between 
policy makers and implementers (Pressman et. al., 1973; Barret et. al., 1981: 25) due to 
their differing perceptions of the policy. 
The present writer argues therefore that it is wrong to assume that implementation 
processes are smooth and straightforward. In the policy process many things go wrong 
between policy formulation and implementation. However, it may be argued that the 
chances of successfully implementing a policy will be increased if thought is given at the 
policy design stage to potential problems of implementation. This has implications for 
the current research because there is an apparent gap between the formulation of Ghana's 
development policies and their outcomes, where the gaps are created by public sector 
structural inefficiencies and inadequate skilled personnel for policy implementation. 
3.3.2 Implementation Structure 
An implementation structure is composed of all agencies or actors who seek to put policy 
into effect through a variety of activities. Hogwood et. al. (1984) have said that in 
modern society, the implementation structure is very instrumental in policy 
implementation. Their argument stresses that the process for policy implementation 
encompasses a variety of important tasks that are provided through multi-institutional 
programmes that consequently combine to realise the policy outcome. The 
implementation structure is normally interconnected clusters of institutions, firms, 
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governments and associations that come under the framework of the policy to be 
implemented. Hogwood et. al. have stressed that it is therefore almost impossible for any 
single institution to fully execute the implementation process on its own. 
To constitute an implementation structure, the nature of the policy to be implemented 
must offer the framework to adequately define the combination of institutions required to 
carry out the programme. These institutions are normally constituted into technical and 
administrative units. The selection of implementing agencies and the task of assigning 
them to the appropriate unit depends on the type of policy to be implemented, and the 
roles the respective agencies are required to play in the process. For example in the 
NIRP implementation process, the MoF has been assigned to oversee public sector 
financial reforms and the Attorney General's Office to oversee reforms in the legal 
sector. These actors participate in the NIRP process for a variety of goals and motives, 
and view the policy to be implemented as their fundamental or instrumentally important 
interests. The policy therefore puts these institutions in a confounding set of relationships 
with a single objective of achieving the overall goals of the NIRP. 
Davies et. al. (1982: 121) have stated that within the implementation structure, subgroups 
of actors also perform specialist roles, namely: decision making, planning and 
intelligence gathering, resource provision, intermediary and coordinating roles, services 
provision, and evaluation. These make consensus building and agreements important 
characteristics of the implementation structure. Hanf (1982: 160), Hjern et. al. 
(1981: 214) and Hogwood et. al. (1984) have added that the implementation structures 
offer a strategy for analysing purposive action within a framework where parts of many 
public and private institutions cooperate to implement a policy 
Secondly, the role of implementing agencies and the work processes in the 
implementation process differ from those in day to day tasks of institutions because in an 
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implementation structure there is less formal structure and fewer authoritative relations. 
Thus, the work structures are more dynamic and shifting in an implementation structure 
as the cluster of actors does not represent a legally defined unit with a corporate charter 
and office building. Besides, the decision to participate in any programme is fuzzy as it 
is based on consent and negotiation. Thus, the network of institutions is not an 
administrative entity. It provides the resources for making the implementation process 
functional. 
Hogwood et. al. (1984) have added to this argument by stating that the policy 
implementation process requires a brand of implementation structure that has some 
organic features such as relatively undefined tasks, relationships and reduced emphasis 
on hierarchy. From their point of view, these organic features are appropriate in an 
uncertain or fast-changing environment because they enable institutions to adapt more 
speedily and effectively to the changes envisaged by policies. According to Hogwood et. 
al., this happens because the organic features offer implementing agencies with wide 
latitude to process information quickly compared to the shortcomings of the traditional 
bureaucratic organisation that insist on official channels and vertical communications. 
The implementation structure as an element of policy implementation provides the 
instrument for exploring the structures being used to implement Ghana's development 
and capacity building policies (see chapters five and six). This will be particularly 
important in determining the impact that members of the implementation structure makes 
on the development process. 
3.3.3 Cross-Institutional Linkages 
It has been noted above that the processes of implementing policies are not done by any 
one institution. The process requires a combination of a number of institutions to 
perform differing roles to achieve the set objectives. This element of policy 
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implementation shows that it is imperative for policy makers to design processes for 
effective cross-institutional linkages at the policy making stage to enable the 
implementation process meet the set target. These institutional linkages may involve 
institutions within the implementation structure or outside the structure but who have a 
stake in the policy to be implemented. The level and kind of linkage is determined by the 
nature of the policy. 
Putting such linkages in place alone does not guarantee a successful implementation. 
Mountjoy et. al. (1979) have acknowledged that cross-institutional linkages also creates 
problems for policy implementation due to role duplication and institutional self- 
interests. For example, implementation of the NIRP process involves a multiplicity of 
sub-programmes and these require the involvement of a large number of institutions. 
However, these implementing agencies may have distinctive interests that account for 
differential motivation for their implementation efforts. Besides, there may be a number 
of decision points associated with the NIRP implementation that require clearance to 
enable the programme to continue but this may provide grounds for disagreement and 
delay (Ayee, 1992) and may hinder the implementation process (Lane, 1987). The 
present writer hold a view that these problems will occur whether implementing agencies 
belong to a single institution or not, because they have a degree of independence and a 
relative autonomy due to their respective specialised areas of operation. Besides, these 
agencies may also have their own legitimacy or links to the outside environment and 
therefore are not substitutable. As a result, any level of control is limited by the amount 
of power available to the controlling agency12. These will ultimately lead to conflicts and 
to eliminate these, it becomes important for policy-makers and implementing institutions 
12 The 'amount of power' refers to resources, legitimacy and authority to apply sanctions and incentives possessed by 
one agency vis-ä-vis those it is seeking to control. 
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to interact through negotiation, bargaining and compromise processes. Barret et. al. 
(1981) have added that it is important to secure performance through compromise in any 
policy implementation process. This is best achieved through networking. From the 
discussions made so far, one can infer that the policy implementation process is 
characterised by conflicts and therefore it is very important to incorporate in the process a 
strategy to anticipate obstacles and how to prevent or eliminate these - that is 
implementation estimates. 
As discussed in chapter two, networking is very important for policy implementation as it 
draws attention to project interdependencies and future resource needs. But to make 
networking useful, a process has to be designed to guide the behaviour of all actors in the 
network. This process must be communicable, acceptable, feasible, and credible to all 
actors in order for the network to function effectively. This strategy need not be seen as 
separate from planning other more technical strategies at the policy formulation stage. 
Nixon (1980) has said that communication is an important function of networking and 
institutional linkages. He argues that communication is therefore an important variable in 
policy implementation. He puts emphasis on clarity and consistency in the 
communication of policy to all stakeholders. The thrust of Nixon's position is that 
institutions are interdependent but the asymmetric distribution of resources that normally 
accompany policy implementation also creates conflict in inter-institutional relationships. 
Hogwood et. al. (1984) has suggested that where there are actual or potential differences 
among institutions, the government agency wishing to promote the policy to be 
implemented will have to exercise political judgment about which strategy is most likely 
to improve the chances of successful implementation. This task can best be achieved 
through effective coordination and negotiation skills. Ham et. al. (1984) have added that 
in some policy areas, these conflicts are eliminated by the clarity of institutions' mandate 
and security regarding their resources. Network analysis may be a useful tool in 
explaining the policy failures that characterise Ghana's development. This is captured by 
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the research question in 4.2 (iii). The question seeks to investigate the processes and 
impact on institutional coordination and networking on the development process. 
3.3.4 Environmental Reaction 
The environmental reaction to policy implementation is underpinned by the idea that 
policies are often characterised by uncertainties and conflicts that create opposition to the 
policy implementation process. This normally results in organised anarchy that confuses 
the policy goals and creates fluid participation in the implementation process. Such 
situations underpin the need for implementation estimates during the policy formulation 
stages to assess the programme feasibility regarding support and opposition, the stakes 
involved, and the political and bureaucratic resources needed to sustain the policy 
implementation process. Thus, implementation estimates are important to policy 
implementation because the nature and intensity of stakeholder reaction to the 
implementation process determines the success or failure of the policy. Elmore (1978) 
has said that environmental reaction to a policy may range from those that question the 
viability of the policy to those that threaten its existence, and these normally take the 
form of overt actions to reverse the policy to covert actions to undermine it13. Moreover, 
the characteristics of the policy to be implemented also determine the type of reaction 
that is generated. For example, the distribution of the cost and benefits of the policy, its 
technical complexity, administrative intensity, short- or long-term impact, and the degree 
to which it encourages participation determine whether the reaction to the policy will be: 
a. A Public Reaction 
This is the type of reaction from society at large towards national policies that takes the 
form of total rejection, alteration, shaping or sustaining the policy. For the public to 
react, the policy must have a direct impact on broad sectors of the society or on 
13 These happen when those to implement the policy are unwilling to comply with the policy proposals. Elmore (1978) 
calls this behaviour "dynamic conservatism " which is the tendency to fight to remain the same. 
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politically important interests in society. Such policies must be readily visible to the 
affected groups. The stakes in pursuing this kind of policies will be high and can even 
threaten the continuation of a government (see Grindle and Thomas, 1991). Policies with 
these characteristics require policy makers to secure a large political capital to sustain it. 
Where this is absent, they would have to think about ways of accumulating support and 
managing public opposition to the policy (see Elmore, 1978). Or 
b. An Institutional Reaction 
The outcome of some policies is determined by how bureaucratic agencies, public 
officials and administrative routines respond to the policy. Thus, agencies, officials and 
routines are able to shape, alter or reject the policy to be implemented. These are policies 
that usually have no direct impact on large sectors of the population and as such are not 
readily apparent to the public. Such reforms normally concentrate cost in government, 
disperse benefits, have high administrative or technical content, limits participation, and 
have long-term duration. The government's stake in implementing this type of policy 
will be low and the implementation process will emphasise institutional competence and 
compliance. However, alliances between factions or individuals in institutions and 
external interests can sabotage the implementation process (Grindle et. al., 1991). 
Furthermore, the implementation of such policies provides a platform for competition and 
conflict among individuals and groups who have been excluded from the policy process. 
These groups therefore seek to pursue and assert their interests and this sometimes, leads 
to indifference and inertia which Bowen (1982) has said are constraints to 
implementation in much the same way as active opposition. 
These two forms of reactions emphasise that the environment's reaction to policy does 
not occur in the context of simple acceptance or rejection. Bowen (1982), Hogwood et. 
al. (1984) and Grindle et. al. (1991) have argued that there are also a range of possible 
reactions from active acceptance through passive acceptance, indifference, and passive 
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resistance to active resistance. To reduce these threats of resistance to policy 
implementation, Hogwood et. al. (1984) have argued that it will be useful to: 
a. provide full information at an early stage about the policy, including the reasons, 
objectives and means involved. 
b. engage in an extensive consultation with affected parties inside and outside the 
institution, and to make policy decisions participatory where possible. 
c. use valid communication and persuasion (rather than command) to convert 
informal leaders and group `influentials' or opinion leaders to the canons of the 
policyla 
d. create an atmosphere of trust by showing concern for people's interests and for 
their less obvious feelings such as loss of work mates and personal insecurities. 
e. create an atmosphere in which people will express their fears in relation to the 
policy as these are often the reasons for resistance. 
f give assurances that changes will not be rushed, that resources will be adequate, 
that the effects of any change due to the policy will be reviewed and mitigated, 
and that there is some flexibility in the plan. 
The environmental reaction to policies is an issue that is investigated by this research. 
Thus, the study seeks to explore the effects of this reaction on the capacity building 
programme and how this would shape the outcome of the policy and consequently, the 
development process. 
14 Valid communication here is defined as being frank aboutproblems and dangers of the policy implementation, and 
the benefits of the policy. 
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3.3.5 Resources Mobilization 
Any policy implementation requires resources to make the process operational. Ham et. 
al. (1984) have said that policymaking must go with the procurement of adequate 
resources to make action possible. These resources may be political, financial, 
managerial and technical or a combination of these. However, the exact combination of 
resources required for any policy implementation is determined by the policy in question. 
Grindle et. al. (1991) maintain that securing these resources constitute a part of the 
challenges that policy makers and policy managers have to grapple with. Thus, policy 
makers must be capable of identifying which of these resources or a combination of 
which are necessary for implementing the programme and, where and to secure them. 
The capacity to mobilise essential resources is one of the key elements to successful 
implementation of any development policy. Even though resources are by definition 
limited, Grindle et. al. (1991: 148) have argued that they are not fixed and so if policy 
makers are effective, they can mobilise resources through conscious and concerted 
efforts. The resource mobilisation efforts are most effective when policy makers are able 
to analyze the existing resources. This will provide a good idea of what level of support 
is needed for the implementation process". Resource analysis in the policy formulation 
stage is essential as it is a basis for adjustments in policy and implementation structure. 
These have direct relevance for substantive output of policy. Resource problems, 
especially human resource are captured by the research question as a problem for 
investigation. The question seeks to explore how this resource affects the development 
management process. 
15 Resource analysis is a part of implementation estimates. 
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3.3.6 Management Procedures 
Hogwood et. al. (1984) have argued that it is important to develop appropriate processes 
and procedures, including management procedures for the implementation process. 
These management procedures and processes directly relate to how members of the 
implementation structure will manage the process. They specify who is responsible for 
what, how, where and when tasks should be done. 
Hogwood et. al. (1984) have recounted a sequence of procedures and processes for 
managing the policy implementation process. These imperatives are however rarely 
achieved in practice. According to this theory, the policy process must: 
a. design a programme that incorporates task sequences and clear statements of 
objectives, performance standards, cost and timing. 
b. execute the programme through mobilising appropriate levels of resources 
including structures, staffing, funding, procedures and methods. 
c. build in appropriate scheduling, monitoring, and control processes to ensure that 
the programme proceeds as intended, and if deviation happens, to adopt 
appropriate corrective plan immediately. 
These procedures are only theoretical guide to managing the policy implementation 
process because they assume a very high degree of control over the policy to be 
implemented and its outcome that are not achieved in practice. Furthermore, they are 
insulated from the environment and hence not realistic. 
Hogwood et. al. (1984) have suggested that the managerial technique that may best 
handle the implementation process is Network Planning and Control (NPC). The NPC 
provides a framework for policy-making and implementation through identifying the 
tasks to be accomplished, the relationships between these tasks, the agencies responsible 
for each tasks and the logical sequence in which they should be performed. Hogwood et. 
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al. have added that the Programme Evaluation and Review Techniques (PERT) may 
complement this method. The PERT allow for probability estimates of the duration of 
each task. It calculates the critical path to ensure that no slippage will occur to delay the 
entire project. The method also seeks to monitor any slack elsewhere in the network and 
reallocation of resources, time, technology and task management to permit activities on 
the critical path to be completed on time (Hogwood et. al., 1984). Managerial problems 
are central issues to the research question (see 4.2 (v)). The question explores how 
managerial pitfalls affect Ghana's development management and how the capacity 
building programme intends to solve these problems. 
3.3.7 Evolutionary Process 
This element emphasise the idea that policy and implementation is a continuously 
changing process (Ayee, 1992). That is, the implementation process has certain dynamic 
properties which negates the conventional concept of implementation under which policy 
goals are decided by one agency and the means to achieve them are left to another 
agency. Majone et. al. (1978) has also said that when practitioners act on policy to 
implement it, they change it. This implies that the actual policy to be implemented 
evolves during the process of execution. Linders et. al. (1987: 466) have said that policy 
is a construct that emerges from interactions, and as such has no life of its own. These 
propositions discount goals of central decision-makers in favour of the understanding and 
bargains that develop among actors in the implementation process. 
The import of this element is that implementation is a learning and exploratory process, 
during which an organization can utilize implementation failure as a route to 
implementation success. That is, for example in evaluating a policy implementation 
process, the lead agency may consider not only the achievement of the stated objectives 
but also discoveries made during the implementation. Lane (1987) supports this idea that 
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implementation is a learning process by conceding that the process results in the 
redefinition of objectives and the reinterpretation of outcomes and this makes 
implementation an endless process. The evolutionary nature of the policy 
implementation process provides a platform for innovations and discoveries in the 
organisational learning process (see Argyris, 1978; Senge, 1990). This is explored by the 
current study in chapter 6. The chapter examines the evolutionary nature of the NIRP 
and how this affect the capacity it is seeking to build. 
3.4 Notions of a Perfect Policy Implementation 
Policy implementation outcomes are not easily determined during implementation 
because this is an ongoing process between implementing agencies and the policy 
environment each with differing interests. Consequently, their response or anticipated 
reactions to the policy implementation also varies. Implementing agencies that work as 
strategic managers in a complex policy within an institutional framework are essentially 
concerned with achieving politically, institutionally, developmentally and economically 
viable outcomes. These outcomes are determined to a large extent by environmental 
pressures like support or opposition. The environmental reaction may require either 
removing the policy from agenda entirely or modifying it to meet the environmental 
expectations. This explains why policy implementation processes normally lead to 
outcomes quite different from those intended and anticipated by policy makers. 
Thus, a judgment about implementation depends on the interpretation of the 
implementation environment and hence there is no single model of policy 
implementation that can guarantee successful implementation (see 3.5 for a discussion on 
the different policy implementation models). However, the various models seek to 
structure implementation in such a manner that there will be high probability of policy 
success. Secondly and as noted before, implementation success will depend on the 
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ability to plan the implementation process alongside the technical content of the policy 
(Grindle et. al., 1991). Thirdly, environmental factors such as resources, technology and 
characteristics of clients and services are also important for implementation success 
(Hargrove, 1975). 
Hill (1993) has also argued that there is no theory of implementation that commands 
general agreement on the requirements for implementation success because policy 
experts continue to work from diverse theoretical perspectives and use different variables. 
Hogwood et. al. (1984) have also stated that perfect implementation is unattainable in 
practice because perfection is an analytical concept and an ideal that is not achieved in 
practice. The thrust of these two arguments is that most of the logical preconditions of 
perfect implementation like `perfect obedience', or `perfect control' are morally and 
politically unacceptable and unattainable in a pluralist democracy. Furthermore, 
implementation research tends to view the process from the purview of central decision- 
makers rather than from the target group or the policy environment. Hence, the degree to 
which central policy goals are realised become the primary measure for assessing 
effective implementation (Hanf, 1982) but these goals are usually different from the 
aspirations of the policy environment which may judge the outcome differently. 
3.4.1 Building Capacity for Implementation 
An implementation capacity is the ability of institutions to bring together human and 
material resources in a cohesive organisational unit and motivate them to execute the 
policy objectives (Barret et. al., 1981). Grindle et. al., (1991) have argued that when 
actors lack implementation capacity, the implementation process normally fails. The 
elements of implementation discussed in 3.3 provide implementing agencies with the 
capacity to deliver the intended policy outcomes. The absence of any one of these 
constitute an implementation deficit, and the absence of a number of them lead to a 
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cumulative deficit which consequently lead to weak institutional capacity for 
implementation. 
Sabatier et. at. (1979; 1980) have described the under-listed factors as necessary for 
effective implementation although it is difficult to attain them in practice. These factors 
are: 
a. the policy must be based on a sound theory that relates to changes in target group 
behaviour in order to achieve the desired objectives. 
b. the policy and its associated statutes must contain unambiguous guidelines for the 
implementation structure, such that the policy requirements will dictate the 
performance of implementing agencies. 
c. the leaders of the implementing agencies must have substantial managerial and 
political skills and must be committed to the statutory goals. 
d. organised groups and key legislators or the chief executive must actively support 
the policy, with the courts being neutral and supportive throughout the 
implementation process. 
Figure 3-1 below shows the essential variables required for building an implementation 
capacity. They are organised in a critical formation to show the linkages in the variables. 
These conditions affect different stages of the implementation process and they provide 
benchmarks for building implementation capacity for the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the 
NIRP. Many of the attempts to ensure effective policy implementation management 
follow the logic of organisational theory. The theory assumes that if management 
structures and processes, channels of communication and clarity of communication are in 
good form, then a strong capacity for implementation has been established and the policy 
outcome has a great chance of succeeding. 
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Figure 3-1 
Skeletal flow of variables for building an implementation capacity 
Tractability Problems 
1. Availability of valid technical theory technology 
2 Diversity of target-group behaviour 
3 Target group as a percentage of population 
4 Extent of behavioural change required 
Statutory variable for implementation Non-statutory variables for implementation 
I Socioeconomic conditions & technology 
1. Clear and consistent objectives 2 Media attention to the problem 
2. Incorporation of adequate causal theory 3 Public support 
3 Financial resources 4 Attitudes and resources of constituency 
4 Hierarchical integration with and among groups 
implementing institutions 5 Support from sovereigns 
5 Decision-rules of implementing agencies 6 Commitment and leadership skills of 
6 Recruitment of implementing officials implementing officials 
7 Formal access by outsiders 
Stages (dependent variables) in the implementation process 
Policy outputs of Compliance with Actual impacts Perceived impacts aIor revision 
implementing "'policy outputs by -b' of 1 of in 
agencies target groups policy outputs policy outputs statute 
Source: Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980: 542). 
Hargrove (1975: 74) has emphasised the importance of incorporating implementation 
estimates in policy planning right from the outset as a capacity building measure. This 
perspective demands that as a capacity building benchmark, the institutional capability 
that launches the programme must be maintained for its execution. 
3.4.2 Reasons for Implementation Failure 
Implementation failure is central to the research question as the study seeks to explore 
how these failures have contributed to Ghana's under-development. Implementation 
failure may be seen as a product of lapses in planning, specification and control as well as 
the lack of consensus and commitment among implementers. The nature of policy 
implementation failure may be distinguished into two, namely: 
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a. non-implementation which means a policy is not put into effect as intended 
probably because those involved in the execution have been uncooperative and 
inefficient, or because their best efforts could not overcome obstacles to effective 
implementation, and 
b. unsuccessful implementation that occurs when a policy is carried out in full, and 
external circumstances are favourable but the policy fails to produce the intended 
outcomes. 
Ayee (1992) have said that some of the causes of policy implementation failures in 
developing countries are bureaucratic sabotage, inertia, lack of resources, non- 
commitment by political leaders, poorly designed policies, opposition from interest 
groups, and questions about legitimacy of government. Elmore (1978) add that most 
policies fail because no single unit of government is sufficiently powerful to force others 
to conform to a single conception of policy. The present writer holds a view that in 
developing countries the executive arm of government usually emerges as the most 
powerful institution that coerces other institutions and stakeholders to conform to 
policies. In these circumstances, the outcome of the policy in question conforms to 
Elmore's argument that this will result in implementation problems because people and 
institutions alike engage in various behaviours to sabotage the policy as a result of the 
coercion. 
3.5 Models of Policy Implementation 
Policy implementation may be classified into three models based on the approach to the 
policy making process. Elmore (1978) has argued that none of these models however is 
able to fully explain the complexity of the implementation process. The three 
classifications are the top-down, bottom-up and interactive models. 
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3.5.1 Top-Down Model 
The top-down model has also been called Forward Mapping (Elmore, 1978) and Linear 
Model (Grindle et. al., 1991). Hogwood et. al. (1984) have said that the top-down model 
is managerially oriented and is centered on policy. In this model, implementers become 
agents of policy makers. Basically, the model starts with policy making by government 
officials and then seeks to shape the actions of implementing officials and target groups 
to conform to the policy objectives and procedures (Sabatier, 1986; Elmore, 1980). That 
is, the top-down approach tends to view implementation in terms of hierarchical 
structures and management processes, where policy is introduced at the top and 
transmitted down the hierarchy. Hanf (1982) has argued that this model centers on 
steering the relationships between superiors and subordinates and compliance by the 
administration and target groups. Consequently, the outcome is measured in terms of the 
original statement of intent. 
The model begins with elaborate objectives that come with specific set of steps for 
achieving these objectives. This is then measured against the intended outcomes which 
serve as the basis for measuring success or failure. Elmore (1979) has noted that this 
process is consistent with the standard framework of policy analysis and with 
conventional techniques of management science and decision analysis. The assumption 
is that implementing agencies are linked to the policy in a hierarchical relationship. 
Thus, the closer one is to the source of the policy, the greater one's authority and 
influence. Secondly, the ability of implementing agencies to respond to implementation 




The Top-Down Model of Policy Implementation 




Source: Modified from Grindle ct. al. (1991: 123) 
The model is underpinned by factors that tend to centralise control and are easily 
manipulated by policy-makers"'. This model therefore conflicts the notion that 
implementation is a continuous process of bargaining, negotiation and interaction in 
policy analysis (Ham et. al., 1984, Hogwood et. al., 1984). See figure 3-2 above for a 
graphic illustration of the model. 
Grindle et. al. (1991) have observed that most policy implementation processes use the 
top-down model because of the methods involved in conceiving the policy in question. 
That is, a proposed reform gets on the agenda for government action on the basis of 
society's needs. Consequently, the government makes a decision on the proposal and 
16 These factors mats include funding %orrrnla. c, institnlional structures, authority relationships among regulations, 
administrative units, administrative control i. e. budget, planning, and evaluation requirements and oilier resource 
control. 
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attempts are made to implement the decision as illustrated in figure 3-2. The decision 
stage is seen as the critical choice and it becomes the focus of policy makers, whereas the 
implementation stage is either ignored or considered to be the responsibility of a different 
agency namely, the implementing institution. 
The top-down model normally encourages international agencies to substantially support 
efforts to strengthen policy analysis in developing countries. They assume that improved 
policy choices will generally result from rational policy analysis. Grindle et. al. (1991) 
have argued that these international donor agencies use the linear model in proposing 
policies to governments of developing countries. There are however some rare instances 
where these international agencies have been concerned about the implementation 
process. In such circumstances, they have emphasised the need to strengthen 
implementing agencies and government commitment in the policy process. The Ghana- 
Vision 2020 and the NIRP are examples. This explains the enormous financial and 
technical support that these two programmes have obtained from donor agencies. The 
top-down implementation model is captured by the research question in 4.2 (ii). The 
question recognises this model as a problem to policy implementation and therefore seeks 
to explore how this will be eliminated under the NIRP. 
a. Strengths of the Model 
The main strengths of the model are the pre-occupation with effective implementation of 
specific policies, and ability of elected officials to guide and constrain the behaviour of 
public servants and target groups. However, this notion of hierarchical control in the 
sense of tightly constrained behaviour may be objected to on the basis that it is possible 
to keep the behaviour of implementing officials and target groups within acceptable 
bounds over time through compromise and negotiations. This is important to ensure that 
policy implementation is not stunted due to conflicts and schisms that characterize 
hierarchical control. 
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Secondly, the model provides a framework for top-down oriented implementing agencies 
regarding how they should secure effective implementation. Sabatier et. al. (1979: 489- 
92) have justified this approach from first, a liberal democratic point of view that policy 
should be made by the elected representatives of the people and implemented in a 
subordinate manner by public officials. Their second argument is that rationality in 
public policy involves goal setting and this is followed by activities designed to achieve 
those goals. They conclude their argument by adding that these activities must be 
systematically monitored. 
b. Flaws in the Model 
The arguments so far have shown that the model concentrates on identifying the legal and 
political mechanisms needed to affect preferences and constrain the behaviour of 
implementing officials and target groups in the initial policy decision and subsequently 
over time (Sabatier et. al, 1980; Sabatier, 1986). However, these arguments provide 
insufficient grounds for effective implementation. Hence, Hjern et. al. (1982), Barret et. 
al. (1981) and Elmore (1979) have criticised the top-down model for concentrating on 
central decision-makers and discounting other actors in the policy process. Their second 
criticism is that the top-down model is difficult to use in circumstance where there is an 
absence of a dominant policy or implementing agency but a number of government 
directives and implementing actors with none of them being prominent. 
Sabatier (1986) has argued that the distinction between policy formulation and policy 
implementation in this model is misleading and useless as it account in most part for the 
incessant conflict that characterize most policy implementation processes. The 
distinction also ignores the fact that some institutions are involved in both stages of the 
policy process like the MoF or NDPC and the Ghana-Vision 2020. Ham et. al. (1984) 
have stressed on the importance of seeing policy formulation and implementation as one 
process because it breeds clarity in the policy process and helps to successfully negotiate 
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conflict before and during the implementation stage. Elmore (1979) criticises the model 
for its implicit and unquestioned assumption that policy makers control the 
organisational, political and technological processes that affect implementation. The 
flaws in the model make it unsuitable to be used for analysing the current research. 
3.5.2 Bottom-Up Model 
Elmore (1981: 1) has described the bottom-up model of implementation as backward 
mapping. He sees this model as backward reasoning from individual and organizational 
choices that are the hub of the problems to which policy is addressed. The model begins 
by identifying the network of actors involved in the policy implementation who are 
consequently asked about their goals, strategies, activities and contacts (Elmore, 1978; 
Hjern et. al., 1981; Sabatier, 1986; Ayee, 1991). Sabatier (1986) has added that the 
model uses contacts as the fulcrum for developing a network technique to identify the 
local, regional and national actors involved in the planning, financing and executing the 
programmes (see Davies et. al., 1982). 
The fundamental principle of this model sees implementation as the most important 
activity in policy analysis that happens at the bottom of institutional hierarchy rather than 
at the top, or by bargaining between members of institutions and their clients. This 
shows that the people at the bottom must be involved in all stages of policy analysis. 
This is important because the model assume that people at the bottom will eventually 
mould policy to suit their aspirations (Lipsky, 1971; Elmore, 1979) and therefore the role 
of those at the top of the system is residual. That is, they provide the resources that 
implementers need to work, but they should not exert direct control over the factors that 
determine the success or failure of this activity (Elmore, 1978; Sabatier, 1986). Hill 
(1997: 214) have consequently argued that on methodological grounds implementation 
studies must concentrate on the efforts of those at the bottom because this will provide an 
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explanatory framework for inputs from the top. This argument is supported by the 
classical statist position on democracy that it is better to negotiate policy at the bottom'. 
Elmore (1979) says that the model does not begin with a statement of intent but with a 
statement of specific behaviour at the bottom of the implementation process that 
generates the need for policy. The process specifies the policy objective only when the 
required behaviour has been outlined. According to Elmore's perspective, the objectives 
are first stated as a set of organisational operations and then later as a set of outcomes that 
is produced from these operations when the precise target has been established. The 
implementation process is then filtered through the structure of implementing agencies to 
affect the behaviour that is the target of the policy. This process will require the needed 
resources to be available in order to have that effect. That is in the final stage of the 
process, policy makers prescribe a policy that provide resources to those agencies that are 
likely to have the greatest effect of implementing the policy. 
The rationale that underpins the model is the dissatisfaction of policy implementers about 
the assumption of the top-down model that the bottom-up model is incapable of making 
independent judgments and decisions for which reason the behaviour of policy 
implementers must be programmed by someone else (Elmore, 1978). It is however 
difficult for implementing officials who perceive themselves as competent, self-sufficient 
adults to be committed to policies that put them in a category of passive actors. This has 
become even more critical in this era where manpower requirements emphasise 
professionalism of the workforce. As a result there is an increasing demand for 
autonomy, participation and discretion in the policy implementation process. Crosby 
(1994) has also said that the continuous improvement in the performance of 
implementing agencies is most likely to occur when workers groups and individuals are 
" The bottom here refers to those who are responsible for the policy implementation and those affected by the policy. 
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not only provided with knowledge, skills and motivation but also with authority to make 
decisions. 
The bottom-up model therefore examines the implementation process from the purview 
of a multitude of actors and their interaction at the operational level of specific policies. 
It discounts other stages in the policy process, namely; policy formulation, and re- 
formulation (Elmore, 1980). The model focuses on the strategies pursued by various 
implementing agencies in the pursuit of their self-interests because the model see these 
agencies disregarding the central objective of the policy to seek their own interests 
(Barret et. al., 1981; Hjern et. al., 1982, Elmore, 1980; Sabatier, 1986). The model 
underpins the formal division of administrative labour but makes no a priori suggestions 
about the role of a formally mandated organisation or the relative importance of any 
particular public or private actor involved in the policy process. 
Elmore (1979) has observed that although the bottom-up model takes the policy makers' 
position on the implementation process, it does not assume that policy is the only or even 
the major influence on the behaviour of people engaged in the process. The model also 
does not rely on compliance with the policy makers' intent as the standard for success or 
failure. It bases success on the limited ability of implementing agencies at one level of 
the implementation process to influence the behaviour of actors at other levels, and on the 
limited ability of public institutions as a whole to influence private behaviour. 
Thirdly, the model assumes that the closer one is to the source of the problem, the greater 
is one's ability to influence it. It also assumes that the problem-solving ability of 
complex institutions depends not on hierarchical control but on maximising discretion at 
the point where the problem is most immediate. That is, the model stresses diffused 
control and concentrates on factors that can only be indirectly influenced by policy 
makers. Examples of these factors are knowledge and problem-solving ability of lower- 
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level administrators, incentive structures, bargaining relationships among agencies, and 
the strategic use of funds to affect discretionary choices. 
a. Strengths of the Model 
The key strengths of this model is that, it is first and foremost a methodology for 
reconstructing the decision process in policy implementation and implies no normative 
preference for any particular agency in that process. It rather draws central actors into the 
reconstructed implementation process in terms of their practical roles in that process. 
However, if they are the determinant agencies in the implementation process, the method 
will eventually reveal them as such (Hanf, 1982). Thus, the model provides a neutral 
mapping of who participates in the implementation process and to what effect. Secondly, 
the lack of assumptions about which the relevant agencies are, makes a representation of 
a variety of interests in the inter-agency network and organisation rather than a particular 
one, like the top's. This is an important strategy to improve the performance in public 
policy implementation. 
b. Flaws in the Model 
The model is however associated with three fundamental problems. The first problem 
relates to defining what should be done in terms of what can be done by existing 
institutions with minimal disruption and conflicts. Elmore's (1980) statement that policy 
making should be understood in terms of the organisational processes of implementing 
agencies and the effects that these processes have on the target groups is very significant 
in expatiating this problem. Secondly, Hanf (1982) has observed that the model does not 
necessarily lead to the evaluation of performance in terms of preferences, interests and 
objectives of locals who may implement a policy in ways not intended or desired by the 
top. Neither does the model suggest an evaluative benchmark for analysis. It leaves 
room to apply the top's objectives as the evaluative benchmark or to apply those of any 
other actor. 
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These two fundamental problems makes the bottom-up model also unsuitable to be used 
for analysing the findings of the current research. However, it is important to note that 
the crucial difference between the top-down and bottom-up models lies in whether one 
chooses to rely on formal devices of command and control that centralises authority or on 
informal devices of delegation and discretion that disperse authority (see Elmore, 1980). 
3.5.3 The Interactive Model 
Debates between the proponents of the two models above regarding which of the two 
offer a viable framework for policy implementation has led to the conception of the 
interactive model as a third alternative. The interactive model is basically a synthesis of 
the strengths of the two previous models. The thrust of the interactive model is that a 
policy initiative may be changed and even reversed at any level in the implementation 
process by pressures and reactions of those who are opposed to it. The model perceives 
policy as a process in which stakeholders and other interested groups can influence its 
outcome through implementation. That is, whereas some stakeholders may be capable 
of influencing high-level officials in government, others will be effective at affecting the 
managers of the implementation process, and others at those who control the resources 
needed for implementation. 
The interactive model provide tools for: anticipating reactions to change; considering the 
prospects for sustaining the policy through the implementation process; and assessing 
whether the required resources for implementation are available or need to be augmented. 
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Figure 3-3 
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Source: Grindle et. al. (1991: 127) 
This model is presented graphically in figure 3-3 above. With this model the demands to 
put policy issues on the policy agenda comes from many sources, including development- 
minded policy elite. Some items on the agenda are acted upon while others are not based 
on preferences, perceptions, actions of policy elite, and their ability to appreciate the 
economic and political environment they face. Thus, in the interactive implementation 
process, the agenda always contains many issues than are usually acted on as well as 
issues that are acted on but not implemented. In the process, policy makers accord some 
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issues with active consideration, but the point of actual decision is hard to determine 
precisely. The process of authorisation may go through one or more stages of the 
bureaucracy and may have to be confirmed at some level of political decision-making. 
Once an affirmative decision is made, it may be reversed at a higher level at some point 
in the implementation process, and the issues may be returned to the agenda. The model 
therefore see the policy process as a series of formal and informal stages with numerous 
actors who have distinct interests and concerns (see Grindle et. al., 1991). 
Thus, although policy makers see some policies as controversial, unpopular and fraught 
with risks, most of them do not pay particular attention to planned strategies for 
implementing them. This happens because they conform to the linear model that enjoins 
policy makers to decide on a policy but distance themselves from its implementation. 
They leave the implementation process to lower rank bureaucrats whose capabilities they 
are normally unsure. But the model recognises that much as implementation requires 
good analysis and a plan, the chances of success are high if policy makers are involved in 
the entire policy process including the implementation stages. Grindle et. al. (1991) have 
therefore advised that policy makers must not assume that policy formulation is the most 
important stage in the policy process and what follows is just a mechanical process which 
may be executed by others if briefed. 
The interactive model emphasizes coordination, control and compliance but through 
negotiations and not sanctions. According to this perspective, the process involves 
people at the bottom who are already performing complex tasks (see Elmore, 1978 and 
1980; Hjern et. a., 1981; Hjern et. al., 1982; Barret et. al., 1981). Secondly, the model 
draws on the assumptions that policy makers have strong interests in affecting the 
implementation process and therefore policy makers must play an effective role in the 
implementation stage. Thus under the model, Hanf (1982) recognises that the process is 
not the concern of a single, hierarchically integrated organisation but it depends on the 
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collaboration of a number of independent institutions. The implementation process 
therefore needs to establish patterns of interaction and interrelationships among those 
actors through which information is communicated, cooperation established, and 
conflicts resolved. Thus, the interactive model draws eclectically on the participation of 
a variety of different actors from the two previous models to provide an understanding of 
the multi-actor system of implementation. For example, increasing number of 
development and capacity building programmes are carried out in multi-institutional 
settings in which these implementing agencies simultaneously advance local, national 
and international objectives as well as public, private and international interests. Under 
such circumstances these implementers will be confronted with the task of mobilising and 
coordinating the resources controlled by the various actors to enable them put a 
programme into effect. 
Even though Jordan (1982) has argued that the interactive model of implementation 
points to ad hoc, trial-and-error searches for a feasible solution to implementation 
problems, it is the only model that looks at policy implementation from the perspective of 
both actors at the top and bottom of the policy process. Hence, the model is popular in 
private sector models of management. The model provides a suitable framework for 
analysing the complexity that associate the multi-actor system of the Ghana-Vision 2020 
and the NIRP implementation processes. Hence this model is used to analyze the 
findings of the current research. 
3.6 Interactive Policy Implementation and Systems Analysis 
Systems analysis provides a useful framework for analysing the complexities that 
associate policy implementation. The systems' model that has relevance for the 
interactive policy implementation is parallel to Easton's (1965) use of systems to analyse 
political life where inputs go into a decision system and yields outputs. Easton's model 
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has been modified in the discussion to show the urgency of interaction for successful 
implementation. 
3.6.1 Systems Analysis of a Complex Interactive Implementation 
Systems analysis is generally seen as a continuous problem-solving framework through 
four broad stages. A UN Report (1981) describes these stages as: objectives setting after 
problem definition; exploration of alternative approaches to arrive at acceptable decision; 
the assessment and ranking of these alternatives; and the choice of one single alternative 
as the most appropriate policy for achieving the desired objective. The report argues that 
systems analysis had been used as a scientific tool for increasing the degree of rationality 
in policy analysis, where such rationality is based on the canons of efficiency (United 
Nations: 1981: 9-10). 
As discussed previously, the interactive implementation system comprises of a set of 
interrelated entities and their interrelationships. This system has boundaries that 
distinguish it from the operating environment. It is in a sense a net of communication 
and coordination process which permits the flow of information that leads to a self- 
adjusting process. The interactive implementation system has inputs and outputs that 
emanates from actors at the bottom and the top. The output may re-enter the system as an 
input or what is termed feedback by Dougherty et. al. (1981: 135). Thus, the interactive 
policy implementation system has the following three core elements: 
i. a set of component parts (i. e. actors in the policy process including implementing 
agencies) which when put together perform some purposeful activity. 
ii. functional interrelationship of these parts, and 
iii. an ongoing interrelationship between this set of component parts and the 
environment (see Lovell, 1970: 27,32). 
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These three core elements underpin the interactive model and they emphasise that, 
sometimes the goals of the implementation systems get muddled up due to the differing 
interests. The second element suggest that the component parts work together, and if 
some are absent or malfunctions, the system will fail to work to capacity or might even 
break down as shown in figure 3-4. This is further illustrated in Emile Durkheim's 
(1933) valuable contribution to the sociology of policy implementation. This grand 
theorist, see in division of labour an axiom of structural differentiation which is the 
emotive force for managing policy implementation in modern societies. The third 
element expresses an idea that the interactive implementation system monitors the 
environment, respond to it and influences it. 
Figure 3-4 
Effects of Actors Performance on Policy Implementation 
Actors in the Policy Process 
Source: The Author 
In Figure 3-4 above, institutions and agencies like the MDA's constitute the actors in the 
Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP policy processes. Each of these sector-institutions and 
agencies have a purposefully defined role to play in the policy process which is 
represented by lines a, b, c, and d. Secondly, the performance of these roles combine 
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together to achieve the policy objective. Whenever there is inefficiency in the 
performance of any one sector or even in a sector institution or agency's performance as 
in `d', the entire implementation process will not perform optimally and sometimes the 
attainment of the policy objectives will even be problematic as shown with the impact of 
line `d' on the attainment of policy objectives. A defect in the performance of any one 
actor becomes a setback for the entire process if it is not swiftly and adequately corrected. 
Thirdly, these actors are sensitive to the environment in the sense that planning and 
implementation affect the environment and vice-versa. This idea of comparing the 
interactive implementation process to a system is an abstraction and an intellectual 
construct that seeks to explain the complexity of interactive policy implementation. 
Some of the fundamantal principles include: 
: An input to the interactive implementation system takes the form of resources 
like information, money, demands or needs that are injected into the implementation 
system. The system serves as the memory of the implementation process with facilities, 
faculties and mechanism to store and recall information to aid the implementation 
process. All inputs are processed here in the memory. 
After the system has processed the inputs, it is translated into action which is 
returned from the system into the environment as an output through a specific or series of 
programmes. This is where the goals and objectives of the policy are either realised or 
failed. 
Feedback: The feedback is a new information or resource that is the result of the 
previously unleashed action from the system. This provides the basis upon which the 
input goes through the entire cycle again. This makes the interactive implementation 
system a dynamic process. The feedback provides the mechanism for revising the 
previous action or unleashing new action as a follow up to the previous one. By this 
process, the system is able to accommodate new and unforeseen challenges that emerge 
during the policy implementation process. This is illustrated in figure 3-5, which 
elaborates this input-output variety of the interactive implementation system. 
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Figure 3-5 





Source: The Author 
One attraction of this kind of systems analysis in explaining the interactive 
implementation process is its movie effect. The processes it applies to are ongoing and to 
some extent recurring so there is a sense which makes one think about systems analysis 
of interactive implementation in a way that seems to capture the dynamics of existence. 
The processes are serial where one step is a lead to another and they become cumulative 
through the memory such that what happens is a reflection of what happened before. 
Systems also do contain sub-systems and this happens by systems nesting inside 
themselves. This captures the interactive implementation process in motion and the parts 
(i. e. sector-institutions, agencies and policy makers) in a framework of interdependence. 
Another dimension of the nesting process reflects the segmentation of the interactive 
implementation process into a series of differential tasks with the parts being responsible 
for different tasks. Each task can therefore be stopped analytically for a closer 
examination. The current research will use this perspective to analyse the remits of the 
individual sub-programmes of the NIRP and the design of coordination processes for 
achieving the overall objectives of the NTRP. 
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3.6.2 Input-Output Processes in the Interactive Policy Implementation 
One way of analysing the complexity of interactive implementation with systems is to 
compare variations in inputs to variations in outputs, and hope to find that regularities in 
the changes in the former will invariably lead to regularities in variations in the latter. 
For example, when inputs such as funding and technical information are filtered through 
the system (memory) for a predetermined policy outcome (output), they will each 
produce different output because the inputs vary. In the same way, an increase in one of 
these inputs will produce an increased output. To illustrate the argument, the explanation 
for increased speed of a car (output) which oscillates from 60 m. p. h. to 80 m. p. h. is the 
increase in the pressure on the accelerator (variation in input). 
It can be observed from figure 3-5 (above) that inputs undergo some form of processing 
in the memory before it is unleashed as an output. The processing is responsible for the 
causal relationship that exist between changes in inputs and outputs. But figure 3-5 does 
not explain why. Besides, not all changes in inputs are of equal importance for changes 
in the outputs. This therefore requires a new and elaborate version of the model that will 
fragment the inputs into parts, and show the various actors in the policy process and their 
interactions for role accomplishment. The inputs must therefore be categorised into parts, 
and as a first step, local inputs will be distinguished from external inputs. The local 
inputs consist of cluster of things such as government policy, resources, information, 
national culture and its dominant elements, social structure and aspirations of nationals. 
The external inputs include cluster of things that presses on the system from the 
international community. Examples are donor policy interventions, aid, loans, and the 
various forms of technical assistance packages. 
These inputs have to be transmitted, and this is done by policy makers through 
communication. Communication may be uneven, imperfect and irregular hence, systems 
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vary in terms of their communication processes18. There is also the sticky issue of 
perception. Perception in this context may be understood from two perspectives. These 
are the manner in which input is communicated and understood by actors and secondly, 
the visibility of the input. For example, what if quality personnel is misconstrued for 
quantity of personnel, and what if Ghana thinks it will have enough resources to complete 
the implementation of its Vision 2020 and the NIRP by a set date but does not? 
Perception is therefore selective and it is influenced by such variables as ideology, 
culture, human cognitive processes, experience and training, and psychological 
characteristics. Thus inputs are immersed in an intricate mesh of communication and 
perception processes and these have important effect on the quality of output. 
The discussions so far are bereft of the principles of the output processes. The hypothesis 
here is that outputs vary according to variations in inputs as mediated by actors in the 
policy process as well as the process of communication and perception. This means that 
the policy output also goes through the processes of communication and perception that 
are largely defined by information and data. It is also important to distinguish policy 
from implementation, and both policy and implementation from action although it must 
be emphasised that these constitute one chain in the policy process19. The essence of this 
division is to explain for instance why in the policy implementation process decisions are 
made sometimes to perform a particular activity, but what is actually done resembles 
partially, what should have been done, or sometimes a particular activity is engaged in 
that was not previously decided. These processes are illustrated by figure 3-6 below. 
18 Communication is one of the critical factors that determine the output of policy. This maybe lateral or vertical. 
19 Policy has been attached to implementation in Action 1 (in figure 3-6) to show that in this process, the outcome is 
commensurate with the policy objectives. 
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Figure 3-6 
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NB: Policy Actors include policy makers, Implementing Agencies and the Environment. 
In this figure, `actions' have been categorised to explain why and when certain action 
takes place in the implementation process instead of others and to distinguish between the 
types of action that the output is concerned with. For example in the Ghana-Vision 2020 
and the NIRP implementation, action may be various. Sometimes it is the result of 
policies and implementation mediated by communication and perception (that is 
information and data), sometimes the result of implementation without reference to or 
even in spite of policy, and sometimes without recourse to either policy nor 
implementation. It is important to stress that the input and output processes as mediated 
by communication and perception, and the filtration through the memory is to a very 
large extent impacted by institutional factors such as procedures, quality of human 
resource (that is skills and expertise) and governance systems. The output processes are 
effectively executed if institutional networks are effective and the intermediary processes 
like communication and perception are adequate. 
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One way of understanding systems analysis of interactive implementation is to design it 
in the manner captured in figure 3-6. In order to explain this model, it has been assumed 
that institutions perform these functions optimally. The figure also reflects the 
complexity of networking and communication processes that take place among 
institutions concerned with the policy process as for example, Ghana's PSIs in the case of 
the current research. These institutions' performances have impeded Ghana's 
development due to their structural inefficiencies and insufficient level of skilled 
personnel. These institutions however have high stakes in the implementation of Ghana- 
Vision 2020 and consequently, the NIRP. The interactive policy implementation system 
is therefore used as the conceptual framework for analysing the implementation of these 
two policies in chapters five and six. 
Thus, the question that "Ghana's incapacity to progress in her development is caused by 
structural inefficiencies and insufficient level of skills in Public Sector Institutions. In what 
way can the NIRP mitigate these lapses to ensure a sustainable national development? " is 
best explored using the interactive implementation theory as the framework for analysis. 
The theory provides the opportunity to explore and examine the processes and dynamics 
involved in achieving the outcomes of the policies that underpin the research question - 
that is the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the National Institutional Renewal Programme (see 
chapter 4). Thus, the theory will enable the research to analyze the problems and 
opportunities involved in securing the outcomes of these two policies and consequently, the 






Methods and Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research methods used for the current study. The chapter also 
describes how the enquiry process was organized and it is divided into five sections. 
Section one is the introduction and it describes how the chapter is organised. Section two 
states the research question and also lists eleven sub-questions as elements of the broad 
research question. Section three discusses the approach to the enquiry process. Methods of 
data collection are also discussed in section four. Sections five and six respectively discuss 
the steps used for interpreting and reporting the data, and theory of the methodology. This 
last section provides a theoretical explanation for the design of methodology - that is an a 
priori link between methods and the broad research question. Essentially, this shows that 
the research design is a product of the issues under investigation. 
4.2 Elements of the Research Question 
The pith of the research question as discussed in the previous chapters relates to PSIs 
structural and human resource requirements for managing development and how these 
impact the delivery of Ghana's development. The research question is re-stated as; 
"Ghana's incapacity to progress in her development is caused by structural inefficiencies 
and insufficient level of skills in Public Sector Institutions. In what way can the NIRP 
mitigate these lapses to ensure a sustainable national development? " 
113 
In order to find answers to this broad research question, the under-listed questions (derived 
from the literature review and theory chapters above) were used as benchmarks for data 
collection. 
i. PSIs play an important role in managing the development process. How have these 
institutions performed this role, and within the framework of the NIRP, how are 
they required to function in the overall development environment? 
ii. Institutional value systems such as openness, transparency, accountability, 
cooperation and networking, and the legal and institutional framework for policy 
analysis need to be addressed in the capacity building process. In what way is the 
NIRP designed to address these imperatives seeing that the lack of these have 
affected public sector performance at managing Ghana's development? 
iii. Participatory institutional structures and effective coordination of sectional interest 
are necessary for Ghana's development management. In what way will the NIRP 
ensure the move from single centers of decision-making to multiple channels of 
communication and participation, and therefore create an enabling development 
environment for collective efforts in the development process? 
iv. The human resource crisis in Ghana has had a negative impact on building 
institutional capacity for development. In what way is the NIRP seeking to address 
this crisis that has incapacitated institutional performance? 
v. Managerial performance in Ghana's PSIs has had a retrogressive impact on 
institutional efficiency, especially as PSIs have been unable to mobilize and harness 
Ghana's human resource endowment for development. How is the NIRP 
addressing these managerial pitfalls? 
vi. Ineptitude such as over-regulation, lack of accountability, over-centralization, 
limited administrative capabilities and authoritarian practices in PSIs have 
distorted Ghana's development management process. In what way is the NIRP 
seeking to correct these distortions to enhance national development? 
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vii. Gender and tribal bias have impeded Ghana's development process and institutions 
have done very little to provide solutions. What strategy is the NIRP devising to 
correct these cultural problems? 
viii. There have been mix reactions regarding international donor involvement in 
Ghana's development. Whereas one school of thought see this involvement as a 
progressive partnership that leads to skill development and programme funding, 
another sees it as a process that distorts the development process. How will the 
NTRP eliminate these distortions that associate donor involvement in Ghana's 
development? 
4.3 Approach to the Enquiry Process 
This section describes the framework within which the study was carried out. It covers 
such research activities as subject selection, case studies used, negotiating access and the 
topic guide used. 
a. Case Studies 
Two national policies - the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP were selected as case 
studies (for detailed description of these two policies, refer respectively to chapters five 
and six). The Ghana-Vision 2020 is an integrated programme of economic and social 
policies that provide a perspective framework for accelerated growth and sustainable 
development. The programme seeks to turn Ghana into becoming a vibrant and dynamic 
middle-income country by the year 2020. The programme envisages that by this time, 
Ghana would have attained the status and standard of living of an upper middle-income 
country. The vision therefore calls for a comprehensive transformation of the economy and 
society in order to effect significant improvement in the quality of life of all Ghanaians. 
The NIRP on the other hand is a public sector performance improvement programme that 
aims at promoting national capacity building by means of a programme of institutional 
renewal, covering every sector of national life, and using the discipline of good governance 
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to improve the quality of institutional performance. The programme is comprehensive and 
it embraces Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) in Ghana's public sector. 
N RP therefore intends to turn Ghana's public service into a productive and motivated 
establishment capable of contributing towards the attainment of the Ghana-Vision 2020 
objectives through good governance. 
The Ghana-Vision 2020 was selected because it is the most current development policy 
in Ghana. Since the research is about Ghana's development, a critical examination of this 
policy will be useful in revealing the strengths, weaknesses and gaps in the 
implementation process. These problems that associate the implementation of the Vision 
2020 provides the raison de etre for building public sector capacity to manage the 
development process. This is why the NIRP has been selected as the second case study - 
to examine how Ghana is addressing the policy gaps associated with its development 
policies. The justification for selecting these two case studies is that they will be useful 
in providing answers to the broad research question. That is, an analysis of the 
implementation process of Ghana-Vision 2020 will help to determine the actual causes of 
Ghana's under-development whereas the NIRP will provide an understanding as to how 
Ghana is seeking to eliminate these problems. 
The case studies approach was used because according to Stake (1995: 77) it is useful for 
intrinsic research. In accordance with Stake's perspective, this study is concerned with 
developing a general understanding of how policy developments in the capacity building 
programme will drive and sustain Ghana's development. These two processes belong 
naturally together as the former is designed to complement the latter. 
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b. Subject Selection 
Purposive sampling was used to select five PSIs, and two international donor agencies. 
The basis for sampling these institutions and agencies are their involvement with the 
Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP, as well as their specialised area of operation. Thus by 
adopting purposive sampling, the researcher used his prior knowledge and judgment (see 
Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 202; Sedlack and Stanley, 1992: 144-5). The five PSIs 
sampled are the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF), the Office of the Head of Civil Service (OHSC), the Ministry of 
Employment and Social Welfare (MESW), and the Management Development and 
Productivity Institute (MDPI). The NDPC and the MoF were selected because they are 
the two lead institutions in Ghana's development management process. Thus, whereas 
the NDPC is responsible for development policy and planning, the MoF takes care of the 
financial aspects of the process. The MoF has an added responsibility of overseeing the 
Public Financial Management Reform Programme (PUFMARP) which is a component 
programme of the NIRP. The OHCS was also selected because it is responsible for 
managing the Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme (CSPIP) which is one 
of the NIRP component programmes. Another reason for selecting the MoF and the 
OHCS is that it is useful to know how the capacity building exercise is being modeled in 
these two institutions because of their leadership roles. The assumption is that if the lead 
institutions are unable to build their own capacity to manage national development, it will 
raise doubts as to how they can help the other MDAs to build the required capacity. The 
MESW is the lead institution in national welfare policies and that is also important to 
development. The MDPI provides management training for public sector officials. It is 
therefore significant to explore how development management and capacity building 
issues are modeled in these institutions as well. The selection of these five subjects is 
based on balance in terms of policy inputs, their varied roles in the development process 
and consequently their involvement with the NIRP, as well as an opportunity for other PSIs 
to learn based on the lessons provided by these lead institutions (see Stake, 1995: 6). 
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The World Bank and the DFID were sampled from international donor agencies because of 
their deep association with the development and the capacity building processes in Ghana. 
That is, these two donor agencies are the major financiers of the capacity building 
programmes in Ghana. The World Bank makes substantial input to the entire NIRP 
process in terms of funding and technical advice, whereas the DFID is associated 
specifically with CSPIP and also in terms of funding and technical inputs including 
expertise. There is for example, a DFID technical adviser physically located at the OHCS 
working with his Ghanaian counterparts on the programme. Apart from these activities, 
they have also committed huge sums of money in terms of loans and grants to finance the 
Ghana-Vision 2020. Hence it is useful to examine the full extent of their input in terms of 
technical advice and funding to the two policies. 
4.3.1 Site and Subjects Characteristics 
The fieldwork was conducted in Accra, Capital City of Ghana because this is where the 
headquarters of Ghana's PSIs as well as the Secretariats for the NIRP and its component 
programmes are located. Accra is also the seat of government and almost every national 
policy in Ghana is made here even though under the Ghana-Vision 2020, the policy process 
is being decentralized. All the subjects for the study are therefore located in this city. 
Significantly, these characteristics model the pattern and trend of Ghana's development as 
these place emphasis on urban development. As the title suggests, the study covers the 
post-revolutionary Ghana, and this will be defined as the period from 1992 - 2000. 
4.3.2 Negotiating Access 
In order to gain access to these institutions, the researcher engaged in a series of 
negotiations with the authorities of the above-mentioned institutions (see Gilbert 1993). 
The researcher communicated with these authorities through letters. Whereas the process 
was successful with the sampled PSIs and the secretariats of the ID programme, it was not 
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the case with the World Bank although it is one main donor agencies selected for the study. 
The World Bank's resident mission in Ghana denied any direct involvement with the NIRP 
and the Ghana-Vision 2020. Hence they referred the researcher to the NDPC and the MoF 
instead for information required on the Bank's role in the two programmes. The data 
obtained on the World Bank for this research was therefore received through the NDPC 
and the PUFMARP Secretariat at the MoF. The World Bank's recent announcement of 
disengaging itself from the policies of the developing countries may be the explanation for 
this action. Access to the DFID, the second donor agency sampled for the study was 
gained through the Head of Civil Service (HSC) in Ghana. As mentioned already, the 
OHCS works closely with the DFID to implement the CSPIP which is a component of 
NIRP. 
4.3.3 Topic Guide 
The topics listed below served as benchmarks for data collection during the fieldwork. 
Thus these topics guided the processes for collecting the documentary, interview and 
observation data. These guides were derived from the elements of research question. 
These are: 
i. Institutions and the development management process. 
a. identify the role of PSIs in national development management. 
b. enquire about the institutional regulatory processes that associate the development 
management process. 
c. identify aspects of Ghanaian culture and their impact on the development 
management process. 
d. identify institutions' capacity to rise up to the challenges posed by the Ghana- 
Vision 2020 policy. 
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C. explore the Vision 2020 policy formulation process and its implications for the 
policy implementation. 
2. Governance Framework. 
a. identify the extent to which institutional value systems such as openness, 
transparency, accountability, monitoring and legal system impact the development 
policy process 
b. explore how cooperation, consultative and networking processes are managed 
through the existing institutional arrangements for policy implementation. 
c. identify the processes for inclusion in the development policy process and how this 
is being changed or upheld by PSIs. 
d. explore the infrastructural support mechanisms available to aid development policy 
implementation. 
3. Management and Delivery Systems. 
a. identify the managerial impact on the development management process. 
b. explore any possible connection between managerial ineptitude and Ghana's under- 
development. 
c. identify Ghana's manpower potentials and its impact on national development. 
d. identify the processes and potential of building capacity for development through 
the NIRP and how this will impact the nation's development and the processes 
thereof. 
4. Human Resource in Capacity Building. 
a. establish a link between Ghana's manpower crisis and under-development in Ghana 
b. identify the methods used by donor agencies to impart skills and expertise to local 
managers and donor commitment to this course. 
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c. identify opportunities for increased participation of local experts in the development 
policy process. 
4.4 Methods of Data Collection 
The researcher adopted the triangulation approach to data collection in this study. This is 
a multi-method or an intersecting set of different research methods within a single project 
(see Denzin, 1970 and Gilbert, 1993). Three main forms of research methods were used 
in the triangulation and therefore for collecting data. The rationale for this research 
design is that answers to the research question can best be secured by using a 
combination of methods. Thus, the use of any one method would not have been 
sufficient to generate the required data in terms of reliability and validity. 
The multi-method approach provided the formula for testing the reliability and validity of 
the data collected. The case for this multiple data sources is made very necessary 
especially in Ghana where politically sensitive data are often subject to substantial error if 
they were collected by any one method (see Bulmer and Warwick, 1993). This data 
collection design is justified by the problems encountered during the fieldwork. That is, 
political exigencies in Ghana did not permit officials to provide information freely without 
fear of intimidation and reprisals. In such situations, any data gathered for research 
purposes especially from public institutions may be subject to some margin of errors and 
distortions. PSIs constitute the subjects of this research, and these institutions are a major 
part of the government machinery for national development policy analysis and 
development management. However, in view of the closed system of governance in 
Ghana, it became evident during the fieldwork that people deliberately censored the 
information given at interviews. This is very typical of the outcome of qualitative 
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interviews. In certain cases, they completely withheld the information and others offered to 
give information off the record. The multi-method approach therefore was to ensure that 
information withheld in the use of one method might be obtained through the use of 
another method. The methods used are: 
a. Documentary Evidence 
The study made extensive use of documentary data. These were mainly obtained from the 
above-listed subjects. The utility of this method is the availability of data once the 
document gets to the researcher. It is very much unlike interviews where officials can 
withhold information. This becomes the case in documentary data only when the entire 
document or a part of it is made unavailable to the researcher. The research made use of 
both primary and secondary documents. The data so generated accounted for both past and 
current trends in the development management and capacity building processes in Ghana. 
The inadvertent type of primary documents was used because these are generated from the 
day-to-day schedule of the sampled institutions and ID programmes and therefore has a 
high measure of reliability. The types of documents used were focused on those: 
a. with a broad strategic policy making, and planning undertones 
b. debating the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NTRP 
c. addressing major issues of policy implementation, and 
d. aimed specifically at stakeholders of Ghana's development. 
The secondary documents used include government and official publications on the Ghana- 
Vision 2020 and the NIRP, as well as articles and writings of practitioners in the field. 
These documents were obtained from the five PSIs, the DFID and the Secretariats of the 
NIRP, PUFMARP AND CSPIP. 
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The current researcher acknowledged Scott's (1990) caution to pay attention to issues of 
authenticity, credibility, mis-representation and meaning when written documents are 
used as data. The researcher therefore screened the documentary data collected by 
finding out first what kind of document it is and also ascertaining what is says, who 
produced it, and finally established if the documents are complete, altered and or edited 
in any way (see Bell, 1993). The researcher also checked for the author's social 
background, political views, aims and past experiences. Other factors checked included: 
a. the author's experience and whether he/she experienced what has been documented, 
b. the author's expertise, 
c. whether the author told the truth, exaggerated, distorted or omitted anything (see 
Bell, 1993). 
The study incorporated this design to ensure that individual biases do not distort the data. 
The data from the documentary materials are given references that indicate the source and 
year of the publication. Where these are official publications, each word of the title begins 
with a capital letter in the bibliography. Articles are referenced differently. The first words 
of the titles of articles begin with a capital letter but all the remaining words begin with 
small letters. Besides, all quotations that exceed three lines on a page are put in single- 
spaced and small (10pt) lettered quotations. 
b. Interview 
In-depth interviews were used as the second method of data collection. This took the form 
of a loosely structured interview in which the researcher sat face to face with the 
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respondents and asked questions. In view of the fact that the subject of enquiry is sensitive 
to the Ghanaian political system, the questions for the interview were designed in such a 
manner to ensure maximum objectivity and without bias for any political views or political 
party. However this objective was not achieved as some of the respondents declined to 
answer certain questions and or did not want their response to some of the interview 
questions to be quoted or referenced. The interviews were useful in obtaining data that 
could not be accessed by the documentary method of enquiry. This is especially significant 
because record keeping in Ghana's PSIs has generally not been good. It is therefore very 
easy to lose vital data if one concentrates only on documentary sources. The interviews 
served as a follow up technique to seek detailed information or further explanation to the 
documentary data. The interview also enabled the researcher to follow up ideas, probe 
responses and investigate motives and biases of the interviewees (see Bell, 1993). The 
interview helped in securing data on different perspectives of the various issues and 
provided more in-depth information. It also afforded the researcher with the opportunity to 
explore into great details, the respondents' views, experiences and perceptions. 
Some respondents to the interview requested anonymity whereas some information was 
given off the record. In order therefore to comply with the ethics of research, the identity 
of the respondents in the interviews are not disclosed. The profiles of the respondents are 
given in appendix H (and unbound sheet) which is marked "For University of Bristol Use 
Only". This has therefore affected the method used for quoting from the interviews. That 
is, the researcher when quoting from the interviews refers to the institution from which the 
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interview was given rather than the individual respondents. An example of this type of 
reference is "the interview from the NDPC" or "the interview at the CSPIP Secretariat". 
The data from the interviews are normally given in quotes in the analysis chapters. Where 
these quotes exceed three lines in length, they are put in single-spaced and small (10pt) 
lettered quotes. There are also instances where the interviews are paraphrased to illustrate 
an argument (see Appendix G for a sample of the interview questions). 
i. Selection of Respondents 
The respondents for the interview were selected from the above-named subjects. The 
selection was based on the positions or responsibilities of the respondents in their 
respective institutions. These included senior, middle and junior management officials, and 
experts or consultants who have had close association with the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the 
NIRP. These are also officials who have responsibilities towards national development 
management and also connected to the capacity building programme. Another criterion for 
the selection was their knowledge in the subject area. 
The researcher relied on contact persons in the various institutions during the process of 
selecting individual respondents. This was necessary to ensure that only people with the 
requisite technical knowledge were interviewed. This was intended to ensure and satisfy 
the researcher that a particular choice would produce the needed data. In most cases, the 
researcher officially informed the management of the institution about the interview and 
choice of respondents. The decision regarding this was left entirely to the individual 
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respondent, but the purpose was to ensure that the respondent is absolved from any 
recrimination that may result from the interview. 
A total of eleven interviews were given from seven institutions and programmes. The plan 
originally was to obtain two interviews from each institution or programme but this was not 
possible because as stated already, people were reluctant to offer interviews. The 
composition of the interviews therefore is: 
a. NDPC -1 
b. MESW -3 
c. MoF -1 
d. MDPI -1 
e. NIRP -2 
f. PUFMARP -I 
g. CSPIP -2 
(see Appendix H (unbound for profile of respondents) 
ii. The Interview Process and Data Collection 
The interview took the form described by Grebenik and Moser (1962: 16) as a loose 
structure even though the interview process was guided. This form of interview also 
enabled the researcher to cover all topics that are crucial to the subject of the interview and 
also allowed the respondents wide latitude to talk. The researcher only interrupted when it 
was necessary to probe a statement (see Bell, 1993). By this loosely structured interview, 
the researcher was able to establish a good framework for recording the data. The 
researcher used a combination of note taking and tape recording except where the 
respondent either did not want the session to be tape-recorded or wanted to make a 
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statement off the record. The tape recording was useful when the researcher needed to 
verify the accuracy of the notes taken at the interview. The researcher used interview 
guides to record responses under prepared headings. This was a means to properly 
organise the data in a structured way. 
The researcher also took the issues of confidentiality seriously especially due to the 
recriminating nature of the Ghanaian political system. Indeed some respondents requested 
anonymity and specifically stated that, part of the information given should not be 
referenced. Such situations have had implications on the way that such data were used in 
the report. That is such data are not referenced and in some cases, instructions are given 
not to quote some parts of the report until the National Democratic Congress (NDC) 
government in Ghana leaves office. 
c. Observation 
Observation was used as the third method of data source. This enabled the researcher to 
discover valuable information that could not be obtained by using the two methods above 
(see Bell 1993), and also to establish whether people's statements in the interviews reflected 
their behaviour (see Nisbet and Watt, 1980). The researcher adopted the non-participant 
observation method in order to be objective in interpreting what was seen. This 
observation involved identifying trends of behaviours and strategies for policy 
implementation in the development management and the capacity building programmes. 
The data on these two phenomena were gathered from workshops on the Ghana-Vision 
2020 and the NIRP. The researcher also observed how capacity building was modeled in 
the named PSIs. 
The observations made by the researcher are used in the analysis to assess the validity or 
reliability of the data obtained either from the interview or the documentary data. These 
are not normally mentioned in the analysis because they cluster with the other sources. In 
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other instances, the observation is used to reinforce the beliefs and opinion of the 
researcher. Hence they reflect on the researcher's arguments. 
Although structured observation is criticised to be subjective and biased (Bell 1993), the 
researcher adopted this approach because it enable him to focus precisely on the 
information needed. In order to achieve this, the researcher identified and listed the key 
themes of the research and took notes under these themes. That is, this exercise provided a 
framework for recording what was observed. 
4.5 Interpreting and Reporting Findings 
This is the stage in the research where the data collected from the field was translated into 
readable records, analysed and interpreted afterwards. The process involved placing the 
data into categories that have been devised on the basis of significant issues that emerged 
during the fieldwork. Thereafter, the researcher established similarities (or links) and 
differences for the groupings, patterns and items of significance. 
The researcher made an extensive use of the traditional method of data analysis - the file 
cards system. The data was entered unto index cards. These cards were arranged in 
different piles corresponding to the links between emerging empirical phenomena. This 
was a helpful way of establishing connections between disparate events and categories (see 
Allan and Skinner, 1991). The data was thereafter edited and composed into a report. This 
gave a final product for analysing the data and producing the final report. 
The processes involved in the method of enquiry described so far in this chapter are 
presented graphically in figure 4-1 below. The figure explains the investigation process 
from the bottom where the three methods of enquiry are listed. The process started with 
the preparation of entry sheets. Thereafter, the three research methods were 
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operationalized to generate the required data. The data was analyzed afterwards and 
translated into the current report. 
Figure 4-1 
A Methodological Framework for the Enquiry Process 
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Interpretative Framework 
As discussed earlier in chapter three, the study uses implementation theory as the 
interpretative framework. The choice of this interpretative framework is based on the 
fact that the core subject of the study relates to policy - that is the Ghana-Vision 2020 
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and the NIRP. Since the logical conclusion and for that matter the outcome of policy is 
achieved through implementation, the concept provides a useful tool for analysing the 
processes that will produce the specific outcomes for the two policies. The concept will 
also be helpful in determining the causes of the problems and solutions that led to these 
achieved outcomes. The concept will as a result be very instrumental in finding answers 
to the research question. 
System of Referencing 
The report uses the Harvard system of referencing. Books and official publications are 
referenced differently from articles and journals. Books and official publications have each 
word in the title beginning with a capital letter. Journals and articles on the other hand 
have the first word of the title starting with a capital letter and the remaining words 
beginning with small letters. The researcher uses also the works of researchers and other 
scholars to support the main arguments made in this report. 
4.6 Theory of the Methodology 
The rationale for this research design is that the combination of these three research 
methods will provide information that is not available from any one method and 
consequently find the required answers to the research question. For example valuable 
information that may be obtained from documentary evidence will be lost if the research 
was confined solely to interviews. This is because in the interviews, respondents thought 
processes based on their perception and cognition usually impact on the information 
given, and therefore information obtained from interviews are normally subjective. 
According to Bulmer and Warwick (1983), one important advantage of multiple data 
sources is that they permit the collection of critical data on a single topic that are not 
available if just one source was used for the study. This approach is necessary to 
improve accuracy in measuring any single phenomenon. The assumption is that 
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consistent findings from two or three methods are more likely to represent all the possible 
findings that might ever be obtained than findings from any single method (Bulmer and 
Warwick, 1983). Besides, the observation and documentary data also provided greater 
depth and meaning to the data obtained from the interview. That is, they gave high levels 
of precision and factual significance to aspects of the data that would otherwise have 
been difficult to interpret within an a priori framework. Such data were subject to the 
belief systems, political affiliations and perceptions of individual respondents. 
Thus, this design was used to test the reliability and validity of the data generated. This test 
was based on the four assessment methods suggested by Bulmer and Warwick (1983). 
These assessment methods emphasize: 
a. separate information with little overlap, 
b. convergent overlap, 
c. divergent overlap and 
d. inconclusive overlap. 
These assessment methods also showed the manner by which the data generated by the 
three different methods clustered around a given topic. These were useful for interpreting 
and assigning value to the data. The clustered data are indicated in the analysis with the 
use of phrases as "the data indicates concurrently that ... 
" or "the data repeatedly... ". 
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PART IV 




Institutions and Development Policy 
Implementation in Ghana 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the case study of Ghana's recent development policy - Ghana- 
Vision 2020. It analyses the implementation processes of the policy and shows that 
Ghana's ID programme (discussed in chapter six) has been necessitated by the problems 
envisaged in the implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020. The chapter is an attempt to 
answer the research question which is re-stated as "Ghana's incapacity to progress in her 
development is caused by structural inefficiencies and insufficient level of skills in Public 
Sector Institutions. In what way can the NIRP mitigate these lapses to ensure a sustainable 
national development? " The chapter addresses the first facet of the research question that 
seeks to explore the causes of Ghana's under-development i. e. the question that Ghana's 
under-development is caused by public sector structural problems and the mis-match of 
skills for development management, and whether there are more causes to the problem. 
This chapter has been divided into five sections. Section one introduces the chapter and 
section two examines the processes for development policy analysis in Ghana that 
consequently led to the formulation of the Ghana-Vision 2020, and the problems associated 
with the process. This is intended to establish whether at all there is a causal link between 
the processes for policy formulation and policy implementation. Section three discusses 
the dynamics of the development policy implementation process, and sections four and five 
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deals respectively with the governance processes for implementing the policy and the 
challenges that face Ghana's PSIs in the policy implementation process. 
5.2 The Development Management Process in Ghana 
This section describes the development process and establishes the role of PSIs in the 
process as indicated by item one on the list of sub-research questions (see 4.2). The 
interview at the NDPC gave a chronology of development policy events in Ghana that 
show that the development management process has been characteristic of ad hoc and short 
term planning, especially in the post Nkrumah years20. These development policy events 
are presented in table 5-1 below: 
Table 5-1 
Chronology of Development Policy Events in Ghana (1951 - 1995) 
YEAR DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
1951 First Five-Year Development Plan 
1959 Second Five-Year Development Plan 
1964 Seven-Year Development Plan* 
1968 Two-Year Development Plan 
1970 One-Year Development Plan 
1977 Five-Year Development Plan 
1983 Economic Recovery Programme-Structural Adjustment Programme 
1995 Ghana-Vision 2020 
V The seven-year development plan was abolished soon after President Nknunah's overthrow 
Source: Author 
20 Nkrumah (the first president of Ghana) enacted a comprehensive seven-year plan that was abrogated with his 
overthrow in 1966. 
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During this time, Ghana's ad hoc development planning system displayed characteristics of 
centralization, ad hoc management and lack of co-ordination in the policy-making process. 
The documentary sources reveals that the cost that this system unleashed on Ghana's 
development may be seen in terms of the "breakdown in programmed development, and 
was accompanied by substantial waste of the limited resources" (Laryea-Adjei, 1996). 
These lapses constitute some of the problems that have impeded effective policy 
formulation, implementation and monitoring in Ghana. Perera (1968: 57) has appropriately 
argued that inaction and apathy cause problems like these as in Ghana. For example, the 
high centralization of the policy process has made the development process the exclusive 
preserve of the central government with very little or in certain circumstances no 
participation from the citizens in whose interest the policies are being formulated and 
implemented. According to this interview therefore, "the ordinary Ghanaian could not 
identify with the development plans and as a result development programmes lacked 
popular participation and ownership, and were removed from the aspirations of 
Ghanaians". As a result, the implementation processes of these plans according to Erbynn 
(1995: 8) have been chequered. AAPAM (1984: 130) has argued that such over- 
centralization leads to goal displacement that arises out of too strict adherence to directives 
without regard for the reason behind their adoption. This perspective adds that this will 
consequently result in wastefulness, because in such situations information does not flow 
easily and this slows down the decision and action processes. According to the interview at 
the NDPC, the "lack of participation from Ghanaians and the consequent lack of political 
commitment to the policies have resulted in a practice where the policies are easily 
discarded when there is a change in government". This idea is supported by an argument 
made by Grindle and Thomas (1991) that political resources are very important to sustain 
the policy implementation process (see also Ayee, 1992). 
According to the interview, "these short-term ad hoc policies also concentrated on 
economic development and occasionally on spatial development". This means that the 
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"system did not integrate these aspects of development with social and environmental 
development". This development management system was therefore devoid of proper 
framework for co-ordinating and monitoring development policies. According to this 
interview, "the coordinating and monitoring problem resulted from Ghana's inadequate 
manpower base" as this had a poor impact on the implementation of most of these 
development policies. The entire development management system was therefore seriously 
flawed. Erbynn (1995: 9) has admits that "after nearly a decade of economic decline, the 
country's capacity to undertake long-term development planning had been largely eroded". 
The New Development Management System 
The interview at the NDPC show that in the post revolutionary Ghana, "the development 
management process has taken on, a more comprehensive approachi21. "The government 
has made development planning one of its main agenda by leading the process that 
culminated in the formulation of the Ghana-Vision 2020" which is a twenty-five year 
development policy that visions Ghana as a middle level income country by the year 2020. 
This new development management approach has been given a legal backing through two 
sets of legislation namely, the National Development Planning Commission Act of 1994 
(Act 479) and the National Development Planning (System) Act of 1994 (Act 480). 
Through these legislative instruments, the interview reveals that, "government intends to 
bring various PSIs, the entire Ghanaian society, and resources together to successfully 
implement the Ghana-Vision 2020". But the dynamics of the Ghanaian development 
management process (see 5.3 and 5.4) reveals that although the legal instruments are 
necessary to guide the development policy process, it is not a sufficient basis to achieve 
successful implementation due to variables such as conflicts, sectional or institutional 
21 This is the period after 1992. 
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interests and culture. The interview shows further that the "comprehensive approach has 
incorporated a clearly defined strategy in the new development management process". The 
process uses the bottom-up model of policy implementation where "local communities 
formulate goals and objectives of the development policy at the local level" (see 5.3.1 for a 
detailed discussion on this). Thereafter, 
"these are translated into programmes to be implemented in order to achieve the objectives. 
The programme approach to development is currently being piloted at the Ministry of 
Health. If successful, this new strategy of programme approach to development will be 
replicated in all government institutions and may be turned into a national policy for 
development management". 
Grindle and Thomas (1991) have emphasised this idea by saying that "strategizing" for 
policy implementation involves deep and careful planning which is necessary for 
implementation success. 
The documentary sources (see Erbynn, 1995) show that the new approach seeks to make 
certain fundamental changes in the development policy process. These changes reflects the 
"GoG's philosophy that national development cannot be left entirely to market forces". 
These changes are therefore anchored on a framework that require: 
a. a partnership between private and public sectors in the development process. That 
is "the private sector will be responsible for most investments and productive 
activities and will therefore become the engine of growth in the Ghanaian 
economy". The public sector on the other hand will be responsible for the 
provision of an enabling environment (which includes government commitment to 
legal, political and administrative reforms in favour of private-sector initiatives). 
b. the public administrator to be turned into a technician and a facilitator. Public 
sector administrators in the MDAs and in the regions and districts will have to 
undergo a complete change in attitude towards the private sector especially small- 
scale operators. This will require public-sector reforms which aims at effecting 
changes in institutional structures, roles and procedures of public administrative 
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system in order to achieve increased efficiency in the delivery of public services 
(see chapter 6). 
c. a democratization of the policy-making process. This will change the decision- 
making machinery such that "the public administrator and the planner will no 
longer dictate what the private-sector interest must be or what the collective choice 
of a community should be". Individuals and communities will participate in 
determining the collective choice and therefore contribute to effective participatory 
decision-making process (Erbynn, 1995). 
(See Appendix B for a graphical presentation of the new system). 
This emphasizes the important role of the state in development management. That is, 
although the state is providing the blueprint for development, the private sector and the 
civil society act as the main lever for bringing about development change in Ghana under 
the new system. This strategy is endorsed by Griffin et. al., (1987: 185); Wuyts et. al., 
(1992); and United Nations, (1981: 12). The new system therefore captures the state, the 
private sector, and the civil society as partners in the development process. The interview at 
the NDPC indicated that 
"the departure from the old development management system where government was the 
main actor was caused by three important factors. These are the government realization 
that it lacks adequate resources to implement national development policies, the lack of 
popular participation in the development process, and organised opposition that sabotaged 
most development policies". 
This change in Ghana's development strategy provides an alternative to the counter- 
revolution theory which supports the notion that development should be led by the private 
sector as it will better promote development (Hettne, 1995). 
5.2.1 Policy Analysis in the New Development Management System 
The documentary sources and the interview at the NDPC show that in order to obtain a 
national development policy under the new development management system, "the NDPC 
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is required to come out with a broad national development goal". This is formulated 
through a consultative process between the NDPC and all stakeholders in a series of 
workshops and seminars22. Thereafter, "each MDA is required to prepare a plan based on 
the overall national development goal to ensure that there is uniformity in direction". For 
example, "if the broad national goal is to increase average income to about ten times in the 
next ten or fifteen years, the MDAs would have to devise a specific plan to achieve this 
goal". These plans are then submitted to the NDPC. 
The above sources also reveal that units named the Cross-Sectoral Planning Groups 
(CSPGs) have been built into the new development management process for each broad 
sector of the economy. "These groups are required to provide a forum for broad based and 
in-depth discussion and analysis of the sector development plans, and to co-ordinate 
development planning and implementation activities". Each group is made up of 
personnel from the NDPC and the relevant MDAs, other public sector institutions, 
academic and research institutions, private sector organisations and traditional rulers. The 
interview at the NDPC revealed that "currently, there are four of such groups dealing with 
human development, economic development, spatial organisation and environment, and 
science and technology". The NDPC is required to work together with the CSPGs to put 
the plans together and ensure that they conform to national goals before they are 
implemented. The CSPGs is thereafter required to categorize the sector development plans 
into medium term, long term and rolling plans in line with the overall national goals23. 
Consequently, the sector ministries and the district planning authorities are responsible for 
seeing the implementation process through. 
22 Stakeholders include the public sector, private sector and the civil society as previously discussed. 
23 A "rollover" scheme has been built into the methodology of the new development planning system where a project is 
rolled over to the following year if it is not accomplished in the preceding year. 
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The South Commission (1990: 35) has commented that, no genuine development can be 
sustained without the participation of the people who are both the means and the end of 
development. That is, this approach to policy analysis in the new development 
management system reflects the new democratic philosophy of participatory decision- 
making which Nunnenkamp (1995: 10) defines as a process by which people lend an active 
and influential hand in shaping decisions that affect their lives. Juran (1989) has also 
observed that most of the knowledge to improve performance rests with those directly 
involved in the tasks. The interview reveals that, "communities, local authorities, sector 
ministries and the private sector have now become an integral part of the new participatory 
and accountable development policy process". The policy process has therefore become 
interactive in view of the involvement of variety of skills, groups and individuals in the 
process, especially at the implementation stages. The interview accordingly reveals that 
"the new system ensures that solutions to development problems are made within a multi- 
disciplinary environment and it takes into consideration the social, economic, political, 
scientific, technological, environmental and spatial implications". 
The current writer believes that this change in focus towards participatory development has 
been caused by the awareness by government that the greatest resource to a development 
process is the people, and secondly the realization by policy analysts that the ready 
consumption of development is dependent on actual demand. A third factor may be the 
inability of centralized development policy process to accommodate the varied local socio- 
cultural demands and to mobilize local resources as past development policy failures have 
shown (see Mathur, 1986: 14-5). Thus, by inference it may be assumed that policy makers 
are now aware that without the co-operation of the people, there is every likelihood of their 
policies not proceeding along their planned course (see Cornea, 1983). 
The interview at the NDPC also emphasised that "there are procedures for monitoring 
performance and strategies so when the objectives are not being met it is possible to correct 
the anomalies". Furthermore, "the monitoring and evaluation systems are made effective 
by a feedback loop that informs the process". Thus the progress made by the NDPC on the 
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policy implementation process is captured in systems analysis (discussed in chapter 3) 
where information or data resulting from a previous implementation activity is sent to the 
system. The system reacts to the information and a new activity is embarked upon to either 
reinforce or correct the previous action. The interview shows that "this monitoring and 
evaluation system had been incorporated to keep the development process on track and to 
meet its planned targets, to reduce excesses and the level of resource waste". Tinbergen 
(1958: 3) has argued that a system like this will create favourable conditions on which 
development will thrive. 
One major development policy that Ghana has adopted since the inception of the new 
approach to policy analysis is the Ghana-Vision 2020. To a very large extent the efficacy 
of this new approach to development management and therefore to policy analysis will 
determine how successful the implementation of Ghana-Vision 2020 will be and how this 
will enhance Ghana's development. 
5.2.2 Ghana's Development Policy: 1996-2020 
The documentary evidence (see Erbynn, 1995; Ghana, 1995b, and 1997) shows that the 
Ghana-Vision 2020 is a comprehensive development policy with a twenty-five year 
duration (1996 -2020). The policy seeks to turn Ghana into an open and liberal market 
economy (founded on competition and private enterprise, initiative and creativity) that 
optimizes the rate of economic development and ensures the maximum welfare and 
material well being of all Ghanaians. This data reveals that 
"this evolution will involve transformation of the economy from one based mainly on 
smallholder agriculture to a purposefully diversified and productive economy that is 
capable of responding effectively to the challenges posed by the world economy". 
Secondly, the economy will be transformed from one that is dominated by the public sector 
to one that benefits from enterprise and dynamic potential of the private sector, supported 
by an efficient system of public administration (that the NIRP is seeking to build) under 
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this policy. The policy is an "integrated programme of economic and social policies that 
provide a perspective framework for accelerated growth and sustainable development". 
The interview at the NDPC shows that "the vision in Ghana-Vision 2020 is for the country 
to become a buoyant and dynamic middle-income country within the first decade of the 
21st Century". That is by the year 2020 Ghana would have attained the status and standard 
of living of an upper middle-income country, with gross national product (GNP) per capita 
of about cn10.400.000 or just above US $4000. The interview further reveals that the 
philosophy of Ghana-Vision 2020 is based on the premise that "the overriding aim of 
development is the satisfaction of human needs and the improvement and realization of the 
potential of all members of the society". According to the data, this "national development 
goal has been determined by considerations of history, current strengths and the potential 
for further development, following an environmental scan or SWOT analysis". In sum, this 
vision calls for a comprehensive transformation of the economy and society in order to 
effect significant improvement in the quality of life of all Ghanaians. This assumption is 
underpinned by the GoG's idea that "the ultimate aim of the development effort in Ghana is 
the satisfaction of human needs and the development of the potential of every citizen" (see 
Ghana 1994c). 
a. Long-Term Objectives of the Policy (2000 - 2020) 
The documentary sources indicate that the long-term objective of the development policy is 
to "promote Ghana's competitiveness in the rapidly changing world economy and elevate 
the country from low to middle-income status". The policy seeks to achieve this objective 
through "human, economic, rural, and urban development programmes, as well as the 
creation of an enabling environment for private sector operators". The long-term 
objectives also emphasise: 
a. national self-reliance and independence of thought in all spheres of human 
endeavour, 
142 
b. creativity and innovation in all social and economic activities, 
c. good governance at all political and administrative levels, 
d. accelerated and sustainable economic growth, with due regard to the protection of 
the environment, 
e. equitable social and spatial development, and 
f. the promotion of the positive cultural ethos of Ghanaian values, beliefs and norms. 
b. Medium Term Objectives (1996-2000) 
The medium-term objectives of the policy according to the documentary sources include 
to: 
a. consolidate the foundations for accelerated economic and social development in the 
long term, 
b. create development opportunities through political reforms like democratization 
and decentralization, the provision of adequate domestic resources for exports and 
tourism, and encourage private foreign investment and donor support, 
c. eliminating the constraints on development that have slowed down the rate of 
recovery24 
d. create adequate wage and self-employment opportunities to ensure the productive 
absorption of the unemployed into the labour market, 
e. raise the levels of productivity in economic sectors and arrest the process of 
deformation of employment to make way for skill and technology upgrading in 
enterprises with potential for growth and expansion, 
24 The policy see these constraints as high rate of population growth, bad child care practices, lack of effective system of 
plan co-ordination, continuing low levels of domestic savings and financial intermediation, generally low levels of 
productivity, constraints on energy supply, especially electricity, low status of science and technology and 
environmental awareness, and lastly, the biases of the international economic order. 
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f improve significantly employment conditions and ensure good labour-management 
relations, adequate skill development and training, safe and healthy working 
environment, and 
g. ensure that women and the disadvantaged make themselves available to productive 
employment opportunities. 
The interview reveals that the government is using the under-mentioned strategies to 
achieve the medium term goals. These strategies include 
"poverty alleviation, human resource development, strengthening social infrastructure and 
services, increasing employment and leisure activities, education and training; and 
accelerating economic growth with a target of raising Gross Domestic Product to 8% and 
income per head to a little over US$500 in year 2000". 
The interview stressed also that "in order to achieve the long-term objective, the medium 
term strategy is to strengthen institutions for planning, policy formulation, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation" (see chapter six). 
From the documentary sources and observations made, Ghana has embarked on a rural and 
urban development programmes as well as political and institutional reforms in this phase 
of the plan. It is also "creating an enabling environment for the private sector through 
deepening the restructuring exercise of the PAS in order to increase its effectiveness to 
foster a dynamic and co-operative approach, and to promote private sector initiatives by 
changing attitudes within the public service". Within this period also, all laws and 
regulations that inhibit development and private sector operations are being reviewed. 
However, the present writer believes that the socio-economic conditions in Ghana for 
example, unemployment, increased poverty and corruption are evidence that the medium 
term goals of the policy are very far from being achieved. 
c. Short-Term Objectives (1995-1996) 
The interviews reveal that "the short term spanned a period of two years and as a result, 
only brief prioritized programmes were feasible". Within the framework of the long and 
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medium term strategies for achieving respective objectives, the short-term objectives were 
to 
a. strengthen the capacity of PPMEDs of PSIs to operate efficiently through 
recruitment of adequate professionally competent manpower and payment of 
competitive remuneration and fringe benefits, 
b. link PPMEDs with the NDPC to facilitate the blending of sectoral development 
plans, 
c. enhance the capacity of the PPMED personnel in policy and planning through 
training, provision of logistic support including physical facilities. 
It will be revealed subsequently in this chapter that these goals were not completely 
achieved in the short-term either. The interview revealed that, "this problem has been 
created by government policies that have alienated a lot of skilled personnel, as well as 
unattractive salaries in the public sector". This shows that the government has hitherto 
been unable to pay the "competitive remuneration " and fringe benefits to the skilled 
personnel it sought to recruit under the short-term objectives of the policy. 
5.3 Vision 2020 Implementation and the New Development 
Management System 
This section relates to the second element of the research question that seeks to explore the 
impact of public sector governance on the development management process. It was 
argued in chapter three that for any policy implementation to be successful, the process will 
require certain basic characteristics to operate. These characteristics include a structure of 
implementing agencies, resources, institutional linkages, and a good managerial 
framework. These characteristics are discussed in this section to explore the dynamics of 
the Vision 2020-policy implementation process. Grindle and Thomas (1991) have argued 
that the implementation phase of any policy determines the nature and successes of the 
policy. 
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5.3.1 The Ghana-Vision 2020 Implementation Structure 
Wittrock et. at. (1982) has said that an implementation structure consists of clusters of parts 
of institutions and these determine the shape and operations of policies. The interview at 
the NDPC which is also supported by the documentary sources (see Ghana, 1995; and 
1997) reveal that "in order to ensure effective implementation of Ghana-Vision 2020 under 
the new development management system, the national policy process has been 
decentralized". This decentralization process has created four distinct planning and 
implementing agencies. These are the District Assemblies (DAs) at the district level, 
Regional Co-ordinating Councils (RCCs) at the regional level, and the sector MDAs, and 
NDPC at the national level. "The NDPC acts as the national co-ordinating body in the 
development policy process". That is, 
"the role of institutions in the new development management system is identified on two 
levels. These are the national level where the NDPC and MDAs are the main actors, and 
the local government level that is constituted by the RCCs and the Metropolitan, Municipal 
and District Assemblies" (MMDAs)25. 
This provides enormous stake for efficient public sector performance. Lisk (1996: 54) has 
commented that on the macro level, PSIs are required to manage the development process 
through mobilising, allocating and utilizing human and material resources in an efficient 
and productive manner. He stresses that at the micro level, these institutions are needed to 
develop human and institutional capacity to manage development policy and projects. 
Elmore (1978) has argued that, where more than one agency is involved in the 
implementation of a policy, the lines of authority are usually blurred. This may create 
problems in the implementation process. Elmore's observation therefore provides a useful 
lesson for the policy implementation process because strategically, it requires establishing a 
25 See Appendix B for a graphical presentation of the structure of the new system. 
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framework for networking and cross-institutional linkages. Elmore's argument is 
reinforced by the idea that the ability of implementation structures to respond to problems 
depends on the specification of clear lines of authority and responsibility in the 
implementation process. 
a. The National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) 
The documentary sources and the interview reveal that under the new development 
management system, "the planning system law (Act 480) has made the NDPC the national 
co-ordinating and regulatory body of the development management system". This Act 
enjoins the Commission to "regulate the development policy process through legislative 
instruments and guidelines". Thus 
"the NDPC is responsible for co-ordinating the policy implementation process in the 
districts, and integrating economic, spatial and sectoral plans of MDAs and ensure that 
these plans and programmes are compatible with national development policy objectives 
and are in conformity with sound environmental principles. The NDPC approve plans and 
programmes of the districts, ministries and sector agencies, and also monitors the 
implementation of these approved plans and programmes". 
The interview stressed that "this role will enable the commission to revise (where 
necessary) national development policies in the light of changing domestic and 
international economic, social and political conditions". This data also indicates that, "the 
NDPC is obligated to monitor the annual development budget of the MoF to ensure that 
sectoral and geographical budgetary allocations are compatible with national development 
objectives". 
The documentary data and the interview show that the NDPC's responsibilities include: 
a. the provision of a long and medium term framework for formulating development 
policy, 
b. the provision of policy guidelines for the preparation of local and sectoral 
development plans by sectoral agencies and District Assemblies, and 
c. advising the President of the Republic of Ghana on development strategies. 
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"The NDPC is therefore at the apex of the new development management machinery. The 
Commission led the policy dialogue that culminated in the formulation of the Ghana- 
Vision 2020". 
b. The Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) 
The interviews and the documentary materials further reveal that within the framework of 
the new development management system, the respective roles of the MDAs are described 
by law (see Act 480). In this context and 
"under the framework of the Ghana-Vision 2020 sector MDAs have been transformed into 
planning and policy formulation units from their previous administrative roles. The 
demands of the Vision 2020 policy as well as the development management system require 
each ministry to create a Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Division (PPMED) 
which is suppose to co-ordinate policy and operationalize planning within the ministry as 
well as with agencies under the ministrys26. 
The role of the PPMED include organizing the various Heads of Department and Directors 
to formulate sectoral development policies and programmes in line with the national 
development goals and in accordance with the NDPC's sectoral development planning 
guidelines, and to oversee their implementation 27. 
"The PPMEDs are the NDPC's direct link to the MDA especially as they are responsible 
for submitting the sector development policies together with proposals for implementation 
to the NDPC for evaluation and approval". 
The MDAs are also required to monitor the implementation of the NDPC-approved 
sectoral development plans and to submit monitoring report to the NDPC. 
26 Some ministries have specialised agencies for example the Ministry ofJustice has theLawRefomis Commission under it 
as a specialised agency. 
27 the PPMED was established under the Civil Service Law of 1993 (PNDC Law 327). This law states that among other 
things, the NDPC shall advise the Minister responsible for each ministry about the structure, functions and the number 
and qualification of the planning personnel of the PPMED. 
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c. The Regional Co-ordinating Councils (RCCs) 
The interview at the NDPC further showed that "the local government Act (462) of 1993 
and the National Development Planning (System) Act 480 of 1994 makes the RCCs the 
planning and implementing authorities at the regional level". It is the responsibility of all 
RCCs to co-ordinate the development plans and programmes of all District Assemblies in 
their region and to harmonise these with the national development objectives and priorities. 
The RCCs also monitor and evaluate the implementation of approved development plans 
and programmes of the District Assemblies and of such national programmes and projects 
in the region as the NDPC may direct. 
d. The Municipal, Metropolitan and District Authorities (MMDAs) 
The documentary sources (see Ghana, 1995; and 1997) and the interview at the NDPC 
show that "local development policies are formulated and implemented by MMDAs with 
the RCCs acting as link institutions between the district and the ministry". That is under 
the new system, "sector ministries plan and formulate national policies, but where local 
authorities have a stake in the implementation of the policy, the sector ministry will co- 
ordinate the implementation of the policy". The interview at the NDPC illustrates the point 
with the example that, 
"if the Ministry of Education (MoE) is required to implement a national programme like the 
Free Compulsory Universal Education, local authorities in the various districts may also 
have a stake in the implementation phase of the policy28. The local authorities will receive 
funds for this purpose based on a common fund. But the MoE will be required to co- 
ordinate the implementation of this policy across DAs in the country and to also monitor the 
implementation process through the RCCs". 
Sector ministries therefore have an additional co-ordinating and monitoring role regarding 
the implementation of their sectors' development policies. 
38 The Free Compulsory Universal Education is a programme that aims at providing free basic education compulsorily 
for all Ghanaians. It is a part of the plan for Ghana Vision-2020. 
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This interview shows that "MMDAs play a critical developmental role in view of their 
close proximity to the people". Besides their conventional administrative functions, 
MMDAs are required to: 
a. act as change agents for the transformation of society and economy, 
b. identify and promote development opportunities, 
c. mobilise human and physical resources, 
d. co-ordinate all development activities within the district 
e. protect vulnerable groups, particularly women, children and the aged, and 
f. disseminate information on all matters relevant to development. 
The Local Government Act 462 of 1993 designates each MMDA as the district planning 
authority for its area of jurisdiction. 
The interview at the NDPC and documentary materials (see Ghana, 1995; 1997) show 
further that the "district level also represents the plan formulation stage of the new 
decentralized development management system". The planning functions of the District 
Planning Authority are to: 
a. initiate discussions on policy proposals on district-wide and sub-district 
development plans, local action development plans and settlement plans, 
b. co-ordinate these plans into district development plans which are compatible with 
national development objectives and priorities, 
c. monitor and evaluate the implementation of approved development plans in the 
district. 
The District Planning Authority are required to hold open, democratically conducted public 
hearing on any proposed district development plan or components of the plan, including 
individual projects. The Planning Authority also takes into account the views expressed at 
the public hearing and where necessary modify these to reflect the public expectation 
before the adoption of the proposed district development plan (see Erbynn, 1995). The 
sub-district agencies like Urban, Town, Area and Zonal Councils represent the 
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management stage of the development planning process, while the Unit Committees at the 
community level constitute the implementation level of the new decentralized development 
planning system. This structure of implementing agencies is described graphically in 
Appendix B. 
From the above report, it may be inferred that membership to the structure cuts across the 
various sectors of the economy for example economic, social, urban, district and 
employment sectors. This shows a comprehensive participation in the implementation of 
the Vision 2020 policy. The membership structure also epitomises the notion that no single 
institution can effectively implement the development policy by itself. It is evidence that 
the nature of the policy to be implemented must offer a framework to define the 
combination of institutions required to carry out the programme. Thus, the implementation 
structure discussed above is underpinned by the GoG's (1997: 31) view that development 
policies and programmes must be comprehensive and co-ordinated if they are to achieve 
the long-term goal of an improvement in all aspects of the quality of life. Such policies and 
programmes cannot therefore be formulated in narrow sectoral compartments because 
every aspect of development has implications for all others. 
5.3.2 Resource Requirements for Implementation 
The resources required for policy implementation is shown in the form of inputs in the 
interactive implementation model (discussed in chapter 3). The documentary sources 
identify three major types of resources that are associated with the Vision 2020 policy 
implementation. These are: 
a. Human Resource 
This section describes the parameters of the human resource crisis in Ghana's PSIs as 
identified by item four on the list of research questions in 4.2. The section also shows that 
the human resource crisis has affected the development process in Ghana as argued by the 
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research question. The documentary sources (see Ghana, 1995b; and Boateng, 1994) have 
identified two major problems that associate the human resource requirements for Ghana's 
development process that have persisted since the mid-sixties. These problems are: 
a. the lack of skilled personnel in certain critical areas of the Ghanaian economy. The 
interview at the MESW and the MDPI show that this problem has been caused 
mainly by "the lack of funds to provide training locally, and poor wage and 
incentive structures, particularly in the public sector" (see i below for detailed 
discussion of this problem); and 
b. the surplus in certain categories of skills which according to the data is also caused 
by "overemphasis on general education and shrinkage of employment opportunities 
in the formal sector due to its inadequate growth". 
Tinbergen (1958: 5) has accordingly argued that training and education at all levels are 
very important conditions for development. The current writer believes that it is important 
for all levels of education and training to be commensurate with the absorptive capacity and 
requirements of the economy. This is important to avert unemployment problems and 
waste that has currently besieged the development process in Ghana (see Ghana, 1994c: 
49). The GoG has argued that improved human capabilities do not only contribute to a 
better quality of life for all but also reinforce the nation's capacity to achieve accelerated 
development (Ghana, 1994c: 1). Thus, the quality of human resources available to a 
country at any particular time is the cornerstone to the country's development. It is hardly 
possible for a nation to forge ahead in development without making these resources 
available and dynamic. This failing, the country would have to depend on skills and 
expertise from foreign countries, and as such the country cannot be said to own its 
development. The development process itself will be denied of a strong foundation and 
hence sustainability. As discussed in chapter three, such a situation will set the 
development clock back. 
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According to the documentary data (see Ghana, 1995b; and Boateng, 1994), Ghana's 
human resource problems emanated from the fact that few programmes in manpower 
planning were undertaken in the 1960s and 1970s, and as the economy failed to developed 
as planned, these programmes were abandoned. The "traditional manpower planning 
approach used during this time was excessively quantitative which emphasised more on 
enrollments in and numbers of formal institutions than the quality of skills". Secondly, 
"projected educational outputs were determined by short-term trends in economy-wide 
employment elasticity and sectoral distribution of gross domestic product". Long-term 
implications of such projections were ignored, and this has over the time led to skill 
shortages in some sectors and surpluses in others. These have contributed to "the serious 
shortages of skill that are crucial to the development management process and also to 
policy implementation at the professional, managerial, sub-professional, middle-level 
financial and accounting management, and policy analysis and budgeting"29. Mathur 
(1986: 96) expresses the serious impact that inadequate skills have on the development 
management process. His argument is that institutions that saddle officials who lack basic 
managerial skills with responsibilities for development in very senior administrative 
positions cannot cope with the demands for the provision of administrative skills of the 
kind needed to plan and implement the highly complex policies. Berg (1993) has also 
observed that the large increase in the size and character of the tasks imposed on Ghana's 
weak administrative system has not simply meant a marginal decline of the capacity to 
perform. It has also created forces that have eroded the whole decision making machinery 
and also destroyed the capacity to execute and control. 
Secondly, the interviews at the MESW and the MDPI reveal that: 
29 Policy Analysis is defined here as policy formulation, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. 
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"the absence of consultative and co-ordination processes between PSIs and the HRD sector 
has resulted in a situation in which the skills produced hardly matched the requirements of 
some segment of the economy". 
Examples are the planning and policy analysis sectors. These sectors grew during the 
1980s in a significantly different environment. This situation is evidence that Ghana has 
failed to evolve an adequate HRD strategy in such a way that skills are produced to closely 
match the needs of the economy. The above interviews indicates that "two decades of 
Economic Recovery, Structural Adjustment and Accelerated Economic Growth have 
emphatically shown the importance of human resource development in Ghana" as public 
institution's within the context of these policies performed poorly in the policy process. 
Baster (1972: 26) has observed that, "it is not just the incidence of human resource that 
makes for development but also the improvements in the quality of this resource which 
account for substantial part (50% - 70%) of economic growth of nations". She stresses that 
this has been demonstrated more recently by the experience of South East Asian 
economies. Bologun (1997: 70-1) has also shown that human capacity is the major lever in 
development. For this reason whether a society will progress from one stage of existence 
to a preferred alternative, stand still, and or revert to barbaric, stone age conditions depends 
to a significant extent on the will and capacity of the people to manage and generally add 
value to other available resources. These observations present a formidable challenge in 
the light of the human resource problems discussed above to the Ghana-Vision 2020 policy 
implementation. The implementation of this policy will require the development and 
utilization of a growing body of creative and highly skilled human resources. The lesson is 
for Ghana to continuously update and improve upon its human resources to enhance the 
development process. 
i. Causes of the Human Resource Problems 
The documentary sources (Boateng, 1994; Kwapong et. al., 1990; NEW, 1996) reveals 
that these skill inadequacies are also products of the lack of economic and physical 
infrastructure. Low salary scales, limited fringe benefits, and rigid promotion schemes 
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inhibit recruitment of capable personnel into the public sector. The data illustrate that in 
1990 for example, the ratio of private sector average monthly earnings per employee to that 
in the public sector was 1: 14 for all sectors. This ratio however differed across sectors as 
shown in table 5.2 below. 
Table 5-2 
Ratio of Private Sector: Public Sector Average Monthly Earnings per 
Employee in 1990 
f"e, 1"'fjrfar. %, ll''i. ltinQ ' u')-I 'u, `)` I 11 
, )ufarrý 27340 38927 0: 70 
uric i 1482 22266 2:; 1 
ion I8766 19406 (1: 97 
i" 29495 236(15 1: 21 
1, .` lovage, ( attlrnunlicttiot1 36121 32211 1: 12 
lnsur Encc, d. 63995 30484 2.10 
rý 39566 281137 1: 14 
Source: Kv%abia Buatent; (1994) 
Within the public sector, differential emoluments affect recruitment and retention of staff in 
particular areas. The data show that in the teaching field a Senior University Lecturer 
receives 25% of emoluments of a managing director of a public corporation who has 
similar qualifications, years of experience and equivalent responsibilities as the senior 
lecturer Table 5.3 below is a typical example of the public sector differential emoluments. 
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Table 5-3 
Comparison of Some Allowances in Selected Public Institutions 
h(i-ýllýllllll I\II- itiSlllll) N -\ 
'9000 1960I1 N/A 420 
121442 I1)359 N/A N/A 
13464 39600 N/A N/A 
Note: Percentages are calculated on basic salary. 
Source: Salary Review Commission (Gvampuh Report) 1993. 
From this table one may infer that the poor wage and incentive structure is likely to be a 
contributing factor to the "brain drain" problem in Ghana. This is clearly one of the most 
visible and severe manifestations of the capacity and human resource crisis. This evidence 
suggests that poor wage and incentive structures have a direct correlation with poor policy 
implementation and consequently, with lack of development because personnel responsible 
for implementing the development policies get demoralised and discouraged by the reward 
system. The interview at the MDPI shows that these personnel as a result "embark on other 
income earning activities to supplement their income". Thus "in institutions of this 
country, it is common to see people leave their offices when they are suppose to be on duty 
to attend to private businesses". In the process, they fail to make any serious commitment 
to the policy process and this impedes development. 
Secondly, the interviews at the MESW and MDPI reveals that, "inflexible public policies 
with respect to recruitment and placement" as well as 
"socio-cultural and institutional factors also account for human resource inadequacies in the 
public sector. The inflexible policies coupled with poor infrastnctural development in the 
viral areas, and the lack of incentive package to attract public servants to rural areas have 
caused an acute shortage of skilled personnel in the public service especially in the niral 
areas. Socio-cultural factors such as poor work ethics and attitude to work. in-discipline. 
rejection of transfers, and gender discrimination- 
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have also contributed to the human resource problems in Ghana's public sector. The 
interview from the NDPC shows that the institutional factors are that "development 
management in Ghana had hitherto been highly centralized with its hitherto deeply 
centralized form of administration". As a result, "many trained people do not want to be 
posted to the regions or rural areas where communication with the headquarters is poor or 
almost non-existent". Berg (1993: 58-9) sees problems such as these as constituting a gap 
in policy analysis in particular and development management in general. In Berg's 
perspective these are critical mass of top-flight policy analysts and managers who can help 
pilot the Ghanaian economy through the storm and turbulence that it faces daily. 
These human resource problems constitute a serious threat to the success of vision 2020 
policy implementation and to the entire development process. This situation may force 
Ghana to trade up its competitiveness in development by importing skilled labour from 
other countries, and already there are signs of this happening with the presence of an array 
of technical experts from donor countries. Practices such as these will distort the entire 
development process as the expatriate experts have mind-sets and values that are not 
Ghanaian, and for that matter may not be able to appreciate the indigenous Ghanaian 
culture and social structures. Kamoche (1997) has accordingly argued that developing 
expertise from a nation's human resource endowment plays an indisputable role in the 
development process. Nancy Baster (1972: 2) has also emphasised that, the growth of 
national independence is an important aspect of development that requires indigenous 
personnel to be in key positions. She argues that it does not mean independence when a 
nation depends on other nations for the supply of its human resource needs. 
b. Financial Resources 
Ham and Hill (1984) have advised that policy making must accompany the provision of 
adequate resources in order to make implementation possible. However, the interviews at 
the NDPC, MoF, and PUFMARP repeatedly identify that, "local revenue sources are 
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mostly under-developed and inadequate. In areas where they are developed, collection 
systems are ineffective and this causes district assemblies to depend on centrally generated 
revenues". There is also "insufficient dialogue between central and local government 
institutions to ensure that resource allocated from the centre matches the local effort to 
mobilise local resources". Moreover, "sector ministries are unable to make comprehensive 
overview of how available funds at any given period can best be utilised across the sector". 
The problem is rooted in "unrealistic, hard budget constraints that distort the financial 
resource requirement for policy implementation". The documentary sources (see 
PUFMARP, 1997) reveal that development policy implementation is often impeded by 
systemic problems in: 
i. Budget Preparation 
The documentary materials (see PUFMARP, 1997) show that current process of budget 
preparation in public institutions has several weaknesses. According to this data the 
problems include the: 
a. preparation of recurrent budget on an incremental basis3o, 
b. absence of a medium-term outlook, and a lack of forward planning of the recurrent 
budget such that forward estimates of the recurrent costs of policies and 
programmes are not developed, 
c. lack of critical review of the government priorities in the preparation of 
development budget, the inability to estimate recurrent cost implications to 
establish whether sufficient funds will be available to cover these recurrent costs, 
and 
d. lack of adequate budget guidance to the ministries, including the lack of hard 
expenditure ceilings in the budget guidelines reflecting the Government's 
expenditure priorities. 
30 That is by adding a certain percentage (based on for example inflation) to the previous years estimates oferpenditures, 
without reviewing whether the particular activities are in line with government priorities or whether they are being 
implemented in the most cost-effective manner. 
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The interviews from the NDPC reveal that "these weaknesses have generally undermined 
the utility of the budget as an instrument for implementing development policies and for 
managing the financial resources of the nation for development". 
ii. Budget Implementation 
The documentary sources (see PUFMARP, 1997) reveal the problem in this area as 
"deficient expenditure monitoring and control systems in the policy implementation 
process". According to the above source, 
"the lack of timely, accurate, and current information on budget allocations, commitments 
and actual expenditures seriously undermine the Government's capacity for fiscal 
management, leading to inefficient allocation of resources and obscuring public 
accountability". 
Besides, "the principles of financial reporting, monitoring and control as set out in the 1979 
FAD and the corresponding FAR are not adhered to"31. The interview at the PUFMARP 
Secretariat shows for example that 
"donor commitments are irregularly recorded and reported by public sector institutions and 
in the absence of proper records, expenditure monitoring is done on the basis of cheques 
cleared by the BoG or cheques issued by the CAGD. And because of the delays in each 
step of payment processing, the Ministry of Finance is only able to monitor these 
expenditures with considerable time lags that undermine monitoring and control. This 
problem makes it necessary to impose across-the-board cuts towards the end of the year to 
maintain aggregate fiscal discipline irrespective of whether funds are needed for policy 
implementation. These undue delays in reporting makes it difficult to promptly close and 
prepare the financial accounts of the Government". 
iii. Cash Management 
The documentary sources (see PUFMARP, 1997) further show that "organised cash 
management does not exist in Ghana". The evidence of this is 
"the absence of cash flow plan that readily identifies and matches the flow of revenues with 
those of disbursement, and provides forward estimates so as to form the basis for planning 
the government's borrowing requirements". 
" The FAD and FAR are executive instruments that stipulates and procedures and processes involved in 
reporting, monitoring, and controlling public finance. 
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Hence, "the BoG open market sales of treasury bills do not accurately reflect the liquidity 
position of the government". Secondly, "there is no adequate system to guide the prompt 
reporting of transactions and balances of the Consolidated Fund". There is also "a large 
float of revenues constantly in the system reflecting the lags in the transfer to the BoG of 
revenues collected by the local offices of the revenue agencies and deposited with the local 
commercial banks". While these are cash assets of the Government, they are not 
represented as such because they are captured "only when the revenues are transferred into 
the consolidated fund at the BoG". Finally, there is no "integration between the preparation 
and execution of the budget, and the determination of the cash requirements of the 
Government" (see PUFMARP, 1997; Bank, 1996). 
iv. Audit 
Audit requirements in Ghana are covered by the 1972 Audit Service Decree, the 1979 
FAD, and to a certain degree by the 1992 Constitution. In October 1995, Coopers & 
Lybrand (Accra) did a diagnostic study of the Ghana Audit Service. The study identified 
several problems including weak technical skills and professional development, 
deficiencies in the professional mix of staff, lack of use of computer technology, and 
inadequacy of logistics and supplies (see Coopers and Lybrand, 1995). According to the 
documentary source (see PUFMARP, 1997) Internal audit also remains weak. The 
interview at the PUFMARP Secretariat reveals that 
"the FAD empowers the Auditor-General to make arrangements for carrying out internal 
audits but concerns over potential conflict of interest prompted the Auditor-General to 
assign the internal audit function to the Controller and Accountant General Department 
(CAGD) in 1987". 
. 
But this is also an unsatisfactory arrangement as the Accountants are now internal auditors 
also 
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iv. Aid and Debt Management 
The documentary sources (see PUFMARP, 1997) reveal that the problem with respect to 
Ghana's debt management (both external and domestic) is "the absence of a single set of 
accounts on the country's debt". The Aid and Debt Management Unit (ADMU) of the 
MoF is responsible in principle for recording, monitoring and projecting data on external 
debt, and authorising disbursements. Through the World Bank's assistance under SAI and 
EMS, the ADMU operationalized the CS-DRMS. The source indicates that "the data 
coverage of this system is still incomplete particularly, information on Government 
guarantees on external debt of para-statals and private agencies are not captured". As a 
result, "knowledge of the GoG's external current and potential indebtedness is incomplete 
as no database exist which captures government liabilitiess32. This is a serious problem in 
terms of the timely payment of Ghana's external debt obligations. A second problem is 
that the recording and management of domestic debt remains a BoG operation with no 
linkage with the ADMU. 
These problems have made the government unable to efficiently plan local resource and 
allocate the required size to the development policy implementation. The documentary 
evidence (see Ghana, 1997) reveals however that in order to facilitate the Ghana-Vision 
2020 policy implementation, the government have had to embark on a medium-term 
resource mobilisation and management framework to finance Vision 2020 policy goal and 
targets. This framework require: 
32 The same is true on the asset side of the government's balance sheet (that is net lending by the government). This is 
however being addressed under a separate Bank project, the Privatization and Public Enterprise Development 
Technical Assistance Project II, which is helping the development of a database to capture information on 
Government assets, that is loans to pars-statals and private organisations. 
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a. "the government to agree with the IMF and World Bank on the medium-term 
macroeconomic and fiscal ceilings and targets", 
b. "the MoF to collaborate with the NDPC to develop a medium-term resource 
management and financial strategy", 
c. "the government to project its Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MIEF) to 
manage and optimise public sector reform goals and targets", and 
d. "the design and execution of a tight-loose public financial management 
programme". 
The government hopes that these strategies will release funds for policy implementation. 
Furthermore, the interview at the NDPC reveals that, 
"the development management system makes provision for a budget hearing meetings 
which deals specifically with resource allocation for policy implementation but the 
framework for allocating these resources is not well defined. Because of this, resources are 
distributed arbitrarily". 
Moreover, "the NDPC is developing a more systematic way of allocating resources but 
until development priorities are clearly set out, it will be difficult to devise this systematic 
method to allocate resources effectively". This is necessary to eliminate the financial 
resource allocation problem and thereby enhance the policy implementation in the 
development process. It is important for the NDPC to complete this process to avoid 
implementation delays because Hogwood et. al. (1984) have warned that money is not a 
resource in itself but only a ticket with which to purchase real resources and the process of 
converting money into real resources is subject to delays. 
c. Donor Funding for Policy Implementation 
Donor funding for Ghana's development policy is captured in item eight on the list of 
research questions. The thrust of this question identifies donor involvement in Ghana's 
development either as progressive partnership or a process that distorts the development 
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process. The section explores which of these two characteristics is applicable in Ghana's 
case. This donor involvement also helps in identifying what the causes of Ghana's under- 
development are. 
The documentary sources (see World Bank, 1996) show that Ghana's development is 
heavily dependent on external aid for both capital investment and funding for policy 
implementation in the context of the domestic financial situation discussed above. Total 
aid given by donor agencies has "since the 1980s averaged over 8% of GDP where half of 
this is capital investment, about one-third for programme aid and the balance for technical 
assistance and food aid". For example, between 1984-1993, Ghana attracted a considerable 
volume of external aid. Much of this has been in support of the ERP and SAP 
implementation. "Total aid disbursement over the period have risen from US$498.85 
million in 1984 to US$824.2 million in 1993 or 13.6% of GDP. The annual average has 
been US$498.85 million, which is equivalent to 8.2% of average GDP". These statistics 
show the dependency relationship between international donor agencies and the new 
development management system in view of the difficulties that associate the mobilisation 
of local sources of revenue for Ghana's development (discussed above). 
The documentary sources (see Ghana, 1995b; GoG and UNDP, 1993) reveal further that 
these agencies offer official development assistance (ODA) which may be divided into aid 
from bilateral donors on one hand, and international and regional agencies on the other 
hand. The latter group is dominated by the World Bank primarily in the form of credits 
from its International Development Associations (IDA). "In 1993, IDA credits together 
with smaller amounts from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) totaled $308.7 
million, that is 72% of multilateral disbursements to Ghana and 37% of total 
disbursements". Among the bilateral agencies, the principal donors in 1993 were Japan 
and France who together contributed 36% of bilateral aid. Other major donors were 
Canada, Germany, UK and USA each of whom provided more than $40 million (Ghana, 
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1995b: 29). The ODA is conventionally divided between capital investment on 
concessionary terms (capital aid) and technical assistance (TA)". But some bilateral 
donors now provide capital aid in grant form and some have retrospectively converted 
outstanding loans into grants. Other multilateral agencies on the other hand 
unconventionally provide aid in the form of loans even for technical assistance, though the 
terms are usually very soft34. The total aid in 1992 amounted to US$481.1 million or 7% 
of GDP and was allocated as shown in table 5-1 below with technical assistance equivalent 
to about one percent of GDP. 
TABLE 5-4 
Source: Government of Ghana and UNDP (Novemher 1993) "Development 
Co-operation: Ghana 1992". 
Most of these loans and aid are offered to finance development policy. The interviews at 
the NDPC and the NIRP concurrently emphasized that under the new development 
ji The distinction betxven tile tWo fin"nls of aid is blurred as capital aid usually includes some element of nnining und 
other' / reis of T(chnicalAssistance, and TA programmes almost invariably include allocations fin- equilrunctit to 
enable development programmes operate ef ectAve! v. As a general rule, capital aid is provided in tile/in"m 0/'soft 
loans and technical assistance as all outright grant. 
For example, no interest is payable on //).. 1 credits, though there is a variable service charge, cw"1"en(ly at the rate o/ 
0.75% per annum. Repayments are . spread over 40 years, including a 10-year moratorium. 
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Types of Aid in 1992. 
management system and "to implement Ghana-Vision 2020, Ghana will still depend on 
these sources of funding due to the acute shortage of local funding". However, 
"the international agencies are required to put their funds in a common pool of financial 
resources for the sector they intend to support. The respective sectors will determine how 
to use these funds, namely; to support development programmes in the sector and on the 
basis of national need. Until this time, donor funding has been geared towards 
development projects, and they almost always made public relations out of it. This has 
led to a spiral of rivalry among donors as each want to be seen as a leader in an area or 
sector . 
Hence some of them tend to flagship projects and announce their presence in 
their area of operation. The programme approach to funding development is intended 
among other things to end this practice and it seeks to enhance the attainment of the 
overall objectives of the particular development programme without making development 
sporadic. The programme approach to funding development seek to turn development 
finance into a single comprehensive framework and it is creating confidence in the new 
development management system". 
This shift in donor direction has been caused by the criticism of designing and carrying out 
technical assistance programmes which does not only fail to solve development problems 
but also end up undermining capacity building in the recipient country (Lisk, 1996; Jaycox, 
1993a). Jaycox rejects the donor practice of designing a programme and then soon find a 
big mismatch between the programme design and the local capacity of the people to carry it 
out. In order to alleviate this problem according to Jaycox, lots of money and technical 
assistance are invested in the programme on assumption that the gap will be bridged. 
Bologun (1997: 71-8) has also criticised donor technical assistance agencies as being liable 
for exporting foreign ideas on development to developing countries. He shows that the 
ultimate goal of these agencies is to equip the average developing country with the capacity 
to produce and consume as developed countries. He contends that development is not a 
commodity to be exported from outside or a formula to be copied without regard to the 
conditions prevailing inside a country. He also reiterate that development is not a 
computerised air terminal in a country where the level of numeracy and literacy is low, and 
neither is it a turn-key project financed entirely from external resources and managed, 
maintained and rehabilitated with external technical assistance. Bologun indicates that 
development is rather a process in which a society identifies its important problems and 
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provides an atmosphere that is congenial to articulate ideas for resolving these problems (or 
the bulk of it) locally. To Bologun, development is in effect the sum total of indigenous 
resources (or capacities) that are deployed to achieve specific ends, while battling with 
environmental constraints and foreign competition. These assumptions throw up some 
skepticism about the utility of donor intervention in Ghana's development process. This 
skepticism questions whether this involvement will lead to sustainable development? 
Bologun links this skepticism to the cultural elements that underpin development. He 
argues that most definitions of development that embraces modernization, westernization, 
technological progress, or improvement in the material conditions of the people discount 
the cultural barriers that underpin development and the communality of vision on the 
essence and techniques of development. These assumptions suggest that any external 
agency that participates in the development process of another country is likely to 
misconstrue a lot of stakes in the process (see Toye, 1987: 10-1). The World Bank 
(1991: 7) has also added that the stopgap measures where expatriate advisers are called 
upon to substitute for the lack of capacity in Africa cannot provide a lasting solution. 
The World Bank's view show that in the immediate future, donors will need to continue 
to help bridge the gap in African expertise through technical assistance and other forms 
of support. In the long run however, there is no substitute for Africa having its own 
indigenous capacity. As a further criticism to donor intervention, the World Bank (1991: 
12) has added that too often donor agencies have substituted the capacity of core PSIs by 
setting up their own project management units. This suggests that donor effort lacks an 
overall, consistent and coherent strategy for capacity building in Africa and these have 
also inadvertently contributed to Africa's current capacity shortfalls. 
The evidence has shown so far that a third of development funding in Ghana as well as 
critical technical expertise are provided by donor agencies (see World Bank, 1982). This 
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level of dependency for policy implementation raises fundamental and serious questions 
regarding the sustainability of the development process. That is, in circumstances where 
there is a policy disagreement between the state and a donor agency, the latter may threaten 
to withdraw its support should they fail to comply with the agency's prescriptions. 
Instances such as this will contribute to the distortions in the implementation process of the 
Vision 2020. The present writer argues therefore that, this level of dependency poses a 
threat to the sustainability of Ghana's development. 
d. Infrastructural Provisions for Policy Implementation 
The interviews at the MDPI, MESW and the CSPIP Secretariat show that "most PSIs in 
Ghana are without adequate infrastructure. These institutions lack very basic office 
equipment such as computers, telephones, copiers, stationery and inappropriate office 
accommodation throughout the country". This has been the result of "inadequate central 
government funding and other budgeting constraints, and it has affected PSIs capacity for 
policy implementation". There are a few exceptions to this problem as 
"most public financial institutions such as the MoF, the Controller and Accountant 
General's Department and the Internal Revenue Service have these infrastructure even 
though these cannot be considered adequate. These have enhanced the performance of 
financial institutions compared to their counterparts in the non-financial sectors". 
Secondly, the interview at the NDPC, the MoF, MESW and MDPI produced a consensus 
that, 
"the few infrastructure available to these institutions for example vehicles that are urgently 
needed to aid communication and networking are used for private ends by top management 
personnel.... These vehicles are normally parked in the homes of these top personnel". 
Secondly, this data show that "under the recommendations of PARDIC and the newly 
enacted Civil Service Law 1993, sector ministries and agencies are to set up four divisions 
to enhance policy implementation". These divisions include, 
"a General Administration and Financial Management, PPMED, Training and HRD, and 
Statistics, Research and Information Management. As at the last year of the Vision 2020 
medium term, only a handful of MDAs has been able to establish these divisions due to 
shortage of skills. This problem has affected institutional performance in a number of 
ways. Each Ministry has its own development area in the various sectors, and therefore the 
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respective ministries are required to prepare their own development budgets. This has 
however not been possible in all ministries due to their failure to set up these divisions 
especially, the PPMEDs and the Financial Management Divisions. Even those who have 
established these divisions have other problems like the lack of qualified staff, as most of 
them are not even headed by directors. This has created problems for co-ordinating 
information for the budget preparation. Some MDAs are headed and managed by 
administrators who are unable to appreciate the technical content of the institution's remit 
in the policy process. But where there is a technical person as the head, as for example if 
the Ministry of Agriculture has a director who is an Agricultural Economist, s/he will know 
what technical issues are required in the policy process. But the case is different when an 
administrator has risen through the ranks to become Chief Director as pertained in most 
PSIs in Ghana". 
The interview at the NDPC also shows that for example, 
"during budget preparation, the heads of the various PSIs are asked to submit budget for 
their respective departments and agencies. But the submitted budget always turns out to be 
details of budget for staff salaries and expenditure on Accra-based activities of the MDAs 
rather than on their development programmes" 35 
e. Procurement Practices 
The documentary source (see Bank, 1996) shows a lack of adequate framework for 
procurement practices in the policy process. These practices have been diagnosed by a 
World Bank report that has identified two key deficiencies. The data show that the only 
formal rules and regulations on procurement in Ghana's public sector are incorporated in 
Ghana Supplies Commission (GSC) Law that conducts no more than a quarter of all public 
procurement in the country. The diagnosis shows that other procurement agencies use 
Bank and other donor procurement guidelines. The data show that "although this serves 
the immediate needs of all concerned it exposes the country to potential problems when the 
country is required to depend on its own laws for remedying procurement disputes and 
issues". Secondly, this practice "leaves bare the area of local procurement and prevents the 
country from using national competitive bidding (NCB) procedures in Bank-financed 
contracts". Thirdly, "the process of reporting public procurement to the CAGD is slow due 
to the manual processing of all purchases and payment". 
35 Accra is the capital city of Ghana, which incidentally also houses the headquarters' of almost all PSIs. 
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The above data suggest that resources available to the development process are problematic 
and that securing these resources and identifying the combination of the resources required 
alone are not enough to make policy implementation smooth. Additionally however, the 
quality of the secured resources is also very crucial for a successful implementation. In 
Ghana's circumstances, the fluid nature of the resources may create serious implementation 
problems that may range from perception to mismanagement as explained in systems 
analysis in 3.7.2, and thereby impede the development process. Ayee (1992) has warned 
that part of the causes of implementation failure in developing countries is the lack of 
resources for the process. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: xii) have also observed that 
some policies languish because funds cannot be secured to see the implementation through. 
Grindle and Thomas (1991: 148) have argued that the mobilisation of essential resources is 
a key element in the policy implementation process. They emphasise that although 
resources are by definition limited, they are not fixed and therefore effective managers can 
mobilise resources through conscious and concerted efforts. 
5.3.3 Management Framework for Policy Implementation 
This section is captured by the part of the research question that states that managerial 
performance in Ghana's PSIs have had a retrogressive impact on institutional efficiency 
for managing development, especially as PSI have been unable to mobilize and harness the 
country's human resource endowment for development. The section examines the validity 
or otherwise of this argument. 
The interviews at the NDPC, MESW, MDPI and the MoF reveal that policy 
implementation by PSIs in Ghana are centrally controlled, directed, and supervised. That 
is, the ethos and structure of management in PSIs is essentially "top-down". "Information 
flows are restricted and management is directive rather than consultative and promotional". 
The data show that, "public sector managers do not delegate authority and are reluctant to 
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assign responsibilities to junior staff'. This management approach to policy 
implementation leads to the exclusion of staff who otherwise could have been useful due to 
their expertise in development process especially in the implementation process. "This 
happens regardless of the fact that the development management process requires the 
participation of technical experts and the mass of the people for a successful policy 
implementation". This top-down management approach has affected institutional 
efficiency at policy implementation. The interview at the MDPI provides the evidence for 
this claim. This data reveal that 
"at MDPI-organised management courses, participants complain about managerial practices 
at their respective institutions that make it impossible to introduce the systems they learn on 
these courses. Secondly, most of these managers betray their inadequacies when they 
attend management courses at the institute and indicate that after so many years of being 
managers, the courses have exposed them for the first time to the basics of managerial 
systems that they had had no previous knowledge of'. 
The interviews at the MESW and the MDPI acknowledge that some personnel have proper 
and efficient managerial skills. However, the data points out that the performance of these 
personnel is normally impeded by government practices in managerial appointments. 
"The Government of Ghana normally appoints people to managerial positions without any 
proper plan for transition. Usually, the post becomes vacant before a new person is 
appointed. In such situations, the new manager comes with his/her own values that 
destabilizes the existing managerial practices.... Policy implementation management in 
most public sector institutions is too bureaucratic as members of staff are obliged to abide 
strictly by regulations and some managers get too impersonal in the process". 
This stifles initiative and performance, and has led to delays in past implementation 
processes. This has consequently contributed to public sector inefficiency in the policy 
process. The interview from the MESW shows also that 
"management in PSIs also lack creativity and initiative. They take less responsibility for 
their units' performance and are not accountable for their decisions and action they take. 
For example when PSIs failed to successfully implement SAP-ERP related policies in the 
1980s and early 1990s, no one took responsibility for these failures although it was very 
clear that the management approach to these policies was characterised by ad hoc decisions 
and red-tapism". 
The interviews from the MDPI and MESW indicate further that, "management in PSIs are 
far removed from the needs and aspirations of staff lower down the hierarchy. This has 
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caused disillusions in public sector staff and has had a serious impact on staff motivation 
for productivity". It may be inferred from the data that managerial capabilities determine 
enormously the effectiveness or otherwise of PSIs in the development management 
process. So poor managerial performance will inevitably lead to lack of institutional 
capacity to manage the development process. Consequently however, Grindle and Thomas 
(1991) have argued that a successful policy implementation requires a substantial 
investment in managerial capability. They suggest that training will afford management 
with the skills to determine priorities and influence the process. 
5.3.4 Cross Institutional Linkages and the Policy Implementation 
Process 
The element of the research question in 4.2 (iii) states partly that participatory institutional 
structures as well as effective coordination of sectional interest are necessary for Ghana's 
development management. The documentary sources (see Koranteng, 1997) and the 
interviews at the NDPC, MDPI, and MESW concurrently emphasised that "the public 
service in Ghana is fragmented and seems to have no structure to link all its units into a 
coherent whole". According to Koranteng (1997: 26) this has resulted in overlaps and 
duplication of functions and systems that has led to inaction, non-performance, waste and 
in-discipline. The interviews acknowledge some exceptions to this problem and show that 
"some forms of consultation exist among and within institutions but this does not in general 
terms reflect in the policy implementation process. At the micro-level, management of 
PSIs do not consult due to the culture of seniority". This practice normally stymies the 
efforts of middle and lower level management to move the policy process forward. "Chief 
Executives for example take unilateral decisions on the assumption that they are 
accountable for their institutions' performance". The data shows further that "on the macro- 
level coordinating and networking processes are deficient in institutional practices as most 
institutions are busy with their sectoral programmes". The data show that "even among 
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institutions in the same sector co-ordinating and networking processes are inadequate and 
this has been one of the causes of the series of policy failures". Ham and Hill (1984) have 
emphasised that a successful implementation depends on effective linkages between 
different organisations and departments that have a stake in the process. Gunn (1978) adds 
that there should be perfect communication and coordination among these agencies, and 
Nixon (1980) emphasizes clarity and consistency in communication for the policy 
implementation process. 
The interview from the NDPC shows that, 
"currently under the Vision 2020, only a few strong ministries are able to determine the 
direction of policy implementation in their own sectors because of this weak co-ordination 
among agencies in the same ministry. At the district level, the problem is the same even 
though some are managing under the circumstances to implement their plans". 
Powelson (1972: 143) does not however see this as an absolute setback to the development 
process because he accepts some measure of ideological disagreement to be an ingredient 
of development once enough consensus can be sustained to keep institutions effective. His 
argument is that "those outside the consensus may provide the needle-pricks for change". 
The present writer argues that this view must be considered with caution in a developing 
country like Ghana where ideological disagreements may easily slip into anarchy. 
The interview at the NDPC shows that, 
"Ghanaian institutions are best at co-ordination when they need to borrow funds to 
implement a policy or a programme. For example, when funds had to be borrowed for the 
Gateway 2000 programme a lot of PSIs that are responsible for implementing the various 
components of the programme were seen co-ordinating their activities36. Through a 
medium such as this, institutions co-ordinate better but in the normal schedule of policy 
implementation, co-ordination is quite weak as may be seen for example in infrastructure 
development of this country. After about a month of an expensive road construction, 
another agency will come and dig across the road to lay major pipelines for water or 
telecommunication. This is waste of resources because it will mean re-investing in the 
road". 
The interview at the NDPC further reveals that, 
36 The Gateway 2000 programme is part of the Ghana-Vision 2020 policy. The programme seeks to attract foreign 
investment in Ghana that will in turn serve as the growth engine for the entire West African sub-region. 
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"the NDPC has tried to use the national budget, especially the development budget as an 
instrument for co-ordination but the process has been fraught with difficulties. The 
Commission thought that this would be one way of getting sector agencies to start talking to 
one another about the common objective of achieving the development goal for the country. 
But this has so far not been successful due to the rivalry between the MoF and the NDPC". 
According to this interview, the rivalry between the two lead institutions in the 
development process originated from a government decision in the early 1990s to remove 
the planning function of national development from the Ministry of Finance that has 
hitherto been called the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. "The NDPC was 
then set up with development planning as its remit". The rationale for the government 
decision to split the planning and finance functions was to ensure specificity and 
specialization of functions. "The government assumed that this would make the 
development management process efficient. But the MoF has until this day not been able 
to live up to the reality of this separation, and has resorted to covert action to undermine 
the work of the NDPC". The respondent cited the continuous refusal of the MoF to 
provide the NDPC with valuable data for planning purpose although this is required by 
law: 
"for example, before we agree on the broad goals, we are suppose to have indicators about 
the trends in the economy. In practice it has been difficult working out the broad financial 
parameters and to be informed about the economic trends mainly due to this problem 
between the Ministry of Finance and us. Some of the top personnel involved in planing at 
the time of the separation did not want to be seen as pushing their way. There is a lot of 
fear (and it is a genuine fear) in the public sector that planning was centralized and not 
seen as a `public policy'. So those leading the planing process were also over careful. 
Another problem that has resulted from the lack of co-operation between the NDPC and 
the MoF is that after analysing the problems and setting goals for the Ghana-Vision 2020, 
our priorities were to increase spending according to proportion in the education and 
health sectors. The Vision 2020 document has a section of that, but this plan has not been 
used because we did not agree on the issue with the Ministry of Finance. From that stage 
on, the sector ministries prepared their plans and assumed that heaven will come down and 
manna will fall and everybody will have bread to eat. But of course it does not work and 
did not work that way. Many of them have therefore not followed their plan. Like I 
mentioned, because of weak co-ordination between or among agencies in the same 
ministry, you will find a few departments doing well. Only a few strong ministries are 
able to determine the direction of developments in their own sectors. At the local level, 
the same thing happens. But there are some implementing their plans from the 
information we have". 
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Another problem emanating from this rivalry is that "although the NDPC is responsible for 
monitoring the development budget, this function is still being performed by the MoF". 
The evidence shows that it has been difficult to implement specific activities of the Ghana- 
Vision 2020 such as developing the education and health by increasing spending in these 
sectors. The reason is that the MoF would not concede to the NDPC's leadership in the 
policy process, and there is no one to check these excesses emanating from the MoF. So 
between these two lead institutions for example, the levels of co-ordination and 
consultation have been minimal, and this rivalry is undermining policy implementation and 
the entire development management system. Ham and Hill (1984) have warned that it is 
easier to achieve implementation success when conflict of interest is minimal than when 
disagreement on this scale exists between institutions and in this case the two lead 
institutions. 
The MoF-NDPC rivalry indicates that sectional or institutional interests have enormous 
impact on institutional co-operation. This underpins the need for consensus building 
processes to be incorporated as one of the major pillars in the development management 
process. Secondly, it may also be argued that power consideration and interests to gain or 
avoid influence and control have been the cause of the rivalry between the MoF and the 
NDPC. These therefore capture the development management process as a political 
process in which groups and individuals vie for leadership. Once the leadership status is 
established, it is difficult to relinquish it as has been demonstrated by the MoF. This 
incident shows also that, institutional status considerations have negative effect on the 
development policy implementation process. This occurs through the non co-operative and 
the conflicting attitude it generates. But in order to reduce this level of conflict, the NDPC 
and MoF must engage in negotiations. Kaul (1996: 134) has advised that in such 
situations, enhanced clarity of roles and tighter lines of accountability should be made to 
re-define relationships in the policy process. This will ensure the needed co-operation in 
the policy implementation process. Ham and Hill (1984) have advised that the policy 
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implementation process must be based on negotiations and compromise. Barret and Fudge 
(1981: 89) have also added that a successful policy implementation is an issue of 
compromise among key interests in the policy process. 
The interview at the NDPC show that the weak processes for co-ordination has persisted 
due to the slow implementation of national policy on the institutional framework for policy 
co-ordination. At the national level, the NDPC is responsible for overseeing the processes 
for policy co-ordination among institutions. But the NDPC has been unable to do this due 
to poor staffing levels. Most importantly and secondly, a disagreement of who should be 
the chairman of the NDPC has been the main factor of the commission's weakness to 
perform this role. The interview revealed that, 
"according to the country's constitution, the Chairman of the NDPC must be the vice- 
president of Ghana. During the first term of office of the NDC government, moves were 
made to make P. V. Obeng (a former cabinet Minister and a Presidential Adviser on 
Governmental Affairs), the Chairman of the Commission. The government took this 
decision because the vice-president disagreed with the President on a number of policy 
issues which also led to strained relationship between the President and his Vice. This 
move to make P. V. Obeng Chairman of the NDPC was fiercely contested by the then vice- 
president, which was part of the reasons why the vice-president was sidelined by the party 
and led to his resignation at a latter date. The move to make P. V. Obeng (who has been 
made to resign from his cabinet post for corruption) the Chairman of the Commission had 
been successfully orchestrated however as the then new vice-president seemed to have 
understood the arrangement. This has caused a lot of outrage in many quarters and has led 
to the refusal of Chief Executives of some institutions and other stakeholders to co-operate 
with the NDPC. They have refused to attend the Policy Hearing meetings as well as other 
planning and review meetings of the NDPC. P. V. Obeng himself is unable to control and 
bring together the various Ministers and Directors for effective co-ordination. Hence the 
low capacity for policy co-ordination"". 
This interview also revealed another cause of co-ordination problem as the ERP 
implementation. "During the initial years of the ERP, the government paid a lot of 
attention to short-term crisis management measures to stabilize the economy. This led to 
the compartmentalization of departmental responsibilities", and this has impeded inter- 
sectoral and institutional co-ordination. 
3' The information contained in this paragraph is a classified information that was said off record and as such it 
cannot be referenced. 
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The above data provide evidence that unconstitutional behaviour of government impede the 
development process in the sense that it leads to the non co-operative, non-participation and 
partisan attitude from individuals and groups who oppose such behaviours. It also 
authenticates Hargrove's (1975: 69) argument that policy implementation is a political 
process in which consensus building is problematic as the various groups of actors engage 
in isolated maneuvers to enhance their interests (see also Ayee, 1992). These policy co- 
ordination problems may undermine the development process if action is not taken to arrest 
it, especially because co-ordination is the essence of cohesiveness among the members of 
the implementation structure. Without cohesion and co-operation, the development policy 
implementation process will become static and targets will become difficult to achieve. 
This experience contradicts the systems approach to policy implementation (see chapter 3). 
Systems analysis stresses on attaining good levels of cooperation in the implementation 
process by focusing on the importance of team work for successful implementation (see 
Parsons, 1995). Elmore (1978) has observed that "regardless of how well organised an 
agency might be, its ability to implement a programme successfully depends... on its ability 
to influence other agencies" and this is an important lesson for the successful 
implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020. This also has implications for donor activities 
in the Ghana-Vision 2020 implementation process as well. 
Donor Agencies and Policy Co-ordination 
The interview at the NDPC reveals that, 
"as a matter of policy, there is a bi-monthly meeting involving Heads of Donor Agencies 
who are major financial contributors to the Vision 2020 implementation. These meetings 
are called Decentralization Lunch of Donor Agencies. Even though these meetings 
occur, there are no fast and hard rules about co-ordination of programmes and this 
suggests that Donor Agencies do not co-ordinate enough". 
Secondly, the data show that "donor agencies normally introduce a programme to a 
government agency and decides to fund it without recourse to the overall national plan". 
These donor activities are therefore a serious source of distortions to the development 
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process. Given Elmore's argument for co-operation and given the critical nature of the 
Ghana-Vision 2020 to Ghana's development, it is important to bring donor activities 
under a properly coordinated policy framework. 
5.3.5 Inclusion 
This section addresses the diversity problems that have been identified by research question 
(vii) in 4.2. These diversity problems have resulted in exclusion problems in the 
development process. The interview at the NDPC, MDPI and MESW emphasised 
concurrently that "one of the features of Ghana's PAS is the magnitude of exclusion of 
certain categories of staff and groups from the policy process". That is, 
"participation in the policy process is limited due to non-transparent management practices. 
Policy decisions are handed down from the top to staff at the bottom, and management 
discourages initiative. Some PSIs have also not been too accommodating to the views of 
clients and other stakeholders in the development process and this problem is persistent". 
Thus, according to the NIRP (1997: 3) the failure to exercise decentralized authorities and 
to delegate work has been persistent due to Ghana's inappropriate legal framework. The 
exclusion problem borders to a great extent on diversity issues. 
a. National Diversity Issues 
Two major diversity problems constitute a great setback to participation in the development 
process. These setbacks are expatiated by Bhatnager et. al., (1992: 158) setting out the idea 
that, any initiative that seeks to empower women and disadvantaged groups must 
incorporate plans for substantial training and promotion of management skills. This is 
needed to scale up grass-roots movements. These problems are: 
i. Gender Exclusion: 
The interviews at the MDPI and MESW show that, "women empowerment has not been 
addressed holistically in Ghana" although the GoG has claimed that Ghana has an open 
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policy which gives men and women equal access and benefits to public goods and services, 
provided they have the appropriate qualification (see Aryeetey, 1992: 353). The data show 
that, "the greater percentage of women in employment occupies lower positions with lower 
salaries and does not have opportunity to participate in decision-making". The evidence can 
be seen in Ghana's employment statistics in which Female unemployment is about 50% 
higher than that of male, and while about 49.8% of females have never attended school 
only about 3% attain secondary or higher education compared to 29.1% and 9% 
respectively for males. Adult literacy is lower among females at 42% than among males at 
64% (see Ghana. 1997). Beneria et. al. (1982: 161) illustrates the point by arguing that the 
problem of Third World women does not arise from a lack of integration into the 
development process. On the contrary, they are integrated into the process but at the 
bottom of a hierarchical and contradictory structure of production and accumulation. And 
Aryeetey (1992: 367) agree that to a large extent, the constraints that confronts Ghanaian 
women are concealed rather than obvious, because of the apparent independence that 
women enjoy in the production and management of their own activities. This scenario is a 
serious impediment to the development process in any country and the South Commission 
(1990: 131) has reiterated that, "a gender-sensitive approach to development is not just a 
political imperative, but a basic condition for sustained economic and social progress". 
As part of the Vision 2020 policy therefore, the documentary evidence reveal that the 
Ghana Government has embarked on measures to increase female participation in the 
policy process (see Ghana, 1997). The strategies being used include: 
a. "promoting equality of access for females to all streams of education and vocational 
training for all types of occupations including those which have been traditionally 
accessible only to males", 
b. "providing women with vocational guidance and counseling services on the same 
broad range of technical and vocational education and training, and employment 
opportunities as males", 
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c. "encouraging women to take full advantage of such opportunities and creating the 
conditions required for them to do so", and 
d. "promoting further training for women to ensure their personal development and 
advancement to skill employment and posts of responsibility, and urging employers 
to provide them with the same opportunities for extending their work experience as 
offered to male workers with the same education, training and qualifications". 
The government has announced the creation of a special Ministry for women's affairs to 
promote these goals. Thus, the Vision 2020 seeks to integrate gender interests in the 
development process by seeking to improve the quality of participation of women through 
direct access to decision-making and resources. Aryeetey (1992: 349-51) see this as a very 
important step forward in the development process. 
ii. Tribal Exclusions 
The interviews at the MESW and MDPI show that 
"Ghana is constituted by the amalgamation of tribes, which impedes co-operation, 
consultation and networking processes in the development management process and leads 
to exclusions in the PAS. Tribal affiliations and preferences play a great part in institutional 
practices and procedures including personnel recruitment in PSIs in Ghana and this has led 
to the domination of certain tribes in a number of sectors and where other tribes are 
marginalised. The Ewe tribe (which incidentally happen to be the smallest tribe in Ghana) 
for example dominates institutions like the MoF and most other PSIs". 
That is a selective recruitment process operates to maintain a conservative, non- 
development-oriented character of PSIs. This system is a disincentive to co-operation and 
networking processes which are vital to the successful functioning of the development 
management system in general and policy implementation in particular (see 5.3.4). The 
South Commission (1990: 45) has warned that any development that discount cultural 
factors show itself as liable to breed indifference, alienation and social discord. It is 
therefore important to factor the cultural differences and the effective management of these 
in the development process in order to secure consensus that is a vital ingredient for an 
enabling development environment. Thus culture which may be described as the sum total 
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of values, beliefs, attributes, customs and patterns of behaviour in a given society is a vital 
pillar for development. According to the South Commission's argument, capital formation 
and technical progress are essential elements of development but the broad environment for 
their effectiveness is a society's culture. Hence, it is through the affirmation and 
enrichment of cultural identities via mass participation that development can be given 
strong roots and made a sustainable process. 
Furthermore, the concept of diversity at the workplace recognises the fact that the 
workforce usually consists of a diverse population. Harnessing these differences will 
create a productive environment in which everybody feels valued as their talents are being 
fully utilized to realise development goals (see McDougall, 1996: 64). Secondly, and as 
discussed before, there occur groups of classes with varying interests which lead to conflict 
in the development process but the state's ability to co-ordinate these interests in a manner 
to achieve the development objectives is vital to the development process. Tinbergen 
(1958: 4) has said that this process must be designed to facilitate and stimulate private 
activity. Hence PSIs need to manage these diversity issues to the advantage of the 
development process. If it is left in the current state, these diversity issues will cause 
apathy among groups and individuals associated with the policy implementation process. 
This will consequently impede the nation's development as already this was the case in the 
old development management system and it may persist in the new system as well. 
The interview from the NDPC and MESW show that "with the inception of the new 
development management system, local groups are getting more organised at the national 
level so it is important and easy for PSIs to consult with them at the national level". That 
is, 
"the views of groups and individuals are now sought in the development policy process. 
For example, during policy formulation, there is a consultation process with stakeholders 
and beneficiaries about the policies at the initial stages, particularly when these stakeholders 
have a stake in the implementation". 
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The evidence is seen for example, "in the labour front where units like the Trade Unions 
Congress (TUC), Employers Association, etc. are engaged in the policy process with the 
MESW '. That is, "in the new system, government is no longer the big player in the policy 
process, not even in terms of funding programmes. Under this system, stakeholders are 
consulted in securing funding for development programme implementation". 
Another example of Ghana's drive towards inclusion is the introduction of the District 
Assemblies even though this is not complete38. Thus, the new development management 
system in Ghana seeks to empower individual groups, communities and organisations 
through these innovations. Numenkamp (1995: 10) has emphasised that empowerment 
process such as this is essential for influencing public policy, providing a check on 
government discretion as well as enhancing the effectiveness and sustainability of 
development programmes. Bhatnager et. al. (1992: 161) have noted that participation is 
critically important to good governance and therefore to the development process. 
However he cautions that a serious commitment to participation will inevitably lead to 
difficult issues of governance especially regarding accountability issues arising out of 
empowerment (Bhatnager et. al., 1992: 120). 
5.3.6 Conflict Resolution in the Policy Implementation Process 
The new national development planning system law (Act 480) makes provision for 
conflict resolution in the development management process. According to the interviews 
at the NDPC, 
"conflicts may occur at two levels. A matter relating to the exercise of the planning 
functions of the District Assembly during plan formulation stage or the implementation 
stage of the district development plans, programmes or projects may aggrieve an 
individual or a community or an Area Council". 
38 The problem with the District Assembly concept has to do with the shortage of skilled personnel required to fill the 
vacancies in the assemblies. 
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In such cases, the interview showed that the NDPC's published grievance procedure 
(which is a Legislative Instrument) would be the means by which the aggrieved party 
may seek redress. Secondly, 
"a District Planning Authority may disagree with the recommendations made by the RCC 
in the course of co-ordinating and harmonising district plans at the regional level. If such 
a conflict cannot be amicably settled, the RCC is required to submit to the NDPC, the 
district development plan or programme as proposed by the District Planning Authority, 
along with the RCCs report. The NDPC will consider the case and make a decision in 
line with national goals and priorities that will be final". 
This conflict resolution process underpins the notion that policy implementation is not 
always associated with rationality and for which reason conflicts are always eminent. 
The data discussed so far (in 5.3.4 and 5.3.5) show that the conflict resolution apparatus 
in the new development management system has not been effective. The NDPC will 
therefore have to build its capacity to negotiate consensus before the numerous conflicts 
and grievances throw the Vision 2020 process off balance. Secondly, the NDPC will 
need to build a capacity to anticipate the differing forms of reactions and responses that 
may occur, and from where these will occur in the development process (see Grindle et. 
al., 1991). Fact that these conflicts are persistent indicates the NDPC's inability to 
manage conflicts. It may therefore be argued that the policy formulation phase of Ghana- 
Vision 2020 lacked implementation estimates that are necessary prerequisites for policy 
implementation. This position is elaborated by Elmore's (1980: 611) idea that unless the 
initiators of a policy can galvanise the energy, attention and skills of people affected by 
the policy and bring these resources together to negotiate the policy, the effects will be 
nothing than weak and diffused policy outcomes. In order to reduce or eliminate these 
reactions to the implementation process, Hogwood et al. 's (1984) plan may be useful (see 
3.7.3) else such reactions may reverse or change the Vision 2020 policy objectives. 
These emphasise the canons of interactive policy implementation - that co-ordination, 
control and compliance through negotiations are necessary inputs from people at the 
bottom. 
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5.4 The Governance Framework for Vision 2020 
Implementation 
This section explores the extent to which the governance problems identified by items (ii) 
and (iv) on the list of research questions in 4.2 impacts Ghana's development process. The 
data has shown that PSIs have a high stake in the new development management system 
and for that matter the implementation of Ghana-Vision 2020. This responsibility of 
Ghana's PSIs in the policy implementation process will be realized through good 
governance practices which the World Bank (1989: 60) see as the "exercise of political 
power to manage a nation's affairs" (see also Brautigam, 1991: 1). But the governance 
situation in Ghana is a source of threat to the implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020. 
The documentary sources (see Erbynn, 1995) show that since the inception of the SAP and 
ERP, the GoG policy has stressed on the role of PSIs as facilitators of and partners in 
private sector growth and development. PSIs have however been sluggish at responding to 
this new role and effectively implementing public policies. The interviews at the MESW 
show that "this problem points to the weakness in the policy process that has resulted from 
the practice of centralized and top-down decision-making and one way communication 
processes". Secondly, "leadership under Ghana's circumstances seeks to accomplish co- 
ordination through command and control, but the practice leaves the co-ordination process 
more fragile than before". These weaknesses have contributed to policy implementation 
problems in the PAS. 
The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995) show that in 1995/96, the NIRP Secretariat 
served 150 PSIs with a Self-Appraisal Instrument (SAI). The analysis of this survey 
illustrates the problems undermining PSIs' performance at policy implementation in the 
new development management system39. The result of the SAI shows that: 
39 The SAl is a diagnostic and reconnaissance tool that assisted in the development and implementation of appropriate 
methodologies, processes and programmes for addressing institutional performance and capacity improvement issues 
(see chapter 6 for a detailed discussion on the SAI). 
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a. "most institutions are unaware of key national development policy goals outlined in 
the Vision 2020". Moreover, "not many institutions are able to describe their 
overall policy goals nor are able to explain how these impact on their mission 
statement" and thirdly, "institutions' policy goals do not highlight the issue of 
resource constraints". 
b. "there is a general absence of corporate vision and mission statements". Secondly 
"missions statements are not communicated to all staff or fully owned by 
stakeholders and mechanisms for doing this are not in place in many cases". For 
example it was revealed in the interview at the CSPIP Secretariat that, 
"a beneficiary survey conducted by the CSPIP in which officials from the Passport 
Office were asked in one of the workshops about who their clients were. The 
respondent said it was the government without knowing that the ordinary 
Ghanaian is also a client. These are the impressions created across the various 
PSIs. Traditionally, public servants have often tended to regard the government as 
their main customer or client and consequently have often tended to downplay 
their vital responsibility to the general public and to the business community". 
c. "institutions do not clearly define programmes, projects and services as linked to 
their missions". Secondly, "service delivery is not sufficiently client-focused and 
is often "supply driven" rather than "demand led" and services are duplicated by 
different public service institutions". This stems from a fragmented overall public 
sector management framework. 
d. "with the exception of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) corporate planning systems 
for policy implementation are absent in public institutions". There are also "no 
systems for setting targets and measuring performance, and information on services 
and performance is not transparent where clients and stakeholders are concerned. 
Internal and external audit, and accounting systems are not adequate". The results 
also show that "skills for contract management are weak and this slows down the 
pace of contracting out services and the process also hinder private sector 
involvement in the delivery of public service". 
e. "budget allocations are untimely and cut backs at short notices are also frequent". 
This is one of the setbacks to corporate planning and policy implementation. 
184 
Secondly, "that disproportionate amount of funds is spent on staff cost to the 
detriment of operating expenditures and capital investment". Moreover, "in the 
absence of effective system for managing financial and human resources, inputs are 
not optimised". 
This data show that a lot of problems are associated with the Vision 2020 implementation 
and in order to successfully implement the policy, it is very imperative to find solutions to 
them. 
The interview at the NDPC shows that, 
"the structure of PSIs under which departments and agencies have been created under 
ministries for policy implementation constitute a problem to the development management 
process. Usually these departments and agencies are excluded from policy formulation and 
are only informed about the policy during the implementation stage". 
This is a top down approach to policy implementation that has contributed to the numerous 
policy implementation failures in the country. Aside these problems in the PAS, there are a 
number of other structural and value problems that may impede effective governance and 
for that matter the efficient implementation of the Vision 2020 policy. These problems are 
discussed below. 
5.4.1 Regulatory Processes for Implementing the Policy 
The interview at the NDPC shows that, 
"the development management system and the role of institutions are given a legal backing 
by the Constitution of the (Fourth) Republic of Ghana (1992), the National Development 
and Planning Commission Act, 1994 (Act 479), the National Development Planning 
(System) Act, 1994 (Act 480), the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) and the Civil 
Service Law, 1993 (PNDC Law 327)". 
These legal instruments also seek to regulate the new development management system, 
define the procedures and processes for implementing development policies as well as the 
functional relationships between the various institutions operating in the system. Thus 
these legal instruments give meaning to the vertical and horizontal relationships in the 
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development management system and for that matter policy implementation (see Appendix 
B). The interview at the NDPC shows that, 
"the legal instruments seek to boost PSIs capacity for policy implementation in the new 
development management system. However, the processes for ensuring this are 
problematic. For example, there is the yearly policy hearing which is supposed to be 
organised jointly by the NDPC and MoF and which is participated by all PSIs. This policy 
hearing is organised to co-ordinate sector ministries development plans and to ensure that 
these plans conform to the national goals and plans as envisaged in the Ghana-Vision 2020 
policy40. However, the processes for ensuring these are quite porous since most MDAs are 
able to lobby their plans at the hearings. So when gaps in sector MDAs plans emerge, they 
are able to find support among the other participants. Hence many of the MDAs avoid 
scrutiny and get away with their incoherent plans". 
This shows that the regulatory system for policy implementation have some flaws which 
makes it possible for the various Chief Directors not to conform to the laid down rules. 
This problem underpins Grindle et. al's. (1991) argument that situations occur in the policy 
implementation process that alliances between groups and individuals in the policy process 
may lead to piecemeal sabotage of the policy to be implemented. According to the 
interview, 
"this situation has also persisted partly because national priorities have not been clearly 
articulated. That is even though there is a national policy, it is still short of plan 
prioritization in any meaningful way and therefore it is very difficult to monitor the 
performance of the ministries and sector agencies on this basis". 
In view of these problems, the present writer argues that it is important in the development 
management process to make sure that programmes and projects that are designated to be 
implemented in a particular phase are done according to schedule. This is especially very 
pertinent in Ghana's circumstance where many programmes have been scheduled in the 
context of limited resources. In such situations it is important to determine which one of 
the programmes should come first and what the other priorities are. 
40 This policy hearing was organised in the past by the Ministry of Finance. 
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This interview further indicated that, "the viability of the legal instruments to regulate and 
monitor policy implementation is diminished by the political, and administrative barriers to 
private sector initiative and investment". These barriers, coupled with the rent-seeking 
behaviour of PSIs (particularly the financial institutions) and individual public officials, 
constitute constraints on the creation of an enabling environment for private sector 
contribution towards Ghana Vision 2020. Some other identifiable constraints on the 
private sector regarding the Vision 2020 implementation include "the persistence of 
outmoded legislation such as exchange control regulations and the lack of comprehensive 
and reliable information and statistical data on aspects of economic and social 
development". From the point of view of systems analysis, "such information is essential 
for corporate planning by the private sector, as well as for development planning and policy 
implementation". 
Values of Openness and Transparency 
The interviews at the MESW and MDPI further revealed institutional value systems as 
another category of governance problems in Ghana's PSIs. This relates to 
"openness, transparency and accountability processes that are absent in institutional 
practices in Ghana. Although these values are clearly stipulated in institutional statutes and 
ordinances, they are not enforced due to personal and group interests in the public service. 
For example the lack of openness and transparency has led to red tapism in the allocation of 
funds which could take weeks into months after the scheduled date for a programme 
implementation". 
Another example is that, 
"over-centralization in the MoF, causes over-centralization of budget allocation that in turn 
makes MDAs inefficient in their policy implementation. In low accountability 
circumstances such as Ghana's, public officials misappropriate national funds earmarked 
for policy implementation". 
The existing governance situation is therefore creating serious problems for public sector 
performance at implementing the Ghana-Vision 2020. Sandhu et. al. (1989) have said that 
systemic in-discipline impede institutional efficiency and the progress of the environment it 
serves. Systemic in-discipline was a feature of the old development management system 
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that also contributed to the failures of past policies. The data has identified this 
phenomenon lurking in the new system and it is urgent, based on past experiences to 
eliminate these before it derails the Vision 2020 implementation. 
5.4.2 The Impact of Culture on Implementing the Policy 
Apart from cultural problems being a governance issue, it is also captured as a diversity 
issue in the elements of the research question (see 4.2 (vii)). The section explores the 
extent to which bad cultural practices impede the development process. Aryeetey (1992: 
58) has argued that development policy, as a concept is a cultural fact. He states that the 
manner in which individuals or groups respond to a plan (either positively or negatively) 
are all factors of culture which are also important to the development policy process. The 
interview at the MESW and the MDPI show that 
"Ghanaian cultural practices have in many ways impacted negatively on policy 
implementation. Ghanaians do not have a sense of time and that affects the way time is 
managed in implementation schedules. A lot of incidence abound where staff report late 
to work but also leave the office before mid-day to attend to private matters, and there is 
absolutely no mechanism to check these excesses. The problem of time management has 
therefore affected the practice of long term planning for policy implementation". 
That is, short term and ad hoc planning has characterised the policy implementation 
process as well as the policy process as a whole in Ghana. Secondly, the interviews show 
that, 
"the extended family system in Ghana has been a great setback to the efficient performance 
of PSIs. The extended family system play essential role in job recruitment in Ghana and 
this phenomenon has led to compromises in a lot of institutional decision. So people are 
often appointed to certain positions through prescriptive arrangements such as family tics 
even though the person may not be necessarily qualified for the position. And when one 
has to be disciplined for incompetence or misconduct at the work place, family delegates 
are sent to negotiate. These practices have had crippling effects on institutional 
effectiveness. Thirdly, Ghanaians lack the culture of maintenance and as a result this is not 
built into the way institutions operate. Office accommodation and equipment are rarely 
serviced and in the end a lot of time and money are wasted to get replacements sometimes 
before a programme can be implemented". 
The interviews further revealed that, "Ghanaian perception about matters regarding 
government also impedes policy implementation". That is, 
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"partly due to the non-transparent relationship between government and the people, 
Ghanaians see the government as a wealthy entity that does not feel the im? act of resource 
waste. Hence Ghanaians do not pay serious attention to government work '. This attitude 
has affected immensely the way in which development policies are implemented in the 
public sector". 
Other most manifest forms of Ghanaian culture that have contributed to the difficulties in 
policy implementation include, 
"overt and covert resistance to change, at both the individual and institutional levels and 
preferences for silence and acquiescence for fear of treading on influential and sensitive 
toes. Another is the obsession of hierarchy which is a significant aspect of the Ghanaian 
culture that has had negative consequences on policy implementation. Somebody is a Chief 
Director or a Permanent Secretary in an institution and it is not very easy to get close to him 
because he has gone through a system and it has taken him all these years so he must be 
respected and recognised". 
This practice militates against team building and consultative processes that are necessary 
pre-requisites for policy implementation. These Ghanaian cultural practices have 
debilitating impact on Ghana's development process because culture is a major determinant 
of a nation's values, which also determines to a large extent institutional efficiency. This 
suggests that there is a strong correlation between culture and policy implementation and 
consequently the development process. These cultural problems need to be eliminated in 
order to make institutions efficient. 
5.5 Challenges of the Vision 2020 Implementation 
The data have shown that the successful implementation of Ghana-Vision 2020 is a serious 
challenge to Ghana's public sector. According to the documentary data, (see GoG, 1997), 
the process requires efficiency and professionalism in the performance of PSIs at: 
a. maintaining macroeconomic stability and accelerated growth, 
b. making the policy process effective, 
41 Ghanaians normally refer to public sector jobs as "government work ". 
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c. maximising the use of available resources for effective implementation of the 
various Vision 2020 programmes, and 
d. creating a conducive environment for the active participation of the private sector 
and the entire citizenry of Ghana in the development process. 
These challenges call for improvements in the performance of the PAS to enable it to better 
manage the policy process. These needed improvements will require radical departure 
from previous methods and attitudes that underpinned the formulation and implementation 
of past development policies. To a great extent, a close co-ordination among the various 
agencies, a working partnership between the public and private sectors, the full co- 
operation and active participation of the people, and effective mobilisation of all available 
resources will all be necessary conditions for the successful implementation of the policy. 
As the data have shown, PSIs in Ghana are faced with a catalogue of structural, human 
resource, and governance problems. These include poor management, lack of resource, 
inadequate consultative processes among institutions which is more profound between the 
two front-line institutions in the development management system - the NDPC and the 
MoF. Hence the PAS is weak and there is widespread lack of clear objectives at agency 
levels and weak leadership at management level. 
Moreover, poor conditions of service including low remuneration and inadequate office 
facilities have created low morale and disincentives in the PAS that have resulted in the 
loss of managerial and professional expertise to the private sector and foreign countries. 
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On the other hand, those who have remained in the PAS have been forced by the 
frustrations created by these conditions to engage in certain bureaucratic acts which are 
generally unresponsive to the policy process and especially to the requirements for 
implementing the Vision 2020. For the new development management system to be 
effective and efficient, there must be radical changes to the institutional structures and the 
human resource requirements for the development policy process. This is made urgent by 
Powelson's (1972: 196) observation that the lack of greater administrative efficiency is a 
recipe for under-development. 
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These challenges discussed above provide the rationale for NIRP which is seeking to re- 
structure the administrative machinery for policy analysis in public institutions in Ghana 
(see figure 5.1 above for a graphical presentation of the linkage between the Vision 2020 
and the NTRP). 
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6 
Implementation of the Institutional 
Development Programme 
6.1. Introduction 
Chapter 5 has shown that Ghana's PAS has low policy implementation capacity to sustain 
the country's development. The interview at the CSPIP Secretariat revealed that 
"some improvements were made in policy implementation performance in 1983 when the 
ERP began but the 1990s saw general erosion in implementation performance. Attempts 
were made in the early 1990s to strengthen performance capacity through various reform 
programmes such as the CSRP but these were mainly ad hoc and non-comprehensive in 
nature. Consequently, these attempts did not achieve the desired results of a significant 
build-up of implementation capacity in the public service". 
But it is significant to point out that the challenge of carrying out the Ghana-Vision 2020 
implementation activities in the context of weak institutions will be complex and very 
frustrating (see Winkler, 1996: 3). Consequently, Baum and Tolbert (1984: 499) have 
argued that under such conditions, it is important to develop strong institutions as a major 
tool for efficient policy implementation. They add that, it is important to safeguard the 
hard-won national resources that are committed to the process. Hence, the GoG has 
embarked on the NIRP to reform PSIs and to build a significant policy implementation 
capacity to achieve the objectives of Ghana-Vision 2020. This constitutes the subject of 
this chapter and it addresses the second part of the research question regarding the utility of 
policy intervention measures to the Ghana-Vision 2020 implementation. This is restated 
as, "Ghana's incapacity to progress in her development is caused by structural 
inefficiencies and insufficient level of skills Public Sector Institutions. In what way can the 
NIRP mitigate these lapses to ensure a sustainable national development? " 
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The chapter is divided into six sections that cover the dynamics of the NIRP. Section one 
is the introduction while section two discusses the changes sought under the NIRP. Section 
three examines the NIRP component programmes whereas section four looks at the NIRP's 
intended outcomes. Section five examines the dynamics of the NIRP implementation 
process, and section six is a summary of the discussions made in the chapter. Thus, the 
chapter analyses the NIRP implementation process and attempts to measure the extent to 
which the reform policy will build public sector capacity to achieve the objectives of 
Ghana-Vision 2020. 
6.2 Change and the ID Policy 
This section explores the changes being sought under the NTRP to remove the constraints to 
Ghana's development as the research question argues above. The documentary sources 
(see Ghana, 1994a) revealed that the GoG recognizes the public sector responsibility to 
formulate and implement sound development policies to achieve accelerated growth and 
equitable social development. The GoG is therefore seeking to "restructure PSIs to build 
their policy analysis capacity and to function effectively through maximizing the use of 
available resources for policy implementation" in the development management process. 
This expectation of Ghana's PAS constitute the essence of the NIRP which is a public 
sector performance improvement programme. The programme is comprehensive and it 
involves institutions, agencies and departments in the public sector. The interview at the 
NIRP Secretariat and the documentary sources (see Ghana, 1994a) show that the 
programme is seeking to, "build a proactive and motivated public service that is capable of 
contributing to the attainment of Ghana's development objectives". The programme thus 
seeks to 
"build a public service that is result oriented and sensitive to the private sector as a 
customer and partner in development. This is a strategic mission for the public service and 
it emphasizes the role of public sector as a facilitator of equitable development". 
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The interview revealed that this mission would "establish a balance between the private and 
public sectors to provide the needed catalyst to achieve the objectives of the development 
challenges and opportunities envisaged in Ghana-Vision 2020". Thus, "the NIRP involves 
change in the microstructure of institutional life". This kind of change is described by 
Parsons (1995) as involving change in the way institutions conduct their affairs and 
interact with one another, and change in their motivation for acting the way they do, 
which is often influenced by power and interests to gain or avoid influence and control. 
This kind of change underpins Hargrove's (1975: 69) argument that "implementation is a 
political process in which individuals and groups vie for control or defense against 
programmes" 
6.2.1 Goal Setting for the NIRP 
Pressman et. al. (1973: xv) have said that implementation is the "process of interaction 
between the setting of goals and the actions geared to achieving them". This means that 
the implementation process involves goal setting towards which implementation is 
directed. This perspective argues further that in the implementation process, there is a 
starting point that is where action begins, and an endpoint that is the stage where goals 
are judged to determine success or failure. The documentary source (see MRP, 1995a; 
1995b; and 1995c) and the interview at the NIRP Secretariat reveal that the goals of the 
NIRP are to: 
a. "develop the practice of formulating and distinguishing between short-, medium- 
and long-term planning and policy goals in public institutions", 
b. "develop strategies for harnessing public sector support to accelerate private sector 
development and growth", 
c. "formulate better public sector good governance and management framework to 
make the public sector more strategically focused, business-like and accountable", 
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d. "develop a human resource management framework and manpower strategy for 
enhancing public sector performance in achieving current national policy goals", 
e. "strengthen the government decisions-making and implementation mechanism", 
f. "formulate an appropriate public sector fiscal framework that does not crowd out 
private savings and investments", and 
g. "establish an appropriate framework for technical cooperation policy and 
programme to support public sector restructuring and capacity development". 
The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995a; 1995b; and 1995c) show that under these 
goals, NIRP has developed strategies to address such public sector management issues as: 
a. "the vision, mandate, division of work and linkages between public and private 
sectors", 
b. "the policy formulation and decision making process", 
c. "the public budgeting and financial management system, institutional arrangements 
for ensuring macro economic stability and effective and efficient public resource 
allocation", 
d. "public sector human resource management. The programme puts emphasis on the 
capacity to motivate and enhance public sector performance in policy analysis", and 
e. "viability of the existing constitutional framework for ensuring accountability and 
good governance in the public sector". 
These strategies are designed to facilitate the achievement of the objectives and targets of 
Ghana Vision 2020, and these have been translated into four major projects. These projects 
are: 
a. Structural Transformation 
This section addresses the part of the research question that assigns part of the causes of 
Ghana's development problems to structural inefficiencies (see 4.2). The interviews at the 
NIRP Secretariat and documentary sources (see NIRP, 1996a; 1998) indicate that under the 
structural transformation project, "the NIRP has determined that some PSIs will either be 
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closed down, merged and streamlined, constituted into the core civil service, or wholly 
commercialized". The programme has marked some other PSIs to be "wholly subsidized 
and given subvented agency status, franchised or contracted out. Thirdly, the project will 
"re-classify and rationalize some subvented institutions to determine the advantages and 
disadvantages of transforming the residual Civil Service Departments and the subvented 
institutions into a single category of Executive Agency or Implementing Agency". 
These transformed institutions "will enjoy the same levels of managerial freedom to enable 
them optimize implementation performance". 
These documentary sources further reveal that, the NIRP is "reviewing the mandate of the 
civil service to determine the overall size and cost of the core civil service". The NIRP is 
also "reviewing the supporting structures, systems, processes, staff capacity, capacity 
development plans and the governance framework of public sector institutions". Other 
areas also being reviewed are "the current missions, mandates and institutional 
arrangements in the core public sector management agencies as well as the linkages among 
core agencies to make them strategically focused and performance oriented"42. The goal of 
this review exercise is to 
"identify ways in which the roles and functions of these agencies will have to change in 
order to accommodate and respond to the development challenges of the country especially 
those presented by the Vision 2020". 
The programme is also seeking to "build effective back-up management systems and 
services to enhance the implementation of development policies", and a corollary capacity 
to monitor and evaluate policy implementation. This aspect of NIRP's structural 
transformation is emphasised by the idea that ID programmes need to include making and 
enforcing rules and regulations that unambiguously delineate the responsibilities and 
functions for government bodies (see The South Commission, 1990: 117). The 
documentary source also points out for example that under the programme, "civil service 
42 These core agencies include the office of the Head of Civil Service, the Civil Service Council, the Public Services 
Commission, the Controller and Accountant-General 's Department, and the Ministry of Finance. 
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codes and regulations are being revised to ensure that public servants are aware of their 
duties and rights and also help to foster ethics that emphasize service to the citizenry and 
respect for the rule of law". 
The interview at the NIRP Secretariat reveals that a more vivid evidence of the re- 
structuring exercise is found in "the re-allocation of public sector staff in the productive 
sectors of the economy". NTRP has adopted a complimentary strategy to 
"create jobs in the private and informal sectors. The National Board of Small Scale 
Industries (NBSSI), NGOs, Donor Agencies and the Metropolitan and District Assemblies 
have been requested by NIRP to assist in the re-allocation and employment generation 
process". 
The present writer believes that this strategy is a safety net to reduce or eliminate 
opposition from the affected public sector workers to the NIRP implementation. Without 
this project, the programme may prove difficult to implement due to this staff re-location 
and redundancies. These affected workers and their sympathizers will engage in 
manoeuvres to resist the implementation of this project. However, the decision to provide 
them with alternative employment will remove a lot of fears and anxiety in the affected 
workers. This will consequently reduce any threats of sabotage (see 3.3.4 especially 
Hogwood et. al. (1985) prescription for reducing the threats of resistance to policy 
implementation). Secondly, this public sector restructuring is important to the development 
process in the sense that it is designed to cut down on the sector's recurrent expenditure and 
to re-channel the savings made to fund development policy implementation. Thirdly, the 
structural transformation process will enable PSIs to focus down on the role they are 
required to play in Ghana's development process. 
b. Transformation of the Governance Framework 
The second element of the research question seek to explore the strategies being used by 
the NIRP to address the governance problems in PSIs in view of the fact that the existing 
governance framework has impacted negatively on Ghana's development management 
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process. The current section addresses this question and states the strategy being used by 
NIRP to eliminate this problem. 
The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995a; 1996a) reveal that the MRP is seeking "to 
build a strategically focused public sector policy making and implementation machinery 
linked to an efficient, responsible and accountable public sector management framework". 
To achieve this NIRP has 
"undertaken an examination of existing structures, systems, processes and other existing 
institutional arrangements such as the adequacy of inter- and intra-institutional 
communication, work organisation, work flow patterns, office lay-out and administrative, 
operational and strategic rules and procedures". 
The goal of this exercise is to "remove the constraints on public service performance and to 
ensure timely implementation of policies and programmes". The documentary sources 
reveal further that 
"the NIRP is evolving a finance process to support policy implementation. The process 
outlines procedures for adequate costing of each component of the policy to be 
implemented, a realistic projection of available budgetary inputs in the short, medium and 
long-term and systems to eliminate waste, laxity and the lack of accountability". 
These value systems are necessary to sustain institutional effectiveness and Powelson 
(1972: 189) has shown that values are the foundations of institutions and for that matter 
institutions cannot survive without value support. 
The interview at the CSPIP Secretariat shows that, 
"under the new Civil Service Law (PNDCL 327) the role of ministries in the development 
management process is to formulate policies and monitor overall sector performance. The 
law also specifies that the role of the implementing agencies is to carry out the executive 
functions within the policy framework agreed with the respective ministry. That is, the 
ministries should focus on policy work and the agencies should focus on implementation of 
public policies. Section Be of the Civil Service Law explicitly states that the functions of 
the Ministries are to monitor and evaluate performance of their sector. The NIRP process is 
therefore reviewing the existing arrangements to enable ministries fulfill their key function 
of managing and monitoring sector performance. The review therefore seeks to clarify the 
precise interpretation of section Be of the Civil Service Law as presently it is unclear 
whether this applies only to implementing departments and agencies within the Civil 
Service or whether it covers subvented institutions because they also have implementation 
functions. The review exercise will also clarify the existing methods and systems by which 
Ministries monitor and evaluate the performance of departments and agencies. The process 
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will determine methods and systems for strengthening the existing monitoring arrangements 
by setting targets and measuring performance of implementing agencies against these 
targets and thirdly, the review will extend the monitoring process to cover the budget 
process and the training and skill mobilisation needs for these". 
The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995a; and 1996a) further show that the NIRP is 
seeking to accomplish this public sector governance transformation along three distinct 
lines, but simultaneously for complementarity. The first is 
"a system-wide enabling reforms in the provision of assets, authorities, staff and financial 
resources by the central public sector core management agencies particularly, the Public 
Services Commission, Office of the Head of Civil Service, the Ministry of Finance, and the 
Controller and Accountant General's Department". 
The reform will ensure that "resources for policy implementation are provided to the 
implementing agencies who will be made accountable for them" but the terms for such 
provisions will have to be such that it "gives them adequate freedom and flexibility to use 
these resources efficiently". Secondly, the interview at the NIRP Secretariat shows that 
"the NIRP is undertaking a performance contracting and market testing types of reforms at 
the level of individual MDAs". Under these types of reforms, "each ministry or agency has 
to be explicit about its mission regarding the development process, its proposed outputs, the 
resources needed to achieve these, accountability procedures, regulatory and monitoring 
systems". Kaul (1997: 22) has observed three main benefits of market testing reforms. 
These include: 
i. obtaining quality service from a decision to either contract out a project or 
internally organise it, 
ii. cash savings and value for money services if won by an in-house bid and thus the 
process of competition that was created will lead to greater effectiveness, and 
iii. raising standards and better monitoring and evaluation processes. 
Thirdly, the reforms will "develop procedures within each ministry and agency for the 
management and use of the key resources, namely assets, finances and staff'. This facet of 
the reforms will "set guidelines, rules and norms with which MDAs will have to comply". 
For example the interview shows that, "the procedures for hiring or promoting staff, or 
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setting pay and incentive levels will be determined by centrally mandated rules and 
norms". The application of these procedures will be worked out in detail by each MDA. 
The interview with the NIRP Secretariat also reveals that the programme is establishing a 
framework for consensus building which will be the building blocks for achieving the 
above objectives. This will establish an effective and transparent policy process that is 
both responsive and sensitive to opposing views. This framework also reflects NIRP's 
effort at building national consensus for sustainable development and growth. According 
to the interview at the NIRP Secretariat, this framework 
"serves as a forum for policy dialogue as well as quick and effective consensus building 
process that is essential for successful policy implementation. It is also designed to 
harmonize the roles of politicians and technocrats in the management of Ghana's 
development, strengthen overall public sector leadership and accountability, promote group 
cohesion and to focus on development policy implementation. The consensus building 
process will also provide the opportunity to develop appropriate structures by eliminating 
parts of the existing institutional processes that have become redundant as a result of the 
recent development policy focus, and open more channels of communication"". 
The consensus-building framework will furthermore 
"aid the search for adequate and equitable incentive packages and remuneration to attract 
and retain quality personnel in the public service .... The framework will also 
define the role 
and mandates of decentralized agencies in policy implementation". 
The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995a; and 1996a) show further that the NIRP is 
introducing new public sector budgeting and financial management practices. This 
exercise is intended to "provide understanding of the existing institutional arrangements for 
public financial management and find ways to make them more strategically focused, 
rational, transparent, accountable, cost effective and result oriented". The programme also 
seeks to "revise the public sector decision making process. The reform in this area 
reinforces the fact that efficient functioning of the decision making process of the country 
43 Currently, there are very little lines of communication between lower and top management, as well as poor linkages 
among institutions at the micro level and the central public sector management core agencies like the AfoF, NDPC, 
PSC and the Office of the President. Effective communication systems and processes need to be developed to build 
consensus around a common vision and to increase participation and ownership. 
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is an essential aspect of improving policy management". This aspect of NIRP activities 
seeks "to analyse the way policy decisions are made in Ghana's PSIs, their implementation 
and monitoring processes, and identifying opportunities for improvements". The NIRP is 
making 
"an assessment of the existing cabinet system for public sector decision making together 
with the role of the cabinet office and cabinet committees, other alternative channels of 
decision making, the extent to which the implementation of policy decisions are 
monitored". 
The documentary data show that the, "NIRP has embarked on a project to build public 
sector capacity to reinforce efficiency and effectiveness in implementation". The methods 
adopted under the project to achieve this objective include "assessing the existing 
framework of checks and balances within the public sector for ensuring efficiency, 
effectiveness, transparency and accountability in resource allocation and service delivery". 
That is, as part of a framework for public sector good governance, "NIRP is erecting public 
sector management systems and efficient scrutiny processes to make possible the effective 
and accountable mobilisation and use of scarce national resources at the macro and micro 
levels of PAS". Consequently, the data emphasise that "efficiency, transparency and 
accountability are three key tenets of the NIRP process and are undoubtedly important for 
public sector management and governance"44. 
The transformation of the public sector governance framework stresses the principles of 
division of labour. The exercise therefore has the potential of helping PSIs to focus down 
on their required role as well as eliminating the problems of participation, consultation and 
networking processes as discussed in chapter 5. Furthermore the exercise will "develop 
44 This statement was made by Professor J. E. A. Mills, vice-president of Ghana (in the former NDC government) in a 
keynote address at a Ministerial workshop on Public Financial Management Reforms on 29 August, 1997 at Accra 
and published in the September edition of PUFMARP News. 
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accountability systems and increase performance if successfully implemented". The 
interview at the NIRP Secretariat shows that 
"public sector managers who are still perpetrating their old habits and are opposed to 
change because they feel threatened that the exercise -*tiill erode their power base may 
engage in various behaviours to sabotage the implementation of this exercise. Public sector 
managers are therefore a big threat to the implementation of the NIRP". 
This threat is elucidated by the observation that when governance is associated with 
political conditionality, it is irresponsible and unacceptable (Lopez, 1994: 26). Bologun 
(1997: 79) has also stressed the need for a good governance approach to capacity building 
(see also Dia, 1993). This will require a radical overhaul of the machinery of government 
with special emphasis on measures to promote the rule of law, transparency, accountability, 
and towards the rehabilitation of executive, legislative and judicial institutions. Lisk (1996: 
54) has also argued that building good governance capacity ensures stability. 
c. Human Resource Development 
The fourth elements of the research question states that human resource problems in 
Ghana have produced poor public sector capacity to manage development. The question 
therefore seeks to know how the NIRP intends to develop Ghana's human resource base 
to enhance the development process. The answers to this question are explored in this 
section. 
The interview at the NIRP Secretariat reveals that "the NIRP has crafted a HRD plan for 
Ghana" which Mathur (1986: 103) see as important to the development process because 
variables such as funds, equipment and advanced technologies can seldom substitute 
skilled personnel (see also World Bank, 1980: 76). The HRD plan has identified the 
training needs of public sector workers. Paul (1983: 7) sees this as an important 
instrument of HRD and strategies for skills mobilisation. 
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"This project is intended to bridge the human resource capacity gap that has hampered 
the implementation and delivery of development policies. The plan includes an 
attitudinal programming that encompasses cultural re-shaping, communication abilities, 
cooperation and networking culture, team building and interactive leadership. It is also 
designed to instill in the public sector environment, the practice of developing shared 
vision among workers". 
The import of this HRD programme is emphasised by the World Bank's (1995: 36) 
statement that, increasing the skills and capabilities of workers is key to economic 
success in an increasingly integrated and competitive global economy. This perspective 
sees the BIRD programme as investing in people and this has an additional benefit of 
boosting the living standards of household by expanding opportunities, raising 
productivity, attracting capital investment and increasing the earning power of people. 
The Human Resource Planning Project 
According to the documentary data (see Kwabia Boateng, 1994), "the project is targeted at 
evolving the culture of human resource planning in PSIS". The objective is "to provide 
capacity for public sector management to anticipate the human resource needs of their 
institutions". Secondly, "the project seeks to promote qualitative and cost-effective use of 
human talents for higher productivity in PSIs". The justification for the project is that PSIS 
need to perform efficiently in managing national development and this capability depends 
on the collective effort of all employees. Under the project, PSIs "will develop the capacity 
to hire specific and needed skills, provide these with good incentives, and to be able to 
respond appropriately to changing political environment". The project is intended to 
"effectively utilize the country's human talents to manage the development process, reduce 
waste and enhance policy implementation". This project is underpinned by Boateng's 
(1994: 6) remarks that human resources is an important and valuable asset to Ghana and 
that its value will depend largely upon proper education, training and effective utilization 
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and management of these. Winkler (1996: 5) has explained that the human resource 
programme is important to achieve sustainable development. 
The data show that under the project, "Management Development Institutes (MDIs) are 
required to plan new HRD programmes by integrating human resource planning into 
existing management programmes". MDIs are also required to "offer courses and 
programmes at regular intervals and to follow it up with consultancy work at individual 
institutional level". The project is expected to "produce trained Managers and Chief 
Executives and will consequently result in efficient institutional performance". The 
expected impact will include "well-structured cost-effective institutions, increased 
productivity, growth and expansion leading to more effective development management 
practices". The interview at the MESW shows that "most PSIs are taking advantage of the 
project to correct the human resource lapses by training and re-training personnel in 
educational institutions abroad and in Ghana". 
Thus NIRP has acknowledge the human resource lapses in PSIs which has impeded 
development policy implementation in the past (as discussed in chapter 5), and the data has 
given evidence that the NIRP is determined to deal with the problem. However the present 
writer believes that as much as existing staff are being trained to acquire the necessary 
skills under the HRD scheme, it is equally important to revise the country's educational 
curricular to reflect the human resource needs of the country. This will ensure that new 
entrants into the labour market already have the skills required by the nation to aid its 
development process. Boateng (1994: 1) has noted that HRD is critical for economic, 
social and political development of a country. He recognises also that a substantial part 
(about 50 - 70%) of economic growth of nations is due to improvement in the quality of 
human resources. The GoG (see Ghana, 1997: 62) has added to Boateng's view by arguing 
that "development is essentially a human activity and in the final analysis, development is 
dependent on the quality of available human resources". And Bologun (1997: 78) has 
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observed also that of all resources, that is, material, financial etc., the most crucial, which 
also moulds other resources is the human resource. Hence, the selection, development, 
deployment, motivation and management of this resource constitute vital components in 
the design and implementation of capacity building programmes. 
e. Attitudinal Changes towards the Private Sector and Society 
This section attempts to provide answers to the third research question that seeks to know 
the sort of enabling development environment that the NIRP seeks to establish for grass- 
root participation. The section reinforces Hogwood and Gunn's (1984) argument that to 
enhance policy implementation, human behaviour and attitudes must be influenced to 
conform to laid down procedures. 
The interview with the NIRP reveals that, "the NIRP is mandated to build a public-private 
sector partnerships to facilitate national development". The programme is "drawing on 
best practice examples from other parts of the world like Malaysia, Singapore and Korea to 
assess potential and develop options for greater private sector participation in the hitherto 
solely publicly provided services". NIRP is seeking to achieve this through the 
"maintenance of a stable fiscal framework to promote national capacity development and 
utilization through boosting individual and private sector confidence, and creating 
opportunities for savings and investment". Secondly, and in line with the aim of promoting 
public-private sector linkage, 
"NTRP has de-regulated current public sector management and operating culture, and has 
formulated two schemes to first exchange personnel between the two sectors and second, to 
involve the private sector in public sector manpower training and development". 
In order to improve and sustain the confidence of the general public in the public sector, 
"NIRP had developed good governance and client charters. The process clearly identifies 
key stakeholders and clients and it is seeking to institutionalize a two-way communication 
process to ensure their participation in key decisions and regular reporting of staff and 
management performance against the set key targets. The governance charters also covers 
inter- and intra-institutional relationships". 
206 
Kaul (1996: 135) has noted that the success of ID programmes is built on a foundation of 
attention to both the organisational and attitudinal dimension of public sector reforms. 
Kaul adds that, this must be linked to human resource management that consequently aims 
at encouraging and rewarding both team and individual performance. The data so far have 
shown that the magnitude of change sought under the NIRP is very extensive, but Nixon 
(1980) has warned that, "the greater the degree of change required in order to introduce a 
new policy, the greater the problems of implementation". This view provides a useful 
guide for implementing agencies to strategically work hard at the `implementation 
estimates' in order to avoid these `greater potential problems'. Consequently, Hargrove 
(1975: 4) has observed that if it is realised that it will be difficult to accomplish a policy, it 
is important to implement less of it. In such a circumstance, Hargrove advises that an 
estimate about implementation difficulties becomes necessary to shape the policy. 
The NIRP objective is explained by the idea that without transforming PSIs, the 
development management process will experience policy failures, ineffective programmes 
and a deepening public disillusionment with the government (see Grindle and Thomas, 
1991). It is important to also stress that the pace, scope and depths of the changes taking 
place in Ghana's PSIs will require fundamental rethinking of the conceptual models or 
paradigms upon which public bureaucracies have been built in the past (see Thomas, 1996). 
Thomas takes a less optimistic perspective and argues that the changes sought under 
current ID efforts are products of 
a. politics than management. These are popular models of organisational change 
derived from the experiences of small samples of private firms rather than the 
complications involved in managing change in the public sector, and 
b. the false notion that the fundamental organisational change is inherently uncertain, 
risky, and likely to create conflict (Thomas, 1996: 6). 
Thomas is very skeptical about the real motives of current capacity building programmes. 
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6.3 The NIRP Component Programmes 
This section explores the strategies being used by the NIRP to address the changes being 
sought after by the programme (discussed in 6.2) and in the way envisaged by the research 
question. Thus, the section explores the strategies being used by the NIRP to mitigate the 
lapses that have caused Ghana's under-development. The NIRP is divided into six sub- 
programmes to ensure public sector efficiency in policy implementation. Thus, these six 
component programmes have direct relevance for the Ghana-Vision 2020 administrative 
reforms. This composition of the NIRP reflects Lisk's (1996: 54) observation that the 
policy context for institutional capacity building should be multi-sectoral and flexible, but 
coherent in relation to the desired objectives of development. These six component 
programmes are: 
6.3.1 The Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme 
(CSPIP) 
The Office of the Head of Civil Service (OHCS) manages this sub-programme. The 
documentary sources (see Dodoo, 1997; 1998a) reveals that, "CSPIP has among other 
things been set up to diagnose MDAs' capacity for development management". The 
diagnostic process was intended "to provide support for the policy process in all MDAs". 
That is, the sub-programme seeks to "improve MDAs performance at policy formulation 
and implementation, service delivery, and strategic planning by eliminating all constraints 
and problems that impinges service delivery capacity". 
According to these documentary sources, the CSPIP is targeted at all the constituent parts 
of the Civil Service namely, MDAs, Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs), and the 
District Assemblies (DAs). It is also targeted at those subvented organisations that come 
under the direct supervision of the sector ministries. CSPIP is seeking "to promote a new 
performance management culture that focuses on getting more outputs from the same 
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volume of inputs" (see 6.4 for a discussion on CSPIP's outcomes). The documentary 
sources (see Dodoo, 1998a) and interviews at the CSPIP Secretariat reveal that the methods 
being used to achieve these objectives are: 
i. "training and manpower development especially in the area of core developmental 
and commercial management skills. CSPIP seeks to improve human resource 
management in the civil service through the introduction ofperformance appraisal 
schemes; development of good training policy; use and maintenance of the new 
personnel database; introduction of schemes for better management of existing 
and future (senior) staff; and improvement of the incentive structures", 
and 
ii. "the provision of attractive remuneration in the civil service. This will enable the 
civil service to retain and develop critical expertise in order to play its part in 
national development management. The remuneration policy has been linked to 
the size and productivity levels of the civil service45. CSPIP will therefore seek to 
implement the Integrated Personnel Payroll Database (IPPD) project to remove all 
distortions on the payroll". 
These methods are underpinned by the idea that capacity building should be seen against 
the urgent need to staff the civil service with well-qualified personnel who can perform the 
tasks of the rank at which they are serving at any given moment in time (Mentz, 1997: 1). 
These emphasise the centrality of human beings in the capacity building process. The data 
shows that "in order to promote efficiency in the civil service, CSPIP is seeking to 
introduce a Records Management and Improvement Programme, and Public Complaint and 
Public Relations Units". It will also revitalize the Research Unit and establish the Civil 
Service Reform Coordinating Unit. The interviews at the CSPIP Secretariat and the 
documentary sources reveal that 
"CSPIP is designing standards of service delivery in the civil service and it is hoped that 
these structures will sustain the standards. These standards will be described in client 
charters that will be published and used to monitor standards of services delivered to users". 
Consequently, 
"CSPIP will ensure that all civil service institutions that deal directly with general public 
will produce brochures defining their standards of service delivery. These will also set out 
the procedures that the public should follow when using the services. This exercise will 
formalize service delivery standards and explain the client's entitlement". 
4s The project on salary rationalization was contracted to Price Waterhouse Associates who produced the project 
report in February 2000. The public sector workers have since rejected the report for being inadequate and not 
reflecting the realities of the Ghanaian economy. 
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Thus, 
"civil service institutions will make full and accurate information readily available to all 
users. This must be in plain language regarding how services are run, what they cost, how 
well they perform and who is in charge. This exercise will improve communication 
between the civil service and the public. It will also build trust by explaining the 
procedures and time scale relating to delivery of services. The client charter will ensure 
that the public sector provides choice wherever practicable and there will be regular and 
systematic consultation with users of services. Their views about services, and their 
preferences for improving them will reflect the standards". 
Under the scheme, 
"public servants will be expected to give courteous and helpful service. They will be 
expected to wear name badges. Services will be expected to be made available equally to 
all those who are entitled to them and provided in a way to suit their convenience .... 
CSPIP 
hopes that this exercise will cause bureaucrats to re-examine their roles, work habits and 
attitudes". 
This has not been part of the management culture of the civil service before CSPIP (see 
also CSPIP, 1998; Dodoo, 1998). Secondly, the interviews show that 
"CSPIP seeks to introduce well publicized and easy to use complaint procedures with an 
independent review process. The new civil service law has given a legal backing to this 
exercise. The Law requires a Public Complaint unit to be established to deal with 
complaints and improve communication and trust between the public and the civil service". 
The central unit of the Public Complaint Unit is in the OHCS and it is being developed into 
a proactive focal point for strengthening customer service throughout the Civil Service. 
According to the documentary sources (see Dodoo, 1998a), "CSPIP is consolidating and 
strengthening the OHCS through a re-structuring exercise". The sub-programme is re- 
structuring the Policy Planning Management Division and the Management Services 
Division. CSPIP has also separated the Government Secretarial School from the OHCS 
and it is currently consolidating the outcome of the CSRP regarding salary administration 46 
The documentary sources further reveal that the programme seeks to "create a series of 
46 The Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) which spanned from 1987 to 1993 was undertaken as a component of the 
World Bank led Ghana's economic reforms. The objective of the programme was to improve resource management in the 
public sector. The CSRP made some significant successes at reforming the civil service but also created a lot of major 
problems for development policy implementation as the programme concentrated on strengthening the core civil service 
institutions and neglected the implementing agencies. 
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small policy focused ministries through the PPMIEDs, and to hive off from the Civil 
Service policy-implementing agencies". "The hived off implementing agencies will be 
converted into centralized and decentralized subvented agencies under their ministries". 
The interview at the CSPIP Secretariat shows that as 
"part of the NIRP re-structuring exercise, CSPIP has introduced performance indicators for 
chief directors in the civil service. The process seeks to make the chief directors 
individually accountable for the performance of their institutions. Chief directors will be 
empowered to appoint staff on the basis of merit, remunerate in accordance with the need to 
recruit and retain quality staff, promote discipline and dismiss in accordance with fair 
procedures. The President in consultation with the PSC and OHCS will make and confirm 
the appointment of the Chief Director. On appointment, the Chief Director is expected to 
draft a medium-term sector and annual business plan and budget within Cabinet approved 
sector MTEF for discussion and approval by the Minister. He will also develop an 
organisational structure and fill up senior management positions. He will be obliged to 
progressively advertise all remaining positions in the new organisational structure to enable 
all existing staff have an equal opportunity to apply. However, any staff who is 
unsuccessful in securing a position will be assisted to find alternative employment, to be 
retrained or to pay them compensation and severance". 
This re-structuring task of the CSPIP may be difficult to implement, as the reaction of civil 
service workers may tend to sabotage the implementation process. This may happen 
because as discussed in chapter three, policies such as these create fear and uncertainty 
about the future among workers regarding their livelihood. Hence this aspect of the 
programme must be managed strategically. 
6.3.2 Public Financial Management Reform Programme (PUFMARP) 
PUFMARP is the second component programme of the NIRP and the MoF manages it. 
The sub-programme seeks to show the strategies being used by the NIRP to build 
accountability and transparent practices in PSIs, which is part of the governance problems 
present in Ghana's development management process. This reflects item two of the list of 
research questions in 4.2. The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995) indicate that the sub- 
programme emphasizes "the idea that the re-organisation of the structures and processes of 
the PAS cannot be divorced from the re-organization of public finances". This is a 
"comprehensive package designed to solve the current problems in Ghana's financial 
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management regime from their roots". The programme is a product of "Ghana's 
realization through in-house reviews that there is a problem with the country's financial 
management practices". The programme also emerged partly from "various piecemeal 
attempts in the past to resolve some of the problems affecting the efficient management of 
Ghana's financial resources" (see PUFMARP, 1997a)47. Thus, "PUFMARP is taking a 
holistic view of the public financial management bottlenecks identified in the Public 
Expenditure Reviews (PER) of 1993 and 1994" (see Appendix F for a functional view of 
Ghana's Current Public Financial Management System). 
The programme is divided into eight components to ensure that all key aspects of the 
financial system are taken care of. The core component is the Budgeting and Public 
Expenditure Management System (BPEMS) which aims at reforming: 
i. The Budget Preparation Sub-system 
According to the documentary sources (see PUFMARP, 1997,1997a; and 1998a), the 
reform objective of this component is to "improve the planning and budgeting of public 
expenditures and thus strengthen fiscal policy formulation and implementation". The sub- 
system therefore seeks to: 
a. "institute a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MIEF) as part of the normal 
budgetary process. MTEF will cover both the recurrent and the development 
budget". This will complement the BPEMS system and would be fully integrated. 
Other elements of MTEF are "an aggregate three-year expenditure and revenue 
framework, the Medium-Term Expenditure programming at sectoral level and a 
rolling three-year Public Investment Programme". 
Some of the earlier initiatives were: the Public Investment Programme (PIP) to deal with issues affecting the Capital 
Budgets; the Civil Service Reform Programme and later the Integrated Personnel and Payroll Project (IPPD) to deal 
with staff costs burden on the budget. Others were the Budget Improvement Working Group (BI117G) to help implement 
the Broad Based Budget Concept; and more recently, the Expenditure Tracking System (EX'TRACON) to monitor 
expenditure in MDAs. 
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b. "improve the annual budget formulation". The changes sought will include: 
"preparation of a model budget circular indicating the possible expenditure 
ceilings within which MDA budgets have to be formulated, development of a 
software for the Budget Division that will facilitate budget preparation and the 
installation of this budget software in all MDAs, arrangements for the eventual 
electronic transmission of budget proposals from MDAs to the Budget Division of 
MoF, and programme for consolidation and preparation of draft budgets". 
The budget software would enable the "use of historical and baseline data for 
budgeting purposes, and to facilitate the interactive process for budget submission, 
consolidation, and revision". The use of this software will further enable "the 
budget process to be tracked from initial proposal to parliamentary approval". This 
will also be useful in producing master copies of the budget in a form suitable for 
presentation to Parliament. It will also "permit the development of rolling 
expenditure plans and provide programme profiles requiring special attention". 
This system will be an integral part of the BPEMS. 
c. "train a core group of budget and finance staff from the MoF, the NDPC, and the 
MDAs in the preparation of MTEF and annual budget, and using the information 
system for preparation of such budgets". 
These changes will result in "a proper budget preparation for development policy 
implementation through improved database and improved link-up between planning and 
budgetary outlays in a specified macroeconomic framework". This will also lead to 
increased ownership and enhance accountability. 
ii Budget Implementation Sub-System 
The objectives of this sub-system according to the documentary sources (see PUFMARP, 
1997; 1997a; and 1998a) are to ensure "an orderly and smooth implementation of the 
budget, while providing adequate flexibility to the MDAs to manage their development 
programmes and projects within the budget". This will enable the MoF to oversee 
macroeconomic stabilization. This programme is designed "to promote a system of 
accounting that impact on the effective utilization of the financial resources" of the country, 
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"provide a window to the public to ascertain the financial status of government, and serve 
as a major instrument in the formulation and implementation of government policies". 
That is, the sub-system seeks to "implant a modern accounting sub-system which classifies, 
records and analyses in a timely, reliable and standard manner all government financial 
transactions". This sub-system will provide basic financial transaction data and reports to 
all other sub-systems" and will "form the core of the new financial management system". 
Under this sub-system, PUFMARP will introduce a common General Ledger System, to 
enable the CAGD to consolidate Treasury Reports, revise the processes for preparing 
annual operating statements by the CAGD, and specify Accounting Standards for PSIs. 
iii. Accounting 
The documentary sources (see PUFMARP, 1997) reveal that the reform in the accounting 
system will seek to "link accounting with the payroll and pension systems and install an 
effective public payments system". Under the programme, "MDA staff will be provided 
with training in the new accounting system". Each MDA is required "to implement an 
effective financial management system for planning, allocation, utilization and accounting 
of resources". It is envisaged that these will lead to a "changed and complete base for 
public accounts, and a complete, timely and reliable financial information to assist MDAs 
in their policy implementation activities". The sub-programme is also designed to 
"facilitate the proposed devolution of financial responsibility to sector MDAs and 
MMDAs". The remaining components of the sub-programme are described as satellite 
sub-systems. 
Satellite sub-systems 
The documentary sources (see PUFMARP, 1997; 1997a; and 1998a) show that the satellite 
sub-systems include: 
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i. Revenue Management 
This sub-system seeks to "promote systems of tax administration in order to achieve greater 
taxpayer compliance and convenience". It is also intended "to increase the efficiency of 
revenue collection, reporting and forecasting". 
H. Cash Management 
This sub-system is designed "to achieve an efficient provision of the cash resources of the 
Government while voiding the immobilization of resources and minimizing the cost of 
borrowing". This will be achieved through "the introduction of a modern cash 
management system that will estimate, project, monitor, and manage revenue inflows and 
expenditure outflows". 
iii. Aid and Debt Management 
The documentary sources (see PUFMARP, 1997) reveal that the sub-system seeks to 
"strengthen the management of the acquisition, and servicing, of public debt". The 
changes being made to this area include: 
a. "the integration of the external debt database between the Aid and Debt 
Management Unit (ADMU) of the MoF, the BoG, and the CAGD so as to provide a 
single complete status of Ghana's external debt, and the full operationalization of 
an Aid Management Information System" (AMIS), 
b. the integration of information on technical cooperation, currently incorporated in 
the system of the National Technical Cooperation Assistance Programme 
(NaTCAP) with AMIS48, 
c. the strengthening of ADMU as the focal point for external debt data, and 
18 The responsibility for NaTCAP has been transferred to ADMU from the NaTCAP Secretariat. 
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d. the training of staff from the ADMU in areas such as debt portfolio analysis, 
negotiation skills, international finance, budgeting, and information technology 
related to their work. 
iv. Procurement 
According to the data (see PUFMARP 1997), the objective of this sub-programme is to 
"streamline the procurement of goods and services, and establish an effective monitoring 
and tracking system". The project is reviewing "public procurement practices in Ghana 
with a view to formulating a national procurement code and establishing mechanisms for 
monitoring compliance with the code". The exercise will specify and adhere to 
"competitive tendering and contracting procedures that will include the standardization of 
procurement across MDAs". Secondly a database on the cost of procured items will be 
built. 
v. Audit 
The data (see PUFMARP, 1997 and 1997a) shows that the objective of this component is 
"to promote the timely and effective audit of transactions to ensure that resources are being 
used for the specified purposes". The project seeks to introduce in external audit, "the 
development of national audit standards, specifications for audit reports, introduction of 
some value for money audit, on-line access to the budget implementation reports, logistical 
support, and training". Under internal audit, the project seeks to "introduce effective 
internal audit, internal audit reporting, and institutional arrangement for internal audit". 
The interview at the PUFMARP Secretariat shows that "audit practices are not strictly 
observed in the public sector". The project will therefore 
"set reporting requirements on internal audit, develop national audit standards, introduce 
specifications for audit reports, set the criteria for audit staff performance evaluation, 
performance development and formal training for staff'. 
This strategy is intended to create a cadre of professional auditors. The data shows that the 
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"outcome of this strategy will be an audit service capable of performing reliable financial 
audits; implementation of procedures and sanctions when problems are identified in audit 
reports; internal audits being performed continually to provide feedback to the heads of 
MDAs for more effective management". 
Ancillary sub-systems 
The documentary sources (see PUFMARP, 1997; 1997a; and 1998a) show that there are 
ancillary projects under the sub-programme, and these include: 
i. Fiscal Decentralization 
The data reveals that the fiscal decentralization sub-system is meant "to support national 
development by providing the government with the instrument required for a decentralized, 
effective and efficient financial management system which will allocate and manage 
financial resources at the district level efficiently". That is under the sub-system, 
PUFMARP has responsibility to "strengthen operational management at the DAs, create a 
stronger accountability culture to inform institutions and individuals about what is being 
spent, how quickly, and for what". It is envisaged that these activities will lead to a 
"strengthened local financial management system, the provision of key tools to enforce the 
spending disciplines which helps to ensure macro-economic stability, enhanced central 
control and audit role at all levels of public sector, and greater accountability at the regional 
and district levels". 
ii. Changes to the Legislative and Regulatory Framework 
According to the documentary sources (see PUFMARP, 1997), this change intends to 
"provide an adequate legal framework for public financial management". It seeks to 
introduce transparency and accountability in the financial management process. The 
hitherto "existing legislative and legal framework has been rendered inadequate and 
obsolete by the changes in political and institutional arrangements in Ghana" that is, the 
transition from a military dictatorship to a civilian administration. Besides, "the legal 
system is inconsistent and contradictory". The sub-programme is therefore to "review the 
current legislative framework and develop new financial rules and regulations". The thrust 
of the changes in legislative and regulatory framework for financial management is that 
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"compliance with the new financial laws should lead to greater efficiency, effectiveness 
and accountability in the public administration system of the country"49 
The evidence from Ghana's past public financial management regime raise doubts about 
the usefulness of financial laws as a stand-alone remedy because the old system also had 
laws governing it but the system failed to produce good management. The present writer 
believes that perhaps what is needed also are strategies for negotiation in order to secure 
compliance. The Ghanaian experience suggests that financial laws may be necessary but 
not sufficient conditions for achieving efficiency transparency and accountability in the 
PAS. White's (1995: 99) idea on making the legal system relevant for the development 
management process is useful to this discussion. White argues that the effectiveness of 
committing resources to the development process depends greatly on a set of rules. He 
believes that for this legal system to be effective, the rules must be known in advance, they 
must actually be in force, there should be mechanisms to ensure enforcement, conflict 
resolution should be carried out through the decision of an independent judicial body, and 
procedures should exist to amend the rules when they no longer serve their purpose. These 
may be useful strategies to make the new financial regulatory framework under the Vision 
2020 effective. They may also be useful tools to eliminate the corrupt and non-transparent 
practices in Ghana's PAS. 
iii. Human Resource Development 
The documentary sources (see PUFMARP, 2997; 1998a) show that the design of 
PUFMARP strongly emphasizes HRD. The programme seeks to "provide public sector 
workers with opportunities for the transfer and acquisition of new skills and to contribute to 
19 This opinion was expressed in a statement by Dr. R. Dodoo, Head of the Civil Service in an opening address of a 
Workshop on Financial Management at Accra on 20 October, 1997 and carried by the November 1997 edition of 
PUFMARP News. 
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the national capacity for trained financial managers in government". The training 
programme under PUFMARP is divided into seven categories. These are: 
a. "specific training to key Government staff in the principles, concepts, and 
methodologies for the subject areas covered by the project components", 
b. "training related to the operational work of public sector staff', 
c. "general training to the personnel in the financial management chain related to 
aspects of financial management such as accounting, budgeting, policy making, 
taxation, etc. " 
d. "general training to public sector financial management staff in standard computer 
software packages", 
e. "training to senior-level management and policy makers in the use of computer- 
based financial management information systems", 
f. "end-user training in the use of the computer-based financial management 
information systems", and 
g. "technical training to GoG system analysts and programmers in the use of the 
specific tools to be employed for developing and implementing the information 
systems under PUFMARP"so 
According to the data, 
"the project is providing these training needs in the context of an overall training strategy 
primarily using domestic resources and facilities. External training is limited to only those 
skills relevant to the success of the project but which cannot be obtained locally. Most of 
the foreign training are used to train local trainers". 
This is intended to make the project self-sustaining and continuous. 
"The project also permits a limited number of structured study tours abroad for key staff 
involved in the implementation of the project to learn from what other countries have done 
in modernizing their financial management systems. The training is based on separate 
training need assessments for each agency". 
"The software being used for the training programmes include RDBMS, UNLY operating system, etc. 
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The training need assessment process begins "with identifying the current capabilities of 
individual agencies, their shortfalls and the areas required for training, as well as the 
mechanisms for providing it". The assessment process also takes into account the existing 
training facilities in these agencies and in the public sector generally. 
iv. Manual Development 
The interviews at the PUFMARP Secretariat and the documentary sources (see 
PUFMARP, 1997) show that PUFMARP is developing operating manuals to provide 
operational guidelines for the convenience of public servants. This is intended to help 
manage the government financial system because the current crisis in financial 
management has developed due to the lack of operating manuals on financial management 
processes with particular reference to budgeting and accounting. These manuals cover 
budget, accounting, and computer systems. This will also provide a standard reference for 
operations and training. 
v. Information Technology Strategy 
The documentary source (see PUFMARP, 1997) reveals that, "the information technology 
strategy seeks to develop a strategic plan for the use of computer based financial 
management system in all MDAs". The data show that currently, "there is lack of skilled 
information technology staff across public institutions whereas there is a high turnover rate 
among data processing class". There is also "a lack of adequate, timely and accurate data 
which is shared by all users". 
The goal of the exercise is to "ensure the availability of timely and accurate financial 
management information on need-to-know basis in the public sector, and the production of 
timely financial reports by PSIs to support development programmes". PUFMARP is 
seeking to "institute an integrated data-sharing information system driven on an open 
system type of client-server information technology". This will "provide the sector 
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ministries with adequate information to implement their programmes effectively and 
supply needed information to central government". 
6.3.3 Decentralization 
Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development manages the decentralization 
component of the N RP. This component programme addresses part of the governance 
problems identified by the list of research questions detailed in 4.2. The sub-programme 
shows how the NIRP is seeking to correct the distortions caused by over-centralization in 
Ghana's PSIs. The interview at the NIRP Secretariat shows that the "aim is to decentralize 
various aspects of national life including development planning and administration, and 
policy analysis". The decentralization process will ensure "mass participation in the 
development process and engender consensus on the values of Ghana's development". 
Powelson (1972: 190) has noted that consensus building will lead to increased development 
because from empirical evidence, all modern societies that have achieved high rates of 
growth have ultimately had to use consensus institutions. Ghana's decentralization 
programme has been met with fierce resistance from some public officials because "they 
suspect that their power base is being eroded with the inception of the new development 
planning system". The reactions from these senior public officials are a great threat to the 
implementation of this component programme in particular, and to the NIRP process in 
general. NIRP must therefore develop strategies like those suggested by Hogwood et. al. 
(1984) to reduce this resistance (see 3.3.4). 
6.3.4 Public Sector Incomes Policy and Administration 
The Public Services Commission (PSC) manages this component of the NIRP. The 
programme is a facet of the HRD strategies being used by the NIRP to correct the human 
resource problems in PSIs. These problems are identified by item four on the list of 
research questions. The interviews at the NIRP Secretariat shows that "this is NIRP's 
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strategy towards the development of an appropriate human resource base to support the 
development process", that is Vision 2020 implementation. The interviews revealed 
further that, 
"the mission and vision statements of these reforms indicate that public sector employees in 
Ghana will be paid equitable salaries and wages in relation to their performance, equitable 
in relation to their colleagues in the private sector, and in relation to what the nation can 
afford". 
Hence in February 2000, the sub-programme produced a report on `public sector wages and 
salary structure' that describes public servants salary scales. The report seeks to correct 
public sector pay disparities. 
"This initially meant placing public sector workers on a universal salary structure in the 
year 2000. Thereafter, the universal structure will be reviewed and the structure will be 
changed and classified on the basis of the sector or job. In some cases, the classification 
will be made on the basis of individual institution's functions and will reflect productivity 
and market forces. Public servants will expect to have their performance appraised 
annually and the outcome of that appraisal to determine further pay progression". 
An attempt was made to implement the first phase of this project in February 2000 in a 
report produced by Price Waterhouse Associates. However, public sector workers have 
rejected the project because they see the report as unfavourable. In an informal discussion 
with three public sector employees, it was revealed that they are not even aware of the 
second phase which seek to correct the pay disparities. This is evidence that 
communication in the NIRP implementation has not been very effective. 
According to the interview at the NIRP Secretariat, this public sector income reform is 
designed to 
"reduce the gap in public sector and private sector salary schemes over the next ten years. 
The scheme will use a formula that is based on productivity and growth in the economy, 
performance improvement in the public sector and increases in domestic revenue". 
This income reform will "enable the public sector to retain its competent staff against 
losing them to the private sector". In pursuance of this reform 
"a management board has been set up with responsibility for the central management, 
coordination and implementation of all public financial, personnel and administrative 
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matters including salary administration and negotiations.... The income policy will have an 
overall effect of ensuring the effective delivery and implementation of government's policy 
initiatives and programme across the public sector in a structured and consistent manner". 
The present writer believes that the achievement of this objective will depend on a properly 
thought out strategy to correct and avoid mistakes such as the lack of communication that 
associated the first phase. The public sector incomes administration reforms emphasise the 
concern for social justice that has been argued by the South Commission (1990: 80) to be 
an integral part of genuine development. According to the South Commission's argument, 
a fairer distribution of income is essential as a means of speeding up development and 
making it sustainable. 
6.3.5 The Policy and Cabinet Process Reforms 
This sub-programme is managed directly by NIRP and it underpins the emerging corporate 
structure and culture of the public sector. This sub-programme explores the managerial 
problems in the policy process as indicated by question (iv) on the list of research questions 
in 4.2, and it shows how the NTRP intends to correct the lapses associated with 
development policy. The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995a; 1995c; and 1997c) 
reveal that the programme seeks "to simplify Cabinet committee structures and strengthen 
the cabinet secretariat by establishing a Policy Management Group" (PMG). The sub- 
programme will also "create an effective linkage between the PMG, the sector ministries 
PPMEDs and the NDPC". The sub-programme is also "building a strong and effective 
operational linkage between the policy process and the MTEF, and introducing a new 
format to coordinate policy decisions across the public sector". It is also building capacity 
for the policy process that encompasses "policy formulation, implementation, performance 
monitoring and evaluation, and incentive support programmes". In view of these 
objectives, NIRP is institutionalizing "a policy formulation and coordination programme 
that is aimed at securing coordination in the policy process". This policy formulation and 
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coordination programme seeks to "develop the practice of linking cabinet decisions to the 
resource allocation process". This will ensure coherence in the process. 
This sub-programme is underpinned by the prerequisites for building public sector 
leadership capacity which involves: 
a. "the establishment of a coherent government policy decision-making system to 
implement the mandate of government", 
b. "the establishment of a coordinated management framework for ensuring an 
integrative and coherent approach to implementing the on-going public sector 
reform initiatives", and 
c. "endorsing capacity benchmarks for monitoring and accountability to guide the 
performance of the public sector". 
The present writer believes that the above will require the establishment of an effective 
framework to bring together, streamline and modernize the current arrangements for 
implementation. 
6.3.6 Legal Sector Reforms 
This sub-programme addresses the problems in the legal framework as part of public sector 
governance problems that is identified by question two on the list of research questions (see 
4.2). The section shows how the NIRP is seeking to build an effective legal base to support 
the development process in Ghana. The Ministry of Justice and Attorney General's 
Department manages the legal reform. According to the documentary sources (see 
CHRAJ, 1996; 1998, and NTRP, 1995c; 1996a; 1997d), the legal reforms are "a response to 
the Ghana Government-World Bank Private Sector Development Project". The data shows 
that this "came out of the concern of the private sector for support from the legal sector in 
its efforts to propel development". It was realised that "unless the legal sector becomes 
responsive to private sector needs, the sector's endeavours would be hampered and the 
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sector itself will not grow". The broader objective of the Legal Sector Reform Programme 
however is to "consolidate the objectives and gains of the on-going public sector reform 
initiatives". This reform seeks to "create the incentive and an enabling environment for the 
effective sharing of public governance and administrative authority between the centre and 
districts". The data shows that "this will lead to a reduction of public sector participation in 
the delivery of service that could be properly provided by the private sector". 
The interview at the NDPC reveals that 
"the legal sector reviews and modernization plans are critical strategies to enable the sector 
ministries, decentralized and centralized departments and agencies and the private sector to 
respond positively to implementation of their respective mandates". 
That is, "the legal reform is aimed at improving the overall public sector governance 
conditions", and that includes the: incentives in the present budgetary system; financial 
management; procurement and contract management; operations of Cabinet decision- 
making process; civil service recruitment process; decentralization-centralization balance; 
and formal and informal rules for the public sector and how they relate to each other and to 
development policy implementation (see NIRP, 1997d). The documentary sources (see 
NIRP, 1995c; 1996a; and 1997d) reveal that 
"these changes will ensure that the aggregate internal systems, structures and process of the 
PAS are coherent, ensure the existence of an enabling environment in public sector 
performance and the creation of an enabling environment within the economy as a whole". 
Paltrel (1989) has argued that the rule of law which may be defined as "the subordination 
of the behaviour of state officials to rational, predictable and publicly recognised 
procedures" is also an essential precondition for accountability and predictability as 
discussed in chapter two under the national integrity system. It is important to emphasize 
that these changes that are sought under NIRP will require new grounds for direction, 
coherence, coordination, control, motivation and improved performance. Consequently, 
the magic elixir to cure these problems may be the creation of new public sector culture 
(see Thomas, 1996: 18) and a new espirit de corps. 
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6.4 Philosophy of the NIRP 
The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1996a; 1997a) show that the underlining assumption 
of the NTRP is that "Ghana's public administration system runs on rules and resources". 
The problems of the public administration system, and the NIRP's efforts to resolve them 
can therefore be explained in terms of the human and financial resources that are 
committed to public agencies towards the performance of their work, and the ways in 
which agencies are required to use, report and account for those resources (rules). 
Figure 6-1 
Scope of the NIRP Process 
Central Policy 
Process 






Source: NIRP (1997a) 
The chapter has so far illustrated that the various components of NIRP are all attacking 
these basic problems regarding rules and resources in Ghana's public administration. 
Figure 6.1 above provide a framework for understanding the scope and linkages between 
the various sub-programmes (see table 6.1 for an elaborate description of the linkages 
between the various reform programmes). 
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The interview at the NIRP Secretariat shows that "the NIRP has both coordinating and 
direct responsibilities regarding the implementation of the component programmes". This 
enjoins the NIRP to coordinate activities of the various public sector reform initiatives and 
it is also responsible for collating, analysing and disseminating information to all key 
players of the various reform initiatives. Secondly, NIRP has "direct responsibility for 
improving the central mechanisms for policy formulation and linking the policy process to 
MTEF". It also has "direct responsibility for improving the governance situation and 
operational efficiency of PSIs". 
6.5 The Institutional Renewal Policy Outcomes 
This section describes what the NIRP envisages to be the outcome of the problems it 
intends to eliminate as identified by the list of research questions. The documentary 
sources (see NIRP, 1995a; 1995b) reveals that, "the NIRP intends to strengthen the 
development management process in Ghana". The programme has "maintained focus on 
improving development policy analysis capacities in key PSIs so as to achieve Ghana's 
development objectives". This includes "building the capacity for public sector 
management to collaborate their activities for better implementation of development 
policies. Through these efforts, the NIRP hopes to 
"turn Ghana's public service into a productive and motivated establishment capable of 
contributing towards the attainment of broad development policy objectives (through good 
governance) in private sector development, and accelerated but equitable social and 
economic development". 
According to Baum and Tolbert (1984: 499), this ID effort is an investment that transcends 
the efficient execution of just one policy, and in fact it may have serious repercussions 
beyond the policy implementation. NIRP therefore hopes to "progressively bring about a 
fundamental and strategic change in the Ghanaian Public Service by re-orienting its current 
practices and mind-set from the vestiges of regulatory management to developmental and 
promotional ones". From the programme's perspective, "this is the key to building 
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capacity for achieving national development targets and goals". Thus, the overall purpose 
of NTRP is to enable PSIs: 
a. "observe good governance practices". This means that NIRP is "building processes 
into public sector practices to ensure that institutions discharge their functions in a 
transparent, competent, accountable and cost-effective way". NIRP is also 
"introducing good governance practices in the national policy process by 
improving public sector capacity to set institutional goals in relation to national 
priorities, set specific policy objectives, set outcomes and targets to be achieved by 
institutions, establish transparent procedures and processes, establish 
accountability mechanisms in the policy process, and align resource generation 
procedures with capacity to obtain results.... Good governance practices will 
contribute positively towards the creation of an enabling environment for 
accelerated growth and equitable social development". 
b. "work towards achieving accelerated growth and equitable social development by 
raising GDP growth from 5% to between 8 to 10% per annum in the medium term", 
and also "to provide support and incentives for the private sector to become an 
effective engine of growth". This is intended to facilitate the systematic alleviation 
of poverty and raise living standards. 
c. "become a more compact public sector. This is aimed towards maintaining a sound 
public expenditure policy as part of overall budgetary reforms"51. Secondly, NIRP 
will "disengage the public sector from those activities that can be satisfactorily 
undertaken either by the private sector, through community self-help or the 
NGO's". 
d. "attain enhanced public-private sector partnership to provide the enabling platform 
for effective interface of the public and private sector in the development of the 
national economy". 
In order to achieve the above outcomes, the documentary data (see NIRP, 1995a, 1995b) 
show that, the NIRP is using a strategy that seeks to: 
sl This reform seeks to overturn the current practices where large wages and salaries causes huge budget deficit. 
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a. "explain and communicate to all PSIs the importance which government attaches to 
the current policies for accelerated economic growth and social development", 
b. "assist the various PSIs to review their missions and objectives, policies, 
programmes, targets, inputs and outputs relationships to ensure that they are 
relevant to, and consistent with, the national policy goals", 
c. "assist PSIs in strengthening their existing arrangements for monitoring the policy 
implementation processes", and 
d. "assist these PSIs to make productivity gains by achieving more with fewer 
resources, through the introduction of market testing and the creation of executive 
agencies". 
NIRP is using these strategies to achieve the programmes intended outcomes through its 
component programmes: 
a. CSPIP 
The interviews at the CSPIP Secretariat show that "CSPIP is seeking to improve efficiency 
and effectiveness in the development policy process through institutional capacity 
strengthening in all MDAs, RCAs, and DAs". It also seeks to "institute a good governance 
culture in all aspects of the organisation and management of the Civil Service". The sub- 
programme intends to "rectify the shortcomings and the critical policy implementation 
gaps" (identified in chapter 5), and to "respond to the challenges of Vision 2020 through an 
urgent and critical review of available capacity in the civil service". The process will 
require the civil service to: 
a. "develop and strengthen leadership at the management levels", 
b. "promote inter-sectoral coordination of functions through helping civil servants, to 
view the public administration system in a holistic manner giving due recognition 
to the fact that the functions of the sectoral MDAs are only part of the overall 
responsibility of government", 
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c. "encourage civil servants to fully appreciate the importance of their role in policy 
analysis and in managing development, and to be more responsive to the public and 
particularly to the private sector in its new role as the engine of growth", and 
d. "promote a critical review of available human capacity within each MDA and 
identify and eliminate the constraints to the effective utilization of such manpower". 
The interview indicated that, "it is hoped that at the end of this exercise, CSPIP will remove 
all the constraints on the civil service capacity for policy analysis". 
The documentary sources (see Dodoo, 1997; 1998a) also show that CSPIP seeks to 
encourage all civil service institutions to: 
a. "adopt transparent, competent, accountable and cost-effective best practices in 
service delivery", 
b. "ensure judicious utilization and maintenance of assets and resources especially for 
policy implementation", 
c. "improve responsiveness to the needs of clients, and private sector and contribute 
towards the national accelerated development efforts", 
d. "evolve efficient, compact and well-managed institutions which will deliver "value 
for money" services", 
e. "establish a culture of strategic planning, programming, target setting and 
performance measurement in civil service institutions", 
f. "identify shortages of specific skills and develop the human resource capabilities", 
and 
g. "motivate civil servants towards result result-oriented practices and performance, 
and justify the linkage with appropriate pay and incentive schemes". 
The data envisages that "these goals will lead the civil service to improve its performance 
capacity in the development process". 
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b. PUFMARP 
The documentary sources (see PUFMARP, 1997) show that PUFMARP seeks "to evolve 
adequate processes to enable PSIs manage public finance with maximum efficiency to 
enhance accountability and transparency in public financial management". This will 
enable "government to maintain macro-economic balance to facilitate development policy 
implementation". Besides, "BPEMS will enhance accountability in all segments of public 
financial management". The programme also aims at "developing an integrated public 
financial management system in Ghana through a system of common, reliable and unified 
database to and from which all-financial data flows". This system will be shared by all 
PSIS. 
These documentary sources reveal further that PUFMARP is seeking to "ensure that PSIs 
comply with all laws and administrative regulations in their work". This is intended to 
"improve the planning and budgeting in the development policy process and specifically to 
strengthen the nation's capacity for policy implementation". This strategy of improving the 
planning, budgeting and accounting processes is being implemented through the MTEF. 
PUFMARP also seeks to "integrate all donor-financed projects and programmes into the 
mainstream national projects and programmes". This will make all such programmes an 
integral part of the national development programme - the Ghana-Vision 2020. 
PUFMARP is further seeking to "ensure that the expenditure profile for each MDA are 
prepared on the basis of objective programmes, under which forecasts are limited to 
existing national policies". This outcome will "facilitate the allocation of limited resources 
to those priority sectors and programmes that are most likely to achieve the Vision 2020 
development objectives". In order to realise this outcome, the "MTEF will provide 
information and financial management resource that are required to improve the allocation 
of the nation's scarce resources for policy implementation". 
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The NIRP's intended outcomes, just like in any reform policy implementation process is 
susceptible to a variety of outcomes ranging from successful implementation through to 
failure (see Grindle and Thomas, 1991). Grindle and Thomas have argued that most 
cases of policy implementation lead to outcomes not intended by policy makers. These 
varied outcomes are products of implementation logic and are factored on the capacity of 
policy makers to understand the location, strength, stakes and strategies of attempts by 
those affected by the policy to promote, alter or reverse the reform policy S2. Grindle and 
Thomas (1991) have argued that the complexity and demands of the implementation 
process affect the performance of implementers and for that matter are a great 
determinant of the outcome of the implementation effort. Already, the interview at the 
PUFMARP Secretariat shows that public sector workers have rejected the incomes policy 
reforms. This is an indication that public sector workers are reacting to the ID process in 
numerous ways and these reactions are likely to generate outcomes that differ from those 
discussed above. The present writer is of the view that in order for the NIRP to achieve 
its intended outcomes, it is imperative to intensify strategies to secure consensus on the 
programme and thereby to contain the reaction of public sector workers who are most 
affected by the reforms. 
6.6 Methodology for the ID Policy Formulation 
Hogwood et. al. (1984) have argued that one of the conditions for making policy 
implementation smooth and reducing implementation risks is to consider the 
implementation process at the policy formulation stage especially since the outcome of 
the policy is dependent on its implementation. He stresses that policy formulation and 
implementation are interdependent and to ensure proper implementation, policy makers 
must be involved and interested in the implementation process. Thus the methodology 
52 Implementation logic is the strategies and tactics for the process, mechanisms for delays as a decision parameter, 
motives of individual implementing agencies, and coalition building to ftx the outcome. 
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for formulating any policy is also a great determinant of the success or otherwise of its 
implementation. PUFMARP (1997: 2) has also added that the critical success factor in 
this implementation process is the way human and organisational issues are planned and 
interconnected. This section therefore examines the NIRP policy formulation 
methodology to ascertain whether the policy formulation process has any impact 
whatsoever on the NTRP implementation. This section explores the correlation between 
the NIRP's strategies to eliminate the problems identified in the list of research questions, 
and what the real outcomes are likely to be. This is important in view of the fact that the 
NTRP is an on-going process for which reason the implementation outcome cannot be 
currently assessed, it is useful to analyse the methodology in order to make some 
predictions about the possible implementation outcomes. The human-organisational 
interconnectedness will be a useful benchmark for making such projections. The 
framework for the NIRP methodology impinges on consultative and participatory 
processes through meetings, workshops and surveys. 
6.6.1 Consultative Processes in the NIRP Formulation 
The interviews at the NIRP Secretariat revealed that as part of the methodology for 
designing the ID policy, 
"NIRP involved the core public sector management teams and provided them with financial 
and technical assistance to discuss, review and develop a common strategy to address the 
current public sector orientation which is anything but enabling". 
The data show that "the review process encompassed public sector top to bottom 
management diagnosis" that dealt with: 
a. the governance and management framework for public sector institutions, 
b. the framework for decentralization of management to lower staff, and 
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c. current best practices to assist with the development of appropriate supporting 
structures, systems, processes, staff capacity development requirements and 
governance in PSIs. 
The diagnostic process also encompassed the "current public sector budgeting and financial 
management system and it was intended to design and implement an appropriate medium- 
term financial strategy and budgetary system" that: 
a. sustains fiscal discipline, 
b. enhance public sector priority setting, 
c. ensures technical efficiency in achieving programmes outputs and outcomes at the 
agency service delivery level, and 
d. generates transparent and timely performance based financial and accounting 
reporting to Cabinet, Parliament, the business community and the general public. 
Moreover the data shows that, "the public sector decision-making process that involves 
analysing the way in which policy decisions are currently made and the processes for 
coordinating and monitoring their implementation was diagnosed and opportunities for 
improvements were identified" (see Appendix C for the model of the diagnostic process). 
The interviews show that this consultative process "is a strategy that was designed to secure 
considerable participation and consensus building by all stakeholders of the NIRP, and also 
to engender their ownership of the programme". This interview at the NIRP Secretariat 
revealed that, 
"the consultative process started with an initial briefing sessions for the political and 
technical Heads of the PSIs. These sessions were led by an official from the office of the 
President and supported by the NIRP's Technical Group. The subject for the briefing was 
the objectives of the programme, and propagation of related concepts and principles that 
sought to create a shared vision about the scope, size and expected performance of the 
public sector. Thereafter, the Heads of PSIs were assisted by the Technical Group to take 
their turn to brief their own management teams who consequently communicated the 
policy, concepts, and objectives of the programme down through their institutions. The 
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Technical Group also assisted the Heads of the PSIs to plan and organise a series of 
structured meetings and workshops for these institutions". 
This strategy is underpinned by Powelson's (1972: 26,143) idea that national consensus on 
economic and political ideology is a sine qua non for institutional effectiveness. This 
implies that the strategy pursued by the NIRP in the policy formulation is an important 
lever for building a consensus necessary to enhance the implementation of the programme. 
For example in conflict situations, it is the consensus mechanism that helps in resolving the 
conflict. Consequently, Powelson (1972: 180) has argued that without a consensus on a set 
of values, any conflict resolution will be ad hoc. 
The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995d; 1996c) reveal that during this consultation 
process, the N RP also "served PSIs with a Self-Appraisal Instrument (SAI) to guide their 
capacity diagnosis and to develop teams to manage the diagnostic process". This self- 
appraisal process was designed to open new horizons for PSIs to understand and address 
their management challenges towards the new public service paradigm envisaged by NIRP. 
NIRP used this SAI to assess and measure the level of preparedness of the PAS to respond 
to the demands of Ghana's macro-economic and development policy goals. This helped 
determine the performance gaps and consequently aided the design of the performance 
improvement and restructuring plans of the NIRP. According to this data, the SAI process 
is categorised into: 
a. introductory in-house teamwork which consisted of a briefing session held for 
institutional heads, liaison officers and in-house CDTs to familiarize them with the 
SAI and to specify the team's tasks. 
b. extended teamwork that reviewed extensively the building blocks of the NIRP (see 
Appendix C for details of these building blocks). This was preceded by briefing 
sessions and workshop where the issues, lessons and observations from the output 
of the introductory work were shared and discussed to enrich the team tasks. 
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concluding in-house teamwork. This was a concluding briefing session of 
workshops organised for institutional heads and in-house teams to share the issues 
and lessons gathered from the extended teamwork. This explained and specified 
the team's tasks. These tasks involve the review of service-wide and governance 
issues, as well as integrating the various in-house tasks into a unified and coherent 
whole. 
The interview at the NIRP Secretariat shows that, 
"the data gathered from the SAI was fed into the briefing sessions and workshops and they 
have been used to model the appropriate type of public service capacity development and 
utilization programme. The basic features of this model are to make the public service 
mission-driven, market sensitive, transparent, accountable, compact and responsive to 
private sector growth and the development policy process". 
The interview also shows that, 
"the latter stage of the SAI process sought to explain the new operating environment, the 
rules of the game in that environment, how PSIs relate to one another in that domain, and 
how the linkages influence the quantity and quality of the resources made available for 
policy implementation. It also addressed "issues of accountability to both external and 
internal stakeholders regarding the use of resources and inputs that will be made available 
to them for policy implementation. The final in-house team reported on what each PSI 
wants to achieve in terms of improved access to resources, and changes in internal 
processes and activities. This is categorised into short, medium and long-term 
perspective53. The final in-house outputs were circulated to key stakeholders that is, key 
user groups, the sector ministries, the private sector, policy research institutes, donor and 
the NTG for study and comments. These outputs were revised and key contributions were 
incorporated. The revised output has been formulated into a short and medium term 
capacity enhancement and institutional strengthening plans". 
The documentary data (see NIRP, 1995d; 1996c) indicates that the SAI encompassed "a 
series of bottom-up capacity diagnosis and self-appraisal exercise at the micro public 
service institutional level and a macro top-down process". The interface between the two 
53 The short run represented what the PSI can achieve for itself just by managing itself more coherently in the light of the 
diagnosis just completed. The medium run reflects the opportunities for change which can be worked out by thePSI in 
conjunction with other players, that is, central agencies under existing "rules of the game". The long run represents 
what might be done, if these rules changed. The long run options clearly lie outside the institutions power to achieve, 
but it offers a tentative diagnosis, which was looked at, and the issues raised were addressed under the macro review 
process organised by the NTG. 
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processes is intended to produce a healthy interactive and integrative process so essential 
for sustainable policy process. To ensure this sustainability, the interview shows that the 
"government has designed the NIRP to be a wholly home-grown and coordinated product 
built on lessons drawn from previous un-coordinated SAP related public sector reform 
attempts and recent capacity development initiatives". 
NIRP has also conducted a survey of beneficiaries of public sector services regarding their 
expectations of the public sector. This is intended to involve the entire civil society in the 
NTRP process. 
The interview reveal that "the outcomes of these systemic reviews, the beneficiary surveys, 
and the diagnostic workshops have been analysed, coordinated and collated into an Interim 
Strategy Document" (ISD). As mentioned before, this served as inputs into joint 
workshops organised by the NTG and the core public sector management agencies to 
address the overreaching system-wide constraints to public sector performance and good 
governance S4. The ISD was introduced to assist the NTG to implement the NIRP policy 
goals. According to the documentary data (see NIRP, 1995d; 1996c) the main features of 
the ISD are the: 
a. sector's mission statements and mandate(s), 
b. definition of component product and services, and the development of regulatory 
and incentive framework for the private sector involvement in the delivery of the 
products and services where appropriate, 
c. development of appropriate structures, systems, processes, organisational designs 
(including work flow patterns and open plans) and staffing arrangements in line 
with the sector's collectively agreed mission or mandate, 
s* The workshops assimilated the outputs from the National Capacity Development and Utilization workshops. Secondly, 
relevant ideas from the deliberations of the Private Sector Roundtable Group held specifically on the subject was 
incorporated. 
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d. identification of centrally managed administrative systems, rules and procedural 
constraints that need to be addresses to enhance the sector's operational and 
technical efficiency in product development and service delivery, 
C. the sector's medium-term financial plan, 
f. an appropriate sector performance management scheme and good governance 
policy framework that acknowledges management's accountability to clients and 
key stakeholders, that is the executive, parliament and the private sector, 
g. sector capacity development and expansion plans including skills inventory and 
mobilisation plan and the appropriate database for identifying and managing critical 
skills, 
h. short, medium and long-term programme costs to guide the rationalization of sector 
policy implementation by departments and agencies, 
i. performance improvement plans to manage the challenges of Ghana Vision 2020 
policy objectives (see appendix D for a sample guideline of the performance 
improvement plans), and 
j. sectors' short, medium and long-term implementation plans, including benchmarks 
to measure and monitor performance and policy outcomes. 
These consultative and participatory strategy used by the NIRP in formulating the 
institutional renewal policy are acknowledged by Subramian as a process that reduces the 
risk of start-up problems and of project implementation failures". Elmore (1978) has 
added that regardless of how well organised an agency may be, its ability to implement 
programmes successfully depends on its ability to influence other agencies at other levels 
ss This argument was made by Subramian of Price Waterhouse Associates in a presentation on "Change Alanagement " 
at Accra in December 1996 and published in PUFMARP News on July 1997. 
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of government. Elmore's observation shows the importance of consultation in the policy 
implementation process. 
6.6.2 CSPIP's Participatory Approach 
According to the interviews at the CSPIP Secretariat, CSPIP used a separate but the same 
methodology as NIRP to plan its programmes. That is, 
"CSPIP organised briefing sessions for all heads of civil service institutions. The purpose 
was to communicate and explain government policies regarding accelerated growth, 
equitable social developments, management improvement and the development of a 
coordinated and shared vision for the future. These are all linked to public sector 
performance. The briefing team was led by the Head of the Civil Service and assisted by 
personnel from the Reform Coordinating Unit, and the CSPIP Technical Team. The 
Heads of civil service institutions were thereafter assisted by the CSPIP Technical Team 
to take their turn to brief their own management teams and workers. The aim was to 
make the management teams and workers aware of the concept, objectives and 
methodology of the reform programme. The aftermath of this exercise made the CSPIP 
Tecluncal Group with the consent of the Head of Civil Service plan a series of structured 
tasks and workshops for civil service institutions. These schedules were designed make 
use of experiences and ideas gained from earlier workshops". 
The interview at the CSPIP Secretariat also stressed that, 
"CSPIP's methodology for the programme design has been transparent and participatory in 
approach. The programme was built on consensus through extensive deliberations on the 
activities related to the programme between the civil society and civil service institutions in 
partnership with donor agencies. This design was intended to ensure the commitment and 
ownership of Ghanaians to the programme. As part of its strategy, the programme 
publicized the poor performance of the civil service. This was a strategy intended to 
mobilise the energies and expectations of civil servants and the general public as a force to 
change the current inertia and help propel the service into becoming a leading example of 
national discipline, excellence and merit". 
The interview revealed that CSPIP served all civil service institutions with a SAI (see 
Appendix E for a sample SAI). 
"... this is an internal institutional appraisal process in which a cross-section of personnel 
from the various institutions reviewed the institutional capacity and performance in relation 
to the institution's mission. To facilitate the review process the instrument focused 
attention on the institution's mission, accountabilities, its structure, programmes, projects 
and service delivery capacity, efficiency, linkages with other institutions, and mandates. 
The processes for self-appraisal and capacity diagnosis involved an analysis of five 
fundamental categories of factors that influence institutional performance". 
These are the: 
a. environment or context in which the MDAs operates 
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b. the inputs made available to the MDAs, 
c. activities, organisation, processes and systems internal to the MDAs, 
d. outputs of the MDAs, and 
e. "implementation of national policy goals by individual MDAs". 
The interview shows further that, 
"CSPIP used workshops and seminars to facilitate this diagnostic process. At these 
workshops participants used the information emanating from self-appraisal and beneficiary 
surveys to identify the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) to the 
institution. They subsequently developed strategies for building upon the strengths, 
eliminate weaknesses, taking advantages of opportunities and mitigating threats. 
Participants in these workshops included a cross section of staff from civil service 
institutions and representatives of stakeholders, beneficiaries and users of the services of the 
institution concerned. CSPIP engaged local facilitators (in the form of consultants) to guide 
the process. This diagnostic process identified system-wide constraints that are to be 
addressed jointly by the specific institution like OHCS, NDPC, MLGRD, and other 
appropriate statutory institution". 
The interview reveals also that, 
"in order to receive feedback on the methodology for the policy design and also to keep 
faith with its philosophy of participation and consensus building, CSPIP have held a series 
of high level consultations involving 500 participants with selected target groups. This 
exercise also sought to create a sense of ownership of the programme within the civil 
service. The consultation process also helped to communicate the CSPIP message to 
selected key target groups. Subsequently, MDAs also conducted beneficiary or user 
surveys to obtain feedback on the quality and quantity of the services or outputs they 
deliver. These surveys are intended to enable each institution to get to know how its clients 
assess the type of impact it makes on them. The parameters for assessing the impact 
include staff orientation towards client needs, the transparency and efficiency with which 
the institution's services are delivered, and level of institution's accountability to its 
stakeholders. The aim is to get public institutions to acknowledge the views of their clients 
in designing policies, programmes and projects for service delivery". 
The interview shows further that, 
"CSPIP used local consultants to assist MDAs in selecting the priority services for 
investigation and the appropriate survey instruments for drafting and programming the 
selected survey method, conducting the survey, producing the report, organizing review 
workshops and formatting the report for use in subsequent diagnostic workshops. The 
beneficiary survey and the diagnostic process served the purpose of identifying service 
wide constraints to MDA performance. Through these, the MDAs specified their capacity 
constraints and developed their capacity building plans. These plans are being implemented 
currently". 
This consultative strategy adopted at the policy formulation stage is a useful tool that will 
be an advantage to the policy implementation process. That is, the strategy has sought to 
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involve all implementing institutions in the policy formulation and therefore generate a 
sense of ownership of the policy in these institutions. Besides, the strategy will reduce the 
number of active opposition to the policy implementation process. Some skepticism 
associate the achievement of this goal because an informal discussion held with one junior 
officer at the MESW indicates that, "most junior staff are not aware of these new 
developments in the PAS". This respondent therefore expressed doubt about the success of 
the programme. 
It is very significant however that CSPIP pursued a separate methodology from NIRP's in 
the policy formulation process even though the two methodologies are the same. This is 
evidence of division and independence of the various component programmes in the NIRP 
process. This situation may present some difficulty regarding NIRP's effectiveness in 
coordinating and monitoring CSPIP's performance. And already, the interviews at the 
PUFMARP Secretariat revealed that the NIRP has not been effective in performing this 
coordinating role. 
6.6.3 Workshops 
The interview reveals that 
"workshops were used as another strategy to facilitate the institutional renewal policy 
formulation. Currently, more workshops are being held to facilitate the implementation of 
the policy and also to address implementation problems.... The workshops are organised 
either for a specific institution or cluster of institutions as appropriate". 
The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1996c; 1997a) show that there are two categories of 
workshops. These are: 
a. Phase 1 Workshops 
These workshops were held at the diagnostic stage and "included reviews of the policy 
objectives, programmes, targets, inputs and outputs of each institution". They also 
included "analysis to identify public sector activities that may not be necessary or could be 
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better undertaken by the private sector, NGOs or the communities". These workshops also 
"identified change-actions that were aimed at creating a more compact public sector that is 
able to make cost-effective use of existing capacity". 
b. Phase II Workshops 
This category of workshops is ongoing and they seek "to develop strategies and activities 
for bringing about the necessary changes and define specific programmes which are linked 
to the ID process to ensure their timely implementation". The National Technical Group 
(NTG) coordinates the outputs from these workshops. The data show also that 
"the NTG is collaborating with the CPSCMAs through these workshops to produce a 
consensus change strategy with a realistic time frame for addressing these overreaching 
system-wide constraints on effective public sector performance". 
The interview show that the "NTG will also make proposals for unifying the overall 
responsibility for public sector management". 
6.6.4 Macro Review of MDAs Performance 
The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1995b; 1996c; and GoG, 1994b) show that this is 
"another phase of the MDA capacity diagnostic and development programme". This 
phase was prefaced by 
"a series of preparatory joint planning sessions of the key central agencies. These 
planning sessions were aimed at harnessing the collective teciuiical capacity of these 
central agencies and giving a greater policy focus to the annual manpower and financial 
budgets". 
The data show that under the macro review process, the programme intends "to assign 
one central agency to coordinate the central management and control functions of these 
central agencies as they have hitherto been fragmented". The NIRP has proposed to form 
this central agency from the staff of MoF, CAGD, NDPC, OHCS, MLG and NIRP's 
NOC. The NIRP's assumption is that this collaboration can be strengthened through their 
membership of the Committee of Administrative Reform and PUFMARP. Under this 
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macro review process, the documentary sources reveal that, "MDAs have had to do a 
rational and systematic examination of their strategic plans" with emphasis on: 
a. policy, 
b. national and sectoral development goals and priorities, 
c. delegation and decentralization, 
d. macro-economic budgeting, that is ensuring optimal allocation of national resources 
between the private and the public sectors, and between the sector ministries, 
e. assessment of social and economic rates of return on social and capital projects and 
their linkages to the national accelerated growth programme, 
f. efficiency gains, that is realistic balances between personnel emoluments costs and 
operational and maintenance costs, 
g. establishment of performance indicators and targets, and 
h. review of policy implementation processes and accountabilities. 
This data also show that the macro review process "aims to integrate MDA capacity 
development with broad national development policy objectives on accelerated growth and 
equitable social development". The interview at the CSPIP Secretariat indicates that as a 
result of this aim, 
"MDAs were briefed on national and sectoral development goals, macro-economic 
implications of their annual budgets, standards of labour productivity, and opportunities for 
efficient performance. After these processes the Chief Directors and their project 
management teams were made to draw up action plans and project proposals for 
institutional restructuring and capacity development programmes aimed at a more effective, 
efficient and compact civil service. The outcomes of the macro review process and the ISD 
are being enhanced by study visits abroad by key staff from the central agencies and their 
Chief Directors. These personnel travel to countries like the United Kingdom, the United 
States of America and Malaysia to learn about the experiences of these countries' civil 
service". 
One may argue that this exercise reflects the argument for universal application of standard 
ID programmes which is rejected by Thomas (1996: 11). Thomas holds the view that the 
apparent widespread agreement that a universal ID standard is required for successful 
institutional change is misleading. The World Bank (1991: 13) has also added that 
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overseas training and education that are sometimes used as part of the traditional technical 
assistance approach have not been entirely successful in solving Africa's capacity 
problems. The reasons are that the low pay structure in African countries often causes 
trainees to remain abroad. Secondly, nothing is done to ensure that the overseas 
universities or training institutions selected for fellowships have programmes relevant to 
the needs of African participants. Consequently, returning students often find that they 
have acquired theoretical concepts and tools that are inappropriate to the practical problems 
they face as practitioners in their own countries. 
The interviews at the CSPIP Secretariat also reveal that "selected resource persons 
including internationally renowned economists are being requested to make inputs 
regarding the public sector reforms and how this will impact economic growth and poverty 
alleviation". The present writer holds the view that it is important to watch how these 
expatriate input will evolve because Lisk (1996: 53) has cautioned that expatriate technical 
assistance do not and cannot solve all kinds of development problems in Africa. Lisk 
argues that far from solving problems, these technical assistance inputs have in some cases 
become destructive forces that undermine the development of domestic capacity (that is 
critical to solving local development problems). 
6.6.5 Political Support 
According to the interviews at the NIRP Secretariat, "the programme has sought and has 
been granted political commitment to the reforms by the President and endorsed by the 
professional and technical heads of PSIs". This is very urgent because considerable levels 
of stakeholder participation with differing interests are associated with the NIRP 
implementation process. Hence implementation activities must be given political support 
to contain and resolve the emerging conflicts and environmental reaction to the 
implementation process. It therefore behoves on political leaders to develop strategic 
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management capabilities to help manage the NIRP. This requirement is very important to 
sustain the NIRP implementation process. Kaul (1997: 25) has acknowledged the 
importance of securing the highest level of political authority to management reform 
programmes, and the commitment of ministers and senior officials to the process as 
major influences on implementation management. Mutahaba et. al. (1992: 49) have said 
that in order for any new system to function effectively, it should have a clear mandate. 
In the case of a system that is supposed to question the viability of existing practices and 
values, the mandate should be clearly established in the overall national policy 
framework. The present writer however argues that this mandate is made more authentic 
and visible when the programme receives an overwhelming political support. 
6.7 The NIRP Implementation Process 
This section explores the NIRP's strategy for dealing with the problems identified by the 
list of research questions in 4.2. The section is underpinned by the theme that the failure of 
most public policies in developing counties is a product of poor implementation (see Ayee, 
1992). It is therefore important to examine the implementation process of the NIRP to 
determine the extent to which the programme can eliminate the problems identified in the 
list of research question. 
The variety of implementation model being used for NIRP's implementation is the 
interactive model (discussed in chapter three). The programme has included all 
stakeholders in the reform process and according to the interactive model, the actions of 
these stakeholders may influence the outcome of the reforms. The interviews at the NIRP 
Secretariat and the NDPC reveal that, 
"the NIRP's approach to the programme implementation involve extensive participation 
and consensus building across the whole public sector, while at the same time fully 
recognizing and respecting the individual autonomy of institutions whose independence is 
set out in the country's constitution". 
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Chapter three has shown that in the analysis of any implementation process, there are other 
important prerequisites that are necessary for a successful implementation. Under the 
NIRP implementation, these pre-requisites include: 
6.7.1 Implementation Structure 
Hjern and Porter (1981) have described implementation structure to consist of units within 
the institutions who view policies as their fundamental or instrumentally important 
interests. The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1996a; 1997b) show that in "order to 
facilitate the successful implementation of the NIRP, a central structure has been set up to 
put the policy into effect". This structure will "oversee the implementation process and 
provide technical guidance". This structure is constituted by: 
a. National Overview Committee (NOC) 
The data shows that "the NOC is responsible for providing policy guidelines for the 
programme", and also 
"makes recommendations to cabinet on major issues such as fundamental changes in the 
structure, composition and performance of public sector institutions, and national human 
resource capacity development that merit consideration at that level". 
"A Presidential Adviser on Governmental Affairs is the Chairman of the NOC. Other 
members include the Minister of Finance, the Head of Civil Service, and representatives 
from the NDPC and the private sector". The interview at the NIRP Secretariat shows that 
"there are also senior representatives from all the NIRP component programmes as 
members of the NOC. The NOC is both a coordinating and policy making body, and as a 
coordinating body its membership represents the key clusters under which the NIRP target 
institutions have been grouped. There is a sizable representation of the private sector on the 
NOC and that is indicative of the vital links N RP seeks to establish between the public and 
private sectors". 
The present writer believes that this linkage is essential for enhancing private sector 
partnership in the development process. This is important for accelerated and equitable 
social development. The interview shows that 
"the NOC has absolute responsibility for the design and successful implementation of the 
NIRP, and it does this by establishing the appropriate policy framework and guidelines for 
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the programme, soliciting donor support for funding of the programme, and leading the 
initial briefing sessions for the Heads of the targeted institutions on the rationale and scope 
of the programme. The NOC also gives policy and strategic direction and leadership to the 
process and serves as a forum for bringing together the stakeholders. It acts as a clearing- 
house on issues of strategic importance". 
b. National Technical Group (NTG) 
The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1996a; 1997b) show that the NTG reports to the 
NOC and is responsible for providing central operational guidance, technical support and 
progress monitoring. The major tasks of the Technical Group include: 
a. pre-workshop planning, 
b. conducting workshops, 
c. coordinating output of workshops, 
d. central review of policy objectives, programmes, functions, inputs and outputs, and 
system-wide problems, 
e. developing strategies and formulating implementation plans for tackling system- 
wide problems, and 
f. monitoring the implementation of work plans of the individual PSIs and the overall 
work plan for the entire programme. 
The documentary data shows that "the NIRP also require the NTG to work with the Heads 
of institutions to identify and appoint reform coordinators or project managers who will 
work closely with the NTG, and will report directly to the Heads of their respective 
institutions". Again the NTG works closely with the Heads of PSIs to identify and appoint 
full time liaison officers for the capacity development teams (discussed below) who would 
work with the NTG and who would report directly to the Heads of their PSIs. The NTG is 
responsible for selecting and providing overall guidance to a team of facilitators chosen for 
their experience and ability to prepare documentation for the workshops, conduct the 
workshops, and report on the results of the workshops. 
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The documentary data shows that the NTG also "facilitates a micro-institutional bottom-up 
process to identify capacity and service-wide constraints associated with implementing the 
Ghana-Vision 2020 policy". The group "works in consultation with the key stakeholders 
and public sector lead managers from Parliament, Cabinet, OHCS, and MoF. NDPC, SEC, 
PSC, MLGRD etc., and the private sector. This consultation process enables NIRP to 
coordinate the reform activities". The interview at the NIRP Secretariat shows that in 
managing the reform programme, "the NOC and NTG will provide guidance for the lead 
agencies to carry the process through from feasibility and design through to the point of 
implementation". NTG is responsible for monitoring progress, ensure linkages with the 
sub-reform programmes, and assist in resolving problems during the implementation stage. 
c. National Secretariat 
The documentary data shows that the Secretariat backs up the NTG and the NOC with the 
administrative work of the NIRP. 
d. Capacity Development Teams (CDTs) 
The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1996a; 1997b) show that CDTs have been established 
in all PSIs to act as a liaison between their respective institutions and NIRP. "They serve 
as change agents to catalyze the public sector transformation process and the 
implementation of the broader NIRP agenda". Besides, "the CDTs are window into the 
MDAs and the MMDAs and they provide an on-site accountable team for supporting their 
reforms and assessing their capacity to manage change". The interview with the NIRP 
Secretariat reveals that, 
"to make these teams effective, members have been provided with training in change 
management or institutional development tools and techniques. NIRP is also focusing the 
CDTs abilities on "visioning" and strategic planning as well as on the abilities for 
performance improvement plans"56 
36 These are being achieved through a training component in the Vision 2020 change-agenda work-shopsand itsfollow. up 
exercises. 
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The NIRP has increasingly "involved the CDTs in identifying Capacity Development and 
Utilization issues that are associated with the development and implementation of action 
plans for the institutional renewal policy". 
e. Task Force on Central Policy Process 
The documentary data indicates that, "the task force is mandated to support and augment 
activities for the re-orientation of Central Government Ministries towards a more policy- 
oriented role, and to strengthen the management and effectiveness of the national policy 
process". Figure 6-2 below describes the NIRP management structure. 
Figure 6-2 
The NIRP Management Structure 
National Overview Committee 
Office of the NIRP Strategic Adviser 
NIRP Secretariat 
Office of the Technical Office of the Technical Office of the Technical 
Adviser on Sector Adviser on Public Sector Adviser on System-wide 
Programme Rationalisation and Issues 
Restructuring 
Source: NIRP, 1996. 
Separate structures have been set up for the CSPIP and PUFMARP implementation. 
6.7.1.1 The CSPIP Implementation Structure 
The documentary data (see Ghana, 1994; 1994b) show that the Committee on 
Administrative Reforms and the Civil Service Advisory Board constitute the CSPIP 
implementation structure. These are also two advisory bodies to CSPIP. The Head of Civil 
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Service (HCS) is the chairman of these two bodies. Below these two sub-structures and 
also responsible to the HCS are: 
i. Project Management Team 
The interviews at the CSPIP Secretariat show that, 
"the project management team is the technical group and it has been established for the 
overall implementation and management of the sub-programme. To make them confident 
and perform competently, the members of the team have been given training and sponsored 
for study tours to learn about state-of-the-art and best practices of the ID processes in other 
countries. This group is made up of six members and it includes the Head of Civil Service 
and a DFID Adviser whose role is to provide technical guidance when required. The team 
also monitors the progress and performance in CSPIP projects". 
ii. CSPIP Secretariat 
The interview shows that the Secretariat is headed by a Director and assisted by a small 
supporting staff. It caters for the day-to-day administration of CSPIP. 
iii. CSPIP Support Office 
The interview shows that "this office helps to administer DFID input. It directly aims at 
supporting CSPIP activities, to provide essential logistical and financial support to CSPIP, 
and to ensure the successful implementation of DFID's support to CSPIP". A DFID 
representative heads it. 
iv. Reform Coordinating Unit 
The interview revealed that, "this Unit was established to meet the requirements of Civil 
Service Law 327 (1993) which calls for a unit to coordinate all other reforms in the Civil 
Service and help establish linkages between these". "The technical support required for 
this task is being tapped from freelance consultants with good track record". 
v. Capacity Development Teams (CDTs) 
The interview and documentary source (see Ghana, 1994; 1994b) reveal that 
"CDTs have been established in all MDAs under CSPIP with capacity development 
coordinators at the headquarters of each ministry. This coordinator liaises with the Reform 
Coordinating Unit and the Technical Group, and will report directly to the Chief Directors 
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of the ministries. The CDT's which are the change agents and include 5-8 senior staff 
would have to work as a team for designing and implementing the reforms". 
The interview shows further that, 
"at a diagnostic workshop, the HCS recommended the membership attendance of junior 
staff. This is extraordinary because it is not part of administrative framework and the 
proposal seeks to involve junior staff in the programme implementation. Heads of the 
respective civil service institutions are the Chairpersons of the CDTs, with the CDTs 
themselves becoming the centre of all reform activities. CDTs are not restricted regarding 
the number of membership but are required to allow sufficient membership to represent 
proportionately the main parts of the institutions. The Heads are assisted by CDT 
coordinators to facilitate the smooth implementation of the policy. The coordinators are 
deputy Directors in the Civil Service or officers of equivalent rank". 
6.7.1.2 The PUFMARP Implementation Structure 
The PUFMARP implementation structure has been categorized into four distinct but 
functionally linked bodies. These are: 
i. The Steering Committee 
The documentary sources (see PUFMARP 1997; 1997c) reveals that "the Steering 
Committee has the responsibility to oversee the overall implementation of the reform 
programme". The data shows that "it is the highest policy making body of the sub- 
programme but it also has responsibility to make recommendations to government on 
difficult issues for decision". The Steering Committee is also 
"responsible for coordinating and approving the various component projects to ensure 
coherence and compatibility in design, management and implementation, building a 
consensus on and maintaining commitment to PUFMARP, and reviewing and approving 
the procurement of goods and services for PUFMARP implementation". 
The interview at the PUFMARP Secretariat show that "the committee is made up of 
fourteen members who represents various MDAs who are either large spenders or who are 
implementing programmes which will affect the financial management systems such as the 
decentralization programme". 
ii. Project Management Team 
According to the interview, 
"this team comprises of three personnel and their main responsibilities include assuring 
quality programme output. It is also responsible for coordinating activities in the various 
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component projects to ensure their smooth integration and ease of implementation. The 
team also supervises the work of the consultants, and report to the Steering Committee". 
This data shows that, 
"the three positions in the Project Management Team comprises of the Project Manager as 
the Head of the Secretariat, and a Finance Manager who handles the financial management 
policy issues, regulatory framework and standards, as well as the re-engineering of the 
business processes needed in the reformed system. The third position is an Information 
Technology Manager whose role is primarily to ensure that the revamped system operates 
in a smooth computerized environment with the appropriate hardware and software and by 
a well-trained operating and technical staff'. 
This management team is supported by an administrative support staff and aided at the 
higher level by senior administrative personnel of the MoF. 
W. Consultants 
The interview at the PUFMARP Secretariat reveals that the "day-to-day activities of the 
project which need to be carried out in order to design and implement the various 
components are being undertaken by foreign consultants". The data show that in order to 
facilitate teamwork, the consultants work closely with the Project Management Team as 
well as GoG counterpart staff to ensure that project objectives are achieved. 
iv. Project Implementation Teams (PITs) 
The interview reveals that PUFMARP has set up PITS in MDAs to introduce the changes 
envisaged by the programme in their respective institutions. These are separate units 
from the CDTs of the NIRP and CSPIP. The data indicates that 
"these PITs will manage the micro implementation of PUFMARP and the team is 
composed of three main groups of personnel, namely one staff each from the project 
management team, the respective MDAs, and the Consultants". 
The data show further that in order to ensure successful implementation, everybody who 
is involved in public financial management function would play a role or the other. The 
data show also that 
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"the role of the PITs is to serve as the flag-bearers, the front line implementers, and the 
Trainer-of-Trainers for the purpose of implementing the reforms in the respective 
Ministries. The PITs will work closely with the Project Management Team and 
Consultants to understudy the sub-systems being developed and to help ensure that these 
systems meet the specific needs of MDAs. The PITs also serve as leaders of PUFMARP's 
implementation in MDAs or as Change Agents. The PITs are therefore set-up as one 
means by which representatives of key stakeholder institutions will be more and more 
involved in the implementation". 
The present writer believes that this will ensure ownership of PUFMARP in PSIs and also 
minimize implementation problems. Figure 6.2 below graphically explains the PUFMARP 
implementation structure. 
Figure 6-3 
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The documentary sources (see PUFMARP, 1997) show that members of the PITs work 
with the consultants and Project Management Team to acquire the needed skills to replicate 
and maintain the system. According to the data, 
"members of the PITS have been given formal training in areas of need so as to enhance 
their skills appropriately. They work closely with the consultants and Project Management 
Team to replicate the designed sub-systems in their respective MDAs and they arc 
responsible for expanding the system throughout the MDAs". 
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From the structures outlined above, it may be argued that the NIRP implementation 
structure is very well set up with properly outlined responsibilities and it confirms Hjern 
and Porter's (1981) argument that almost no programme is fully implemented by a single 
institution. But it is important for the individual groups within the structure to coordinate 
their activities in order to secure smooth implementation. As discussed in 6.7.4 below, this 
has been lacking and if this problem persists, the situation may impede the NIRP 
implementation. Secondly, the membership composition of the individual groups 
especially the capacity development teams is highly skewed in favour of public sector 
management. In the case of CSPIP, the HCS has been seeking to make some changes in 
the membership of the CSPIP's CDTs. However, the nature of the composition questions 
the interactive underpinnings of the ID implementation process. This is a potential 
platform for organised and unorganized opposition to the implementation process, 
particularly from public sector junior officers. Nixon (1980: 129) has cautioned that, 
"where implementation involves more than one level of administration, the whole process 
becomes more complicated" (see Hogwood, 1984; and Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). 
This observation presents a serious threat to the NIRP implementation in terms of how 
smooth the process is likely to be against a backdrop of a variety of institutions responsible 
for managing the various sub-programmes. Bowen (1982) however sees the problem 
differently. He argues that a carefully thought out agreement strategy will increase the 
chances of success. The present writer believes that the multi-institutional management of 
the NIRP implementation may however be explained by the nature of the policy itself. 
That is, the policy seeks to build capacity for development management in the entire PAS. 
In view of the fact that the PAS is constituted by a large number of PSIs, the programme 
cannot be managed any better than having a number of key institutions to be responsible 
for the implementation of the various facets of the programme. But Mutahabe and Jide 
(1992: 62. ) have noted that the ID programme can achieve its intended objectives only 
when it takes into account, the interactions among the component institutions. This 
perspective emphasizes the importance of consultation and networking among agencies in 
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the implementation structure in order to successfully implement the programme (see 6.7.4 
below). 
6.7.2 Resource Requirements for the NIRP Implementation 
Barret and Fudge (1981) have argued that for institutions to develop the capability for 
policy implementation, they must have the ability to bring together human and material 
resources in a cohesive organisational unit and motivate them to execute the policy 
objectives. The documentary source (see NIRP, 1996a) and interviews reveal that two 
distinct resources have been made available for the ID policy Implementation. These are 
financial and human resources. The World Bank, the British Council, the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, CIDA, and the DFID are the key financiers of the NIRP apart from the GoG. 
i. Financial Resources 
The NIRP requires financial support for technical assistance, training, acquisition of 
equipment etc.. The documentary sources (see NIRP, 1996a, World Bank, 1996) reveal 
that international donor agencies play a great role in NIRP's implementation in terms of 
funding and the provision of other resources. These donors are "providing assistance in 
terms of international resource persons, short-term consultancies and funding of the NIRP 
workshops". For example "at the start of the programme the World Bank made available 
US$50,000 to give an early start of the NIRP programmed activities in 1996". The Bank 
has since made available a large policy based credit and technical assistance support". The 
Bank has also "been supporting the central workshops and top-down reviews to enable 
NIRP outline strategic options for addressing the overreaching system-wide constraints to 
public sector performance". The data shows also that, 
"the DFID and the World Bank have aligned their technical assistance projects in Ghana 
into the NIRP agenda. The World Bank, the DFID, the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), the British Council, and the Commonwealth Secretariat are 
also working individually to make available to the NIRP, the financial resources required 
for the programme implementation". 
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Under this scheme however, the interviews at the NDPC and the NIRP Secretariat reveal 
that donors are being guided by NIRP regarding their contribution to the programme. The 
interview at the PUFMARP Secretariat however shows the contrary as the very funding 
schemes of these agencies are distorting the linkages between the component programmes. 
The interview from the NDPC on the other hand reveals that, 
"the philosophy of donor practice is that if an agency commit funds to the programme or a 
sub-programme, the agency sees the programme or sub-programme as its sphere of 
influence. Hence no other agency must thread this area. This practice has presented a 
formidable problem to the NIRP's coordinating function". 
The interviews at the CSPIP Secretariat show that "the GoG has also signed a 
memorandum of understanding with the UK government by which the DFID is funding 
CSPIP during its full operation phase for a period of five years (that is September 1996 - 
August 2001)". But the question is how the capacity built under the CSPIP can be 
sustained when the period of British support comes to an end. Perhaps a new 
Memorandum of Understanding may be agreed with the DFID or another donor. Secondly, 
the interview shows that CSPIP has built an inherent mechanism for continuous and self- 
improvement. For example, the CSPIP Secretariat will be integrated into the Reform 
Coordinating Unit to continue its facilitatory activities. It is also expected that by then, the 
major phases of the reforms would have been implemented already. The CDTs in the 
MDAs will have been well established as change agents and reform implementers. The 
ministries would have been structured along the performance agreements to discharge their 
duties effectively. Hopefully, the decentralization process would have advanced and 
departments integrated into the DAs and therefore major funding would not be necessary. 
The present writer believes that while these are possibilities, the best guarantee is for 
Ghana to incorporate the reforms into the national budget. The interview at the PUFMARP 
Secretariat also shows that, 
"donor agencies including the DFID, IDA, CIDA, the European Union and the World Bank 
are providing funding for PUFMARP. In the past, different donor agencies have been 
known to fund the implementation of accounting systems for MDAs which has contributed 
to the lack of uniformity and distortions in processes and procedures of MDAs operations". 
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The interview at the NDPC shows that, 
"under the new development management system, these donors have been requested to 
refrain from funding stand-alone systems in Ghana. Therefore any forms of assistanec, like 
funding and other support systems that are provided by these agencies and their existing 
commitments to individual MDAs are being coordinated to ensure that beneficiary PSIs do 
not thwart the NIRP implementation process. NIRP has therefore adopted a scheme to 
systematically manage donor contributions to the programme and to national development 
programmes in general than it has been in the past. In the new scheme donor organisations 
are in practice required to respond to the agenda set by the government. This is a complete 
departure from past practice where donors set in motion a series of interventions which 
usually had no recourse to national development priorities and in their implementation, 
local resources which could have been used more effectively elsewhere were diverted. This 
new scheme is embedded in the national and sector capacity development and investment 
plan which is a product of the outputs of the Vision 2020 change-agenda workshop and the 
performance improvement plans '. 
(see also NIRP, 1996a) 
The present writer holds the opinion however that, this new policy on donor support may 
only exist in theory because the data did not produce any evidence of the new practice 
being operational. The evidence on the contrary show that donor agencies continue to fund 
programmes independently which has contributed to coordination problems in the PAS. 
Perhaps there are plans to enforce this policy at a latter time. This heavy donor 
involvement with the CSPIP and PUFMARP may explain why the two sub-programmes 
used separate methodologies apart from the NIRP's in the design of the programmes. 
Secondly, this may be the reason why these two programmes have their individual 
implementation teams (see 6.7.1). Donor involvement in the development policy process is 
captured in the last element of the research question and it seeks to explore how the NIRP 
intends to correct or eliminate the distortions that associate donor practices in Ghana. 
However, from the analysis made above, one may argue that the NIRP itself has become a 
victim of the problems and hence may be unable to make any remarkable changes in this 
area. 
The plan provides the framework for which current and future aid-funded programmes and technical assistance would 
relate. 
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The documentary data (see NIRP, 1996c) shows that the NIRP also "receives funding from 
the national budget, the district common fund, savings from re-deployment, and divestiture, 
and private sector contributions". For example, "the government provides funds for 
PUFMARP's recurrent expenditure". Secondly, "a Performance Improvement Facility 
(PIF) has been created by the GoG to make available the required financial resources for 
the NIRP implementation". This facility has been necessary because 
"the programme will incur transitional costs as well as cost in areas like equipment, 
consultancy or training that can make significant short term difference before the 
government's annual budgetary process gets round to incorporate the cost of the NIRP". 
Thus, the PIF is built into the programme to provide for these elements on a small but 
important scale. Berg (1993: 58) has provided a useful lesson regarding this. He has noted 
that development depends critically on the strength and quality of a country's institutional 
capacity and therefore development cooperation and technical cooperation efforts must 
contribute to achieving this objective. Berg argues that an aid activity cannot be regarded 
as successful unless it has contributed to strengthening local institutions. Berg's major 
concern is that capacity building should be the central and unique goal of technical 
cooperation. 
ii. Human and Technical Resources 
The interviews at the NTRP, CSPIP and PUFMARP Secretariats concurrently revealed that, 
"due to the NIRP's objective to develop local capacity, local consultants are being 
contracted to fill the public sector capacity gaps". This conforms to Nancy Baster's 
(1972: 2) argument that the growth of national independence is an important aspect of 
development that requires indigenous personnel to be in key positions, as well as 
indigenous people to develop indigenous technology. This is a part of national autonomy 
that is seen as an important element of development, and it confirms the idea that "the 
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success of any change project depends upon human resource base" of the country in 
question58 
Secondly, the data shows that the NIRP has also 
"engaged institutional experts from the DFID to work with the NTG and the NIRP target 
groups in identifying local partners to provide facilitative and technical consultancy back- 
up support for the programme.... The contracted local consultants provide technical 
consultancy to PSIs to conduct their change-agenda workshops and follow-up exercises to 
generate individual institutional performance improvement or capacity building and 
implementation plans.... Resource persons from the public sector institutions with 
appropriate skills and commitment are tapped to augment the NTG core staff as and when 
needed. The World Bank also has taken up the responsibility to provide professional 
expertise to assist the NTG with the national debate, discussions and dialogue to put in 
place the essential public administration delivery systems consistent with national 
development goals and aspirations. But NIRP monitors the quality of sector programme 
outputs to ensure that the essential features of the NIRP methodology are not 
compromised". 
The data shows that, the programme recognises that at the heart of every reform 
programme is the human factor. Therefore if the human factor is not well taken care of or 
do not fully comprehend the system being implemented, the new system would simply not 
attain its objectivesS9. NIRP has introduced an incentive mechanism and to train and retain 
these and other well-trained and highly skilled professionals to run the system60. The 
interview at the PUFMARPP Secretariat shows that 
"PUFMARP for example has under the scheme contracted two consultants from the Civil 
Service College in the UK to be responsible for the HRD component of the programme. 
Their brief is to produce a training strategy that provides the framework for identification of 
all the skills that are needed for implementation of PUFMARP and to ensure that initiatives 
for training and development will be undertaken to cover the individual components of the 
sub-programme". 
58 This is quoted from a Statement made by Robert Smith of the Civil Service College in the UK in an interview with 
PUFMARP News and published in the March 1998 edition of PUF7l1ARP News at Accra. 
59 A statement by Joseph Adda, PUF11 TARP Project Manager, at a workshop for Project Implementation Teams, held at 
Akosombo from December, 11-12,1997. 
60 This mechanism involves a Salaries Rationalization Programme to deal with issues ofpay (discussed already in 6.2.1(c) 
and 6.3 (d)). The timing of this salary scheme has been so determined to facilitate the implementation process of the 
programme. 
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The documentary sources (see Bank, 1996) indicate that the World Bank also undertakes 
frequent supervision missions using both Bank staff and consultants. 
The thrust of the NIRP training programme is reflected in the idea that the provision of 
training and education at all levels are very important conditions for development 
(Tinbergen, 1958; 5), and that they bring equity and efficiency into the economy (South 
Commission, 1990: 80). The South Commission's perspective also adds that large 
investments on human resource tend to speed up development performance (South 
Commission, 1990: 101). NDPC (1994: 2) has said that human resources are not only 
considered critical for economic, social and political development of a country but 
constitutes both the means and the end of development. This is because a properly 
planned, selected, placed, trained and motivated workforce reduces waste, enhances 
productivity and ensures survival and growth of institutions (NDPC, 1994: 54). Mentz 
(1997: 10) has also argued that capacity building is the ability to build up personal 
reservoirs of knowledge, experience and expertise over a period of time. Mentz believes 
that this is necessary because personal capacity constitutes the nuts and bolts of capacity 
building (Mentz, 1997: 13). The interview at the NIRP Secretariat reveals however that the 
NIRP is 
"aware of the practice where some donor agencies send inexperienced consultants with the 
objective to create jobs for their home countries. Such consultants are unable to conduct 
thorough research and are also incapable of doing any thorough work. They rather 
introduce pre-cooked systems that may not be relevant to the Ghanaian environment. NIRP 
is watching and monitoring all work and inputs of expatriate technical experts. We are 
screening the choice of consultants for every aspect of the programme and also scrutinizing 
their work to ensure that their inputs meet the national standards and are acceptable". 
The interviews at the PUFMARP Secretariat also show that, 
"under PUFMARP, the Project Management Team and the Project Steering Committee, 
have the responsibility to ensure that consultants add value. Where it has been necessary, 
sub-committees have been formed to examine and assess the consultants' activities and 
outputs in their previous assignments elsewhere. Besides, PUFMARP is designed to enable 
Government officials take over from consultants at some stage in the implementation 
process. This would truly ensure the sustainability of the reform programme. This 
complementary government staff will join the Consultants and work together to ensure that 
they develop the necessary skills to replicate the project across board". 
260 
This strategy has been endorsed by Jaycox (1993: 3) who has observed that, without 
demand for qualified African professionals on the part of African governments, much of 
the efforts and resources expended on capacity building will be wasted (see also The World 
Bank, 1991: 8). 
This level of donor involvement in securing resources for the TARP implementation 
questions the sustainability of the entire programme. This method of resource procurement 
throws some doubts about the NIRP's capacity to monitor the activities of these donors, 
and it also suggests a lack of indigenous capacity to implement the programme in terms of 
both financial and technical resources. Consequently, the World Bank (1991: 12) has 
advised that both African governments and donors must resist the use of expatriates as first 
choice in capacity building programmes and the development management process in 
general. The reason for this argument is that donors have tried to promote capacity 
building in Africa in the past couple of decades but the results have been uneven and 
generally disappointing. Mathur (1986: 99) has observed that this dependence on 
expatriate experts further aggravates the capacity inadequacies of developing countries and 
does not provide a long-term solution to the problem of matching management to the newly 
emerging developmental challenges. Bologun (1997: 78) has added that capacity building 
for development in essence refers to the practice of strengthening indigenous capacity in 
policy analysis and development management. This argument means in effect that certain 
practices like engaging foreign experts in the capacity building programme makes the 
entire capacity building process contradictory. Lisk (1996: 53-4) holds the opinion that the 
interaction between donors and African governments has not at all served the interest of 
capacity building in Africa. Lisk argues that at best, technical assistance should be directed 
mainly at developing the necessary domestic capacity rather than undermining the existing 
or potential capacities. The present writer believes that, this level of donor involvement 
with the NIRP will subject the ID process to the dictates of the donor institutions and any 
attempt to change this may threaten the continuous flow of financial resources. Should 
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such a situation occur, it would change the policy outcome. This practice may therefore 
constitute a serious setback to the NIRP implementation as occurred under the SAP. 
Secondly, the practice is a setback to indigenous initiative and capacity to manage national 
development. Currently, donor provision of these resources may appear very attractive in 
terms of helping the policy implementation process but in the long run, this practice may 
reduce the very capacity NIRP is seeking to build. Paul (1990: 28) has argued that ID 
processes and strategies may differ due to exogenous factors like the differing macro- 
economic or sectoral environments of the development policy, and other policy design 
related factors. The donor involvement is also likely to complicate Dia's observation that 
the institutional crisis in African countries is essentially caused by a structural and 
functional disconnect between formal institutions mostly transplanted from western 
countries and indigenous institutions built on the African history and its culture (Dia, 1996: 
25). 
Donor role as resource providers in the ID policy implementation logically gives donor 
institutions the right to review and monitor the policy process. The basis of this argument 
is that if donor institutions provide resources for policy implementation, then they are 
politically obliged to monitor how these resources are used. This view does not however 
negate the facts of the arguments advanced above. Despite this political obligation, donor 
institutions use their respective monitoring procedures and these may deny the NIRP of a 
standardized framework for monitoring the programme in an integrated manner. This 
situation provides these agencies with the opportunity to inject foreign values into the 
NIRP process although it is intended to be "home-grown", and this is likely to produce a 
policy outcome that is different from what NIRP originally envisaged. 
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6.7.3 Evolutionary Nature of the NIRP Implementation Process 
Any policy implementation is an evolving process with continuously changing phases 
usually making it different from what has been planned. The documentary sources (see 
NIRP, 1995b; 1997a) reveal that, "NIRP has created a ten-year horizon in which the 
programme will logically address the institutional development issues in stages". These 
stages have in-built visible parameters for measuring progress and determining structural 
linkages and relationships with the NIRP component programmes. These stages also 
provide a framework for managing the overall ID policy implementation in a structured 
way. The data suggests that these stages for NTRP implementation may be identified on 
three main levels that reflect the major areas of focus. The focus does not limit reform 
activities but emphasizes the core issues of the period. These are: 
i. Level A 
"This level focuses on institutional building issues. It spans from between three to five 
years and the programme is currently operating in this phase". The focus is to develop and 
implement the management framework and tools to enable the public service to operate 
more efficiently and effectively. During this period, other activities would continue to take 
place concurrently in view of the enormity of the tasks involved in the ID process. "Those 
extra activities to be given priority attention are those that contribute to the basic processes 
and systems of government operations" and secondly, "the framework, rules and 
regulations within which the public sector will be expected to operate". 
In this period, "legislative instruments based on acts governing the financial management 
framework, local government, civil service etc. are being promulgated" and the roles of the 
central public sector core management agencies and the MDAs are being re-classified as 
prescribed by the constitution. 
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ii. Level B 
The level B phase "emphasizes accountability and performance and it will span for three 
years". This stage will reinforce the accountability framework and results management 
process in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness in development management. The 
objective of this phase is "to maintain control in the critical devolution period". For this 
reason, "audit and performance measurement, data gathering and results identification 
processes will continue to be developed and strengthened at this stage". Other expected 
activities will include: 
a. standardizing performance agreements with central agencies, 
b. setting minimum standards of accounting practice and performance record keeping, 
c. setting minimum audit requirements and time-keeping standards, 
d. defining top down policy direction or bottom up planning functions in development 
planning both between and across institutions, and 
e. phased implementation of management systems across PSIs. 
The data shows that in this phase "MDAs will undertake a series of diagnostic and strategic 
workshops in which they will specify their mission, methods of accomplishing this, and 
what support and resources from the centre will be required". This process will culminate 
in a set of contractually agreed programmes and performance indicators for PSIs. 
iii. Level C 
The data shows that "the level C focuses on professionalism in the public sector". The 
programme will span for four years. The programme at this stage will "place emphasis on 
developing the professional capacity of public sector personnel". This phase will require 
the "available human resources to be equipped with the knowledge, attitude and resolve, 
and service oriented public sector culture to sustain improvements in the system". 
Professional development plans for managers and employees would be developed as part of 
the annual performance schedule. These plans will require "the Public Service 
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Commission (PSC) and the other central public sector management core agencies to set out 
best practice guidelines and norms". These agencies will be expected to "monitor the 
development and application of such "in-house" systems, to be sure that they are adequate 
and consistent across the public service". 
The present writer believes that the levels A, B, and C reforms will facilitate better 
management and accountability for the scarce allocated resources for development policy 
process and also enhance ownership of the process in Ghana. The data shows that the 
reform will also 
"free the central public sector management agencies from their current control and micro- 
management of the NIDAs to concentrate on developing appropriate inspectorate, 
management information, consultancy and advisory capacities to assist the MDAs to 
respond efficiently and effectively to current reform policy agenda and manage institutional 
change". 
The programme is however subject to delays in view of the dynamics discussed above. 
This confirms Linders et. al. 's (1987: 466) observation that policy is a construct that 
emerges from interaction and has no life of its own. For example the interview at the 
PUFMARP Secretariat reveals that, 
"under PUFMARP, BPEMS61 was initially planned to be implemented over a two-year 
period. However, improvements to the system and the consequent replication exercise in 
non-pilot institutions are intended to be carried out over a five-year period". 
This indicates that the project will not meet its targeted date. The data shows that, 
"this is being implemented in a phased manner. In Phase 1, BPEMS is to be designed, and 
specifications will be developed for the required software, hardware and procurement 
arrangements to be completed. Under Phase II, BPEMS will be implemented in the seven 
priority ministries that were chosen because of the size of their expenditure62. Under Phase 
III, BPEMS will be replicated in the remaining Sector Ministries and Regional 
Administrationss63. 
61 As the "life-line" of the programme, BPEMS aims to reform the budgeting, accounting and financial reporting sub- 
system and to provide the computerized platform to run the entire financial management system. 
62 These pilot ministries are the MoF (including CAGD), Min. of Roads and Transport, Works and Housing, Afin. of 
Education, Min. of Communications, Min of Health, and the Min. of Local Government and Rural Development 
63 Price Waterhouse Associates (P[9 are currently implementing this component of PUF7l1ARP in three phases at fifty 
sites spread over seven Ministries. 
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6.7.4 Channels of Communication 
The present writer believes that the process of implementing a reform policy is not done by 
any one institution. The process requires a combination of a number of institutions to 
perform differing roles to achieve the set objectives. It is important therefore at the policy 
formulation stage to also design strategies for enhancing effective communication to 
facilitate the policy implementation. Thomas (1996: 21) has stressed that, "leadership, 
cultural change, conflict resolution and overall organisational change depends upon 
effective communication". The NIRP process acknowledges this fact and has designed 
strategies to ensure effective communication. These include: 
i. Programme Linkages 
The interview at the CSPIP Secretariat reveals that 
"there is a key group of central agencies namely, MoF, CAGD, NDPC, MLGRD, and the 
OHCS that have responsibility for system-wide issues. These agencies collectively set the 
context for MDA coordination and collaboration. For example, under CSPIP, the OHCS 
has liaised with these central agencies to mobilise support and inputs into the MDAs self- 
appraisal exercise. Thereafter, these central agencies were called together to determine the 
new dynamics of MDAs operation. The OHCS led the process under the aegis of NIRP's 
NOC that is responsible for overall public sector capacity development". 
NIRP has also maintained important links with the other sub-reform programmes. For 
example, "the linkage between NIRP and CSPIP has kept some level of technical and 
professional relationship between the two programmes. CSPIP regularly submits progress 
report to NIRP". Such reports, according to the interview at the NIRP Secretariat, 
"enhance the managerial work of the NIRP Secretariat and the technical work of NIRP's 
NOC. The NTRP Secretariat in turn reports on CSPIP's activities in its periodic progress 
reports to the NOC. The NIRP Secretariat communicates the NOC's reaction back to 
CSPIP". 
Secondly, the data show that "the HCS is a key member of the NOC and the National 
Coordinator of NIRP serves on the Committee for Administrative Reforms which is the 
body responsible for steering CSPIP". An equally good linkage has been established 
among the component programmes. The interview revealed that 
"because of the relevance and importance of PUFMARP to the implementation of CSPIP, 
strong links have been established between the two. CSPIP through the OHCS is 
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represented on the PUFMARP Steering Committee and has so far pro\ ided assistance for 
the design of the project. The Project Management Team of PUFMARP is in constant 
touch v ith the CSPIP Secretariat and also with the NIRP's NOC'. 
Table 6-1 
An Example of the Linkages between some of the Component Programmes 
Source: NIRP (I'1'17a 
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These networking initiatives of the NIRP are underpinned by two conditions that are 
described by Mutahaba and Jide (1992: 67) as necessary for institutional reforms. These 
conditions are: 
a. cohesion at the highest level of government to ensure the stoppage of the long- 
drawn battles between political functionaries and career officials, and consequently 
focusing the attention of both groups on solving ongoing problems, and 
b. adopting a holistic approach to the new policy. 
Table 6.1 above is an example of the linkages between the various component 
programmes. The table is underpinned by the ideas that implementation effectiveness will 
depend most importantly on the quality of inter-institutional relations among the 
implementing institutions. These inter-institutional relations must be characterised by 
agreement on goals, open communication, mutual trust and support, full utilization of 
member skills, effective conflict management, and institutional motivation and 
commitment. 
ii. Participation 
The documentary sources (see Ghana, 1994a; 1994b) reveal that, "the NIRP insist on 
stakeholder participation to ensure their total commitment to the reform process". In the 
first place, the major stakeholders are all represented at the NOC level to help direct 
policy and guide implementation of the programme. Secondly, all stakeholders 
especially those who are direct beneficiaries of the programme are involved in every 
level of activity of the programme implementation. For example: the confirmation of the 
critical issues affecting their operations, the development of work plan to carry out the 
activities in their respective areas, and the recruitment of consultants and the procurement 
of logistics. These stakeholders also participate actively in the workshops, seminars and 
training in order to upgrade their skills. This participatory networking process 
emphasizes the obsolescence of conventional notions of control and conformity strategy 
used in most policy implementation. It shows that effective strategy for the NIRP 
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implementation rest on consensus building and communication between policy-makers 
and implementing agencies. This is a key feature of the interactive policy 
implementation process and it shows that the NIRP seeks to ensure that implementing 
agencies have a direct personal stake in performing their roles. This is emphasised by 
Ham and Hill's (1984) argument that successful implementation depends on effective 
linkages among institutions involved in the process. Bhatnagar and Aubrey (1992: 161) 
have advised that in order to generate commitment to participation, it is important to 
change the mind-set of the people, through a profound change in attitudes and values. He 
insists that it is unrealistic and impractical to assume that people can be taught or 
persuaded to be sympathetic to participation. This is important to sustain the participatory 
process of the NTRP. 
iii. Communication Strategies 
The documentary data (see Ghana, 1994a; 1994b) shows that the NIRP has launched a 
publicity and communication strategy to facilitate and promote national discussions and 
debate to get greater participation and ownership of the NIRP. This strategy is designed to 
solicit public support for the NIRP, and it include brochures and booklets publication, the 
publication of a NIRP Newsletter, periodic press briefings, workshops for media 
practitioners, advertisements, and radio and television talk shows. 
6.7.5 Environmental Reaction 
The policy implementation theory (discussed in chapter 3) stresses that in any reform 
policy implementation, the consensus required to see implementation through are often 
problematic as various groups of actors engage in isolated maneuvers to enhance their 
sectional interests. This means that the implementation of reform policies almost always 
generate some form of reaction from those affected by the policy. Thus, people always 
fear change because it means uncertainty and a threat to personal security (see Hogwood 
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et. al., 1984). Grindle and Thomas (1991) have added that the government efforts to 
effect change usually produce problems of opposition from many quarters that disrupts 
the implementation efforts. 
The interviews at the NIRP Secretariat, MESW and MDPI show that in the NIRP 
implementation process, this revolves around "the fear about economic effects of change 
in terms of earnings, benefits, job security, career prospects etc. that constitute threat to 
people's livelihood". This fear occur in the form of uneasiness about having to learn new 
skills, assume different responsibilities, meet higher standards, or work with colleagues in 
a new setting. Hence "efforts at implementing any of these changes are being resented in 
certain quarters, especially as the programme outcomes include reducing the staff size 
and reduced personal autonomy". This shows that the context of change is an important 
influence on attitudes. For example where change is thought to imply serious failures or 
shortcomings in the existing arrangements, management personnel may use various 
forms of manoeuvres to create an atmosphere of rumour and suspicion that will 
consequently lead to opposition to the policy. This is likely to explain the resistance that 
the NIRP has incurred from some senior managers in PSIs. The interview at the NDPC 
shows that "these managers see the reforms as a process that is directed at eroding their 
power base". For example, 
"in order to get the MoF and other MDAs to work together under the NIRP implementation 
process, the government had to first eliminate some of the MDAs' suspicions that resulted 
from the practice where some top officials entrenched the status quo to strengthen their 
positions for decades. The government therefore effected transfers in order to put in key 
positions, people who are reform minded and would like to see the programme successfully 
implemented. Thus some key chief directors and directors were transferred and new ones 
appointed". 
Ayee (1992) has argued that this situation is very typical of most reform policy 
implementation because the policy implementation process is a platform for competition 
and conflict among individuals and groups who seek to pursue and assert their interests 
and compete for scarce resources. 
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The present writer believes that the NTRP process is reminiscent of the SAP experience in 
Ghana where the introduction of the SAP administrative reforms resulted in massive staff 
redundancy in the public sector. It has been noted already in 6.7.3 that the NIRP will 
reduce the size of the public sector in terms of staff. With this SAP experience therefore 
in mind, the present writer believes that the NIRP is likely to attract some negative 
reactions from public sector workers. Already, the interviews at the MESW have 
indicated that 
"junior and middle level management staff (of PSIs) are not satisfied with the methodology 
for the programme design and implementation. They feel excluded in the processes and 
they are doubtful about the success of the reform programme". 
Hogwood and Gun (1984) have added that people always fear change due to the associated 
uncertainties. They add that for a policy that is reminiscent of a previous one under which 
serious disruptions occurred due to redundancies like the SAP-ERP in Ghana in the 1980s, 
there is likely to be greater resistance to the policy. 
Another problem in the implementation process is the lack of commitment on the part of 
leadership to implement certain key aspects of the programme. The interview at the NDPC 
and the NIRP Secretariat shows that 
"the sector ministries under CSPIP, the CPSCMAs, and the Office of the President are 
responsible for reviewing options for modifying and changing the operating circumstances 
of PSIs. However, strong commitment required from these institutions for a successful 
implementation is lacking. Currently there is lack of performance from the sector 
ministries and the CPSCMAs to implement these changes". 
This may be interpreted as passive opposition to the policy. Grindle et. at (1991) therefore 
recommend that in developing a strategy for implementation, policy makers will need to 
develop the capacity to anticipate the differing forms of reactions and responses to the 
policy, as well as where these are likely to emanate from (that is implementation 
estimates). Thus, if implementation estimates were done at the initial stages of the policy 
formulation, it would have afforded the NIRP an opportunity to devise strategies to 
alleviate the problem from its very roots. This problem may be explained by Elmore's idea 
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that much of the work of high-level administrators in the implementation process consist of 
anticipating recurrent problems at lower levels of the system and attempting to programme 
the behaviour of subordinates to respond to these problems in standardized ways (Elmore, 
1978). These problems may put the policy implementation at risk if NIRP does not adopt 
strategies to eliminate them. 
Grindle and Thomas (1991) have emphasised that change policies are normally shaped by 
the actions of individuals in strategic locations. Therefore it is important to the policy's 
feasibility in the context of support and opposition to the change it envisages, stakes in 
pursuing the change as well as political and bureaucratic resources needed to sustain the 
process to design strategies to contain such actions. Grindle and Thomas argues that in the 
interactive implementation process, the reform policy initiative may be reversed and even 
changed at any level in the implementation process by pressures and reactions of those who 
are opposed to it. Hence, the capacity to understand the location, strengths, stakes and 
strategies of those opposed to the policy is a key to successful implementation of the 
policy. Hogwood and Gunn (1984) have advised that in situations such as these, the policy 
must be frank about such problems and dangers through effective communication. They 
add that this must be directed at converting informal and opinion leaders to reduce the 
possibilities of resistance. They further advise that management should also create an 
atmosphere of trust by showing concern for people's interest and for their feelings towards 
loss of work-mates and personal insecurities. They recommend that management would 






Building Institutional Capacity 
for 
Ghana-Vision 2020 Implementation 
7.1 Introduction 
The chapter is a summary of the research report discussed in chapters five and six. It 
provides an overview of the lessons obtained from the Ghanaian experience of policy 
implementation in the development process. These lessons suggest that weak performance 
of indigenous institutions is one of the biggest bottlenecks to Ghana's development (see 
Berg, 1993: 59). The lessons focus on the implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020 and 
shows that the problems associated with this process has necessitated Ghana's capacity 
building programme. The chapter also provides a brief of the capacity building process 
which looks at the dynamics of the NIRP implementation and comments on potential 
sources of threats to the NIRP. 
7.2 Ghana-Vision 2020 Implementation: A Rational for the 
NIRP 
The discussions made in chapters five and six have revealed that the development 
management process in Ghana has until the early 1990s been ad hoc and did not follow any 
set procedures. Secondly, the process also lacked political commitment and popular 
participation. These made development management especially development policy 
implementation almost un-operational. 
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Since the beginning of the 1990s however, the development management process has been 
made comprehensive and given the necessary political commitment. This comprehensive 
development process has been the product of the new development planning strategy called 
the programme approach and its participatory character. The new development 
management process also centers on private-public sector partnerships and it sees the 
public administrator's role as a technician and a facilitator of national development. This 
new approach has democratized the development policy process, especially policy 
implementation. Thus, the changes made to the development management system reflect a 
new dynamism in development policy analysis in the sense that policy analysis has now 
become participatory, although there is still the opportunity to improve on this. 
In 1996, the GoG formulated the Ghana-Vision 2020 policy, which is a twenty-five year 
development policy. This development policy has since been operating under the new 
development management system. This new system has had a tremendous impact on the 
Vision 2020 implementation process. For example, under the scheme of the new 
development management system, a clearly defined structure of public sector institutions 
has been set up to implement the Ghana-Vision 2020. In view of the fact that these 
institutions are responsible for implementing the Ghana-Vision 2020, they are required to 
have strong capacity for policy implementation. The study has however identified a 
number of constraints to this challenge. These are: 
a. Resources 
The study has identified three major types of resources that are needed for implementing 
the Vision 2020. These include human resources, financial resources, and infrastructural 
provisions. However, these resources are not adequate and they are associated with a 
number of problems. For example in terms of human resources, there is a serious lack of 
managerial, financial, accounting, budgeting and policy analysis skills but surplus skills in 
all other areas. The study has shown that poor wage and incentive structures, inflexible 
public policy regarding recruitment and placement, as well as other socio-cultural and 
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institutional factors have caused these human resource problems. This phenomenon has 
caused the country to depend on expatriate skills to fill the human resource gap in the 
country. This human resource factor acts as a major constraint to development as the 
research question suggests. The World Bank has suggested that if sufficient numbers of 
high quality indigenous economic managers and analysts can be created, the current 
intellectual and professional dependence on expatriate technical assistance will be reduced. 
Consequently, the process will strengthen indigenous ownership of development 
programme and improve the prospects for the design and implementation of effective 
policies (World Bank, 1991: 7). 
In terms of financial resources, there are inadequate procedures for local resource 
mobilisation and disbursement as well as systemic financial problems in budget 
preparation, implementation, audit, debt and cash management. These problems have 
caused distortions in local funding for policy implementation and have rather necessitated 
donor intervention through funding and technical assistance programmes which provide the 
platform for external intrusion and influence on national development. This way of 
perceiving development in Ghana dates as far back as the 1960s when the government saw 
the mobilisation of foreign capital as the major driver of national development. But it is 
significant that even in the 1960s, development experts were skeptical about the efficacy of 
mobilising foreign capital for indigenous development without local institutional reforms 
(see Perera, 1968: 52). 
Thirdly, Ghana's public sector lacks basic infrastructure such as vehicles and office 
equipment needed to aid the implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020. All of these 
problems limit public sector capacity for implementing the Vision 2020 policy. 
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b. Co-ordination 
The top-down policy implementation model that pertained in the old development 
management system has also persisted under the new system and some stakeholders are 
seeking to change this. The model is a serious impediment to programme co-ordination in 
the Vision 2020 implementation in the sense that it alienates some stakeholders from the 
policy implementation process. This underpins the fact that the public sector framework is 
fragmented and is without any strategy for policy co-ordination and networking. 
The study has revealed further that this problem of public sector co-ordination and 
consultation is becoming perennial and difficult to deal with because the two lead 
institutions in the development management system - the NDPC and MoF - have failed to 
resolve their differences regarding the specific roles required of them in the development 
process. These two lead-institutions are therefore basically unable to hold PSIs together. 
The result is that PSIs operate without recourse to the overall national development policy. 
Hence, the differences between these two institutions are a threat to the successful 
implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020. 
A second explanation to the lack of co-ordination and consultation among PSIs is the NDC 
government's decision to unconstitutionally force a Chairman on the NDPC with the 
responsibility to oversee national development. This is abhorred and rejected by most 
stakeholders in the development management process. These stakeholders have therefore 
refused to recognize and co-operate with the leadership. Most stakeholders refuse to attend 
policy-hearing meetings organised by the NDPC as a sign of protest. Thirdly, the ERP 
implementation process has partly caused the co-ordination problem because it sought to 
compartmentalize institutional responsibilities. The fourth cause is donor intervention in 
the policy process. These agencies do not co-ordinate enough and they normally fund 
stand-alone programmes that have no recourse to the overall national policy. These have 
contributed to the fragmentation in the development process. 
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d. System-wide Governance Problems 
According to the study, there are currently inadequate structures for good governance and 
accountability for public sector management and this accounts for the current public sector 
under performance. The governance framework for most PSIs excludes stakeholder 
participation. This problem has persisted because it is an excuse for public sector 
management to pursue non-transparent practices. However, under the new development 
management system, stakeholders are getting together in groups to present a front that 
cannot be easily discarded in the development process, especially when these stakeholders 
are required to provide counterpart funding for implementing a programme. 
National diversity issues such as gender bias and tribal exclusions also significantly 
determine the level of exclusions from the governance processes which is a formidable 
threat to the successful implementation of the Vision 2020 and to the development policy 
process. 
e. System-wide Constraints 
The study has also shown that under the new development management system 
stakeholders have the right to protest against any aspect of a development policy that they 
object to. However, any such grievance must follow a laid down procedure but these 
procedures have not been effective. The evidence is the numerous conflicts that associate 
the Vision 2020 policy implementation. 
Secondly, the study has revealed that PSIs have been slow in living up to their new role as 
facilitators of and partners with the private sector in development and these have resulted 
from inadequate communication and consultation among PSIs. The study has shown also 
that a number of structural constraints in Ghana's PSIs constitute a serious setback to a 
progressive development policy process, and this is a threat to the successful 
implementation of the Ghana-Vision 2020. These constraints include: 
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a. the regulatory processes that associate policy implementation, 
b. cultural practices, 
c. inadequate monitoring and evaluation systems, 
d. the absence of well developed internal management control functions that allow 
management to take on greater responsibilities for decisions, 
e. insufficient operational performance linkages between MDAs, non-governmental 
agencies and the private sector, 
f. the lack of clearly defined client group, client needs, 
g. the insufficient linkages between policy objectives, planning, budgeting and 
evaluation of programmes, 
h. the lack of concern for technical efficiency in the use of centrally allocated 
resources, and 
i. the weak central performance inspection and audit process for ensuring 
accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing projects under the 
Vision 2020. 
The study has shown that these policy implementation constraints may be factored on 
managerial inefficiencies. This is because public sector management is occupying the 
driving seat of the Ghana-Vision 2020 implementation and any management inefficiency 
will consequently affect the policy implementation process. These problems present a 
formidable challenge to PSIs regarding the successful implementation of the Ghana-Vision 
2020. Hence PSIs need to build the capacity for policy implementation to improve 
performance. This is why the NIRP has been conceived to restructure the governance 
processes and build the capacity for policy analysis in PSIs. 
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7.3 Dynamics of the Capacity Building Process 
In view of the concerns raised in 7.2 above, the research has shown that a comprehensive 
programme of institutional reform has been developed under the NIRP to turn the public 
service into a productive and motivated unit that is capable of implementing the Vision 
2020 policy objectives, and to be effective at implementing future development policies. 
The rational of the NIRP process is underpinned by the ideas that development is critically 
dependent on the capacity of PSIs to respond to development programme initiatives 
(Cochraine, 1986: 57). The process of developing this comprehensive capacity for all key 
PSIs has caused these institutions to urgently and critically review their current capacity 
and to identify constraints on the effective utilization of resources throughout the public 
service. The process is intended to make the public sector efficient and to create an 
enabling environment for private sector growth. 
The research has shown that these demands of the Ghana-Vision 2020 also require 
improvements in infrastructure and human resources, as well as restructuring various PSIs 
on the basis of the redefined mandates in the development management process. 
Furthermore and in order to secure internal efficiency, better linkages are being established 
between the basic roles of PSIs and procedures for resource allocation, management and 
accountability. 
Under the mandate to build public sector capacity, NIRP has adopted a strategy to address 
public sector management lapses in order to enhance the implementation of the Ghana- 
Vision 2020. This strategy is operated under four main themes. These are: 
a. structural transformation, 
b. human resource development, 
c. transformation of the governance framework, and 
d. attitudinal change towards the private sector and the civil society. 
280 
It is within the scheme of these four major transformations, that NIRP expects a 
strengthened and robust public sector capacity in policy analysis, consultation and co- 
operation, and efficient management of resources. These expected outcomes depend 
among other things on the reaction of stakeholders to the policy implementation process. 
The reform process has been categorised into three broad implementation phases. These 
are: 
a. institutional building and strengthening which focuses on the building and 
implementation of management systems and tools for efficiency and effectiveness, 
b. accountability and performance management which reinforces transparency, 
accountability and results management to improve performance, and 
c. professionalism with recourse to ethics, capacities and competencies of the public 
service. 
These three phases are being addressed within a framework of ten years. 
7.3.1 The NIRP implementation Strategy 
The study has identified six component programmes of the NIRP that are relevant for 
building the Ghana-Vision 2020 implementation capacity. The fragmentation of the 
programme into six component programmes is intended to make the NIRP implementation 
easy to manage. These six component programmes are the CSPIP, PUFMARP, 
Decentralisation, Incomes Policy and Administration, the Policy and Cabinet Process 
Reforms, and the Legal sector reforms. All these component programmes are being 
managed by different agencies in order to maintain focus but their method of operation 
points to some measure of independence. In this network of component programmes, the 
NIRP is the umbrella programme with responsibility to link all the reform initiatives to 
improve the PAS. The study shows that all these sub-programmes are addressing the 
bottlenecks in the rules and resources in Ghana's public sector. 
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The study has shown also that the NIRP essentially used consultative and participatory 
approach as the methodology for formulating the policy. It is significant that although each 
component programme embarked on a separate methodology, they all used the same 
instrument and approach namely consultative and participatory. The programmes also use 
workshops as a forum for dialogue and discussions. As part of its implementation strategy, 
NIRP has secured the endorsement of the office of the President. Hence the programme 
has assumed the status of an official national reform programme, which also has the force 
of law. The research has shown further that, the NIRP has made the policy implementation 
process interactive. However, the implementation process has some inherent inadequacies 
that require serious attention if the process is to be successful. For example, the 
programme has a clearly defined structure for implementation, but the implementation 
process must be closely monitored to ensure that agencies will focus enough and co- 
ordinate their respective areas of responsibilities. The reason is that if one area of 
responsibility falters, the entire implementation process may crumple, especially as the 
evidence have shown stark divisions among implementation agencies (see figure 3-4 for 
illustration). 
Significantly, each component programme has a separate implementation structure. This 
strategy is intended to enable the various agencies focus on their required roles and to 
maintain links with the other agencies connected to the other component programmes. 
Donor funding may partly be said to have caused the independence of the sub-programmes. 
It is also significant that foreign consultants and experts have been contracted to manage 
parts of the implementation process. This shows the inadequacy of Ghana's human 
resources especially for the NIRP implementation. This practice also epitomizes the 
seriousness and extent of foreign intrusion and control into what has hitherto been 
considered "a home-grown" programme. This incidence has been possible because the 
NIRP depends to a very great extent on donor resources, and under such circumstances, 
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donors have to monitor and evaluate the programme to ensure that the resources invested in 
the programme have yielded results. 
7.3.2 Resources for the ID Policy Implementation 
The study has identified three fundamental resources that are available for the NIRP 
implementation. These are financial, human and technical resources. Of these three 
resources, human resources have been identified to be the most urgent (see Perera, 1968: 
57). However, the study has so far shown that it is important for PSIs to acquire the 
capacity to effectively co-ordinate all of these resources because the absence of one 
component can adversely prejudice development planning and implementation (see 
Cochraine, 1986: 85). The discussions have shown that a number of international agencies 
are involved in the provision of these resources including the World Bank, the British 
Council, the Commonwealth Secretariat, CIDA and the DFID. These agencies are 
providing both financial and human resources to sustain the programme implementation. 
This level of donor intervention is however seen as an impediment to sustainable 
development. The GoG has also introduced the PIF scheme under which funds will be 
made available to the NIRP implementation in addition to the annual budgetary allocation. 
The PIF will enable NIRP to secure very urgent needs like equipment and consultancy 
without having to wait for the annual budgetary allocation to get through. 
In order to develop the human resource capacity, NIRP has introduced a number of training 
packages and an incentive scheme to retain the trained and other highly skilled 
professionals in Ghana's public sector. This strategy emphasise the idea that the 
fundamental principle of capacity building places high premiums on indigenous intellectual 
leadership and cultural values which can only be promoted by indigenous people (see 
Balogun, 1997: 71). Secondly, and in spite of the need for expatriate skills, NIRP is 
screening the choice of consultants for the programme. The programme is also monitoring 
283 
the work of these consultants to ensure that they meet the national accepted standards in 
order to prevent the situation where some foreign consultants introduced "pre-cooked" 
systems. 
7.3.3 Institutional Networking for Policy Implementation 
NIRP has recognised that the process of implementing the ID policy depends on a number 
of institutions hence an institutional networking strategy has been put in place to ensure 
effective linkages both among the various component programmes, and agencies. 
Secondly, communication under the strategy has also improved as the programme seeks to 
generate debate and to secure public support. Thirdly, the strategy is ensuring stakeholder 
participation in the reform process although there are some aggrieved stakeholders who 
feel excluded from the policy process and therefore are opposed to the programme 
implementation. Currently different groups of stakeholders have reacted to the ID 
implementation process in different ways. Whereas some have embraced the programme 
others are opposed to some aspects of it, and some more others are pessimistic about the 
chances of the programme succeeding. These differing reactions constitute a formidable 
threat to the successful implementation of the NTRP and for that matter, the Vision 2020. 
The subsequent chapter discusses this finding in details. 
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8 
The Logic of 
Ghana's Under-development and 
what the NIRP can do 
8.1 Introduction 
This concluding chapter makes argument about the causes of Ghana's under-development 
and how effectively the NTRP can mitigate and eliminate these problems. The chapter 
also draws lessons from the study and makes a case for these lessons as the study's 
contribution to the field of development work, that is development policy analysis. 
Finally, the chapter discusses the problems encountered during research process and 
makes recommendations on the basis of these limitations for future work. 
8.2 Emerging Facts about Ghana's Under-development 
The study evolved with the question that "Ghana's incapacity to progress in her 
development is caused by structural inefficiencies and insufficient level of skills in Public 
Sector Institutions. In what way can the NIRP mitigate these lapses to ensure a sustainable 
national development? " However, as a result of the data gathered and the analysis made, 
the study has also identified a number of other significant causes of Ghana's under- 
development. These show that the causes of Ghana's under-development go beyond 
structural inefficiencies and insufficient skilled personnel. These newly identified causes 
are very fundamental to the development policy implementation process. They include 
ineffective framework for policy co-ordination, inadequate financial and infrastructural 
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resources for policy implementation, ineffective policy management processes, 
inadequate framework for cross-institutional linkages, diversity problems, and ineffective 
conflict resolution process. The study has identified the causes of Ghana's under- 
development as: 
a. The Policy Implementation Structure 
Although the development policy implementation structure offers in theory a framework 
for policy co-ordination, in practice this framework has not been functional due to the 
incessant conflicts that associate the development management process. 
b. Inadequate Resource 
The inadequacy of not only skilled personnel, but also financial and infrastructural 
resources that are required for policy implementation affect adversely the nation's 
development. These resource problems include: 
i. inadequate skill in PSIs caused by institutional, socio-cultural and economic 
factors that are endemic in the Ghanaian society. 
ii. financial resource inadequacies resulting from under-developed and inadequate 
local sources of revenue mobilisation. That is, the distortions and inadequacies in 
local resource mobilisation have given cause for donor funding of Ghana's 
development policies -a practice that provides donor agencies with a leverage and 
stake in Ghana's development management. Thus these agencies have had to 
monitor and evaluate the policy implementation process, and very often to 
determine the direction of policy. This practice distorts the development process, 
as was the case of the ERP in the 1980s and presently, donor funding for different 
programmes - some of which are inconsistent with the overall national 
development policy. This level of donor involvement consequently lead to the 
introduction of foreign values, norms and practices in the development process. 
These sources of funding development also deny the development process of 
sustainability because any policy disagreement between the donors and the GoG 
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may result in the withdrawal of funds for policy implementation. It is therefore 
significant for the GoG to introduce the programme approach to the development 
process in order to eliminate the practice where donor agencies fund "stand 
alone" programmes that have no recourse to the overall national policy. This will 
remove some of the distortions undermining Ghana's development. 
iii. inadequate physical infrastructure such as vehicles, office, information flows and 
communication equipment, office space, and procurement laws. 
c. Managerial Inadequacies 
The processes for managing the development policy process have been ineffective and 
problematic. These problems have been caused by such practices as top-down and 
bureaucratic management that consequently leads to exclusion of certain critical and 
needed skills in the development policy process. This is evidence that the move to a 
participatory development management process is not complete yet. 
d. Community Participation and Diversity Issues 
In order to resolve this exclusion problem, local groups and individuals are getting 
together under the new development management system to ensure maximum 
participation in the development process. This is an innovation that is likely to make the 
development process sustainable. However, two major diversity issues, that is gender 
and tribal issues constitute a great setback to participation and ownership of the 
development process. 
e. Institutional Networking 
There is the absence of a conceptual structure to link PSIs into a coherent public service. 
This has created consultation and networking problems among PSIs. This problem is 
deepened by a conflict between the two lead institutions in the development management 
process - MoF and the NDPC, and arbitrary decisions of government like the forced 
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appointment of the chairman of the NDPC. This consultation problem distorts the 
development management process and makes policy implementation difficult. The 
problem has also affected the processes for donor operations. As noted already, these 
agencies commit funds to various development programmes that have no relevance to the 
overall national development plan and in this particular circumstance, the Ghana-Vision 
2020. 
f. Conflict Resolution 
The conflict resolution process has not been effective as it should be. Hence a lot of 
institutional and personal conflicts associate the development process. These divisions 
are potential sources of policy implementation failure. 
g. Governance Framework 
The governance framework for implementing Vision 2020 policy is not adequate. Most 
PSIs that are involved in the implementation of the policy are not even aware of the goals 
of the Vision 2020 policy and hence they lack the capacity to relate to the policy 
objectives. There is also an apparent disregard for openness, transparency and 
accountability practices in the policy implementation process. These are very typical 
especially in the allocation of funds for policy implementation. 
h. The Public Administration System 
The structural configurations of Ghana's PSIs where departments and agencies have been 
created under ministries to implement development policies also constitute a problem to 
the development process. Thus, these departments and agencies are often excluded form 
the policy formulation process but only called in to implement the policy after the policy 
formulation. 
288 
i. Private Sector Role 
Private sector contribution to the development process is being inhibited by the rent 
seeking practices of public sector officials, the persistence of outmoded legislation, the 
MoF's refusal to provide reliable information and statistical data on the trends in Ghana's 
development. 
j. Cultural Values 
Cultural practices are having debilitating effects on development process. Such practices 
include time management which has often led to ad hoc and short-term planning, the 
extended family system that also breeds incompetence, perception about government work 
that breeds apathy, the obsession for hierarchy that leads to top-down practices, and 
exclusions. 
k. The Legislative Framework 
Although legal instruments are necessary to guide the policy implementation process, the 
lessons from Ghana's experience shows that these are not sufficient conditions to make 
the implementation process successful. The evidence is that in spite of the legislation 
made to cover and guide the new development management practice, the system is 
fraught with conflicts that consequently undermine the development process. This means 
that, the legal instruments have not been effective at regulating the development process 
and has denied the process of programmes and projects that are consistent and coherent 
with overall national development policy. The ineffective legislative instruments has also 
created a situation that enable most PSIs find ways of lobbying their programmes and 
projects at the policy hearing meetings. In the meantime, the NDPC and MoF who 
oversee the development process have been unable to get together to stop these excesses. 
This erratic manner pf managing development has been made more difficult by the lack 
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of prioritization in the development plan in the context of limited resources for 
implementation. 
The study has on the other hand identified a significant progress in Ghana's development 
process. This is the fact that the new participatory development management approach in 
Ghana recognises the importance of including the private sector and civil society in the 
development management process. This emphasise the growing argument for 
government-private sector partnership for development rather than the arguments for a 
government-led or private sector-led development that is advocated respectively by some 
Third World governments and the World Bank/IMF. In Ghana's circumstances, the 
argument has been taken further to include local communities because members of most 
local communities form self-help groups both in Ghana and abroad to provide funding to 
develop their local communities. The government and the private sector are no longer 
seen as the major players in terms of resource for policy implementation. Local 
communities operate significantly in this area. The new approach also involved a wide 
variety of institutions in the development process thereby making development policy 
process participatory. This is underpinned by a view taken by the study that effective 
lines of communication is a necessary prerequisites to sustain the processes for 
development policy analysis in the new development management system. 
The findings listed above have changed very significantly, the focal theory of this study. 
It has shown that Ghana's under-development is not only caused by structural 
inefficiencies and lack of skills in PSIs. Indeed, all the above-listed problems have 
played their part in under-developing Ghana, and they emphasise the World Bank's 
observation that Ghana must find its own Ghanaian way of faster development as was the 
case in South East Asia. That is, Ghana would need to achieve a judicious blend of new 
methods with indigenous management practices (see World Bank, 1993: 96). These 
problems are also evidence that Ghana's PSIs do not have adequate capacity to 
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implement the Ghana-Vision 2020. The NIRP is therefore seeking to build public sector 
capacity but the findings have shown that even the NIRP is fraught with some very 
fundamental problems that is making the programme's implementation difficult. 
8.3 Efficacy of NIRP's Mitigating Role 
The study has shown that the NIRP has been developed to deal comprehensively with the 
Ghana-Vision 2020 implementation shortfalls through structural transformation, IIRD 
programmes, transformation of the governance framework, and attitudinal change. The 
following issues emerged however from the findings of the study. 
a. Consultative Process 
The consultative processes in the policy formulation stage were good because the process 
involved the management of PSIs in formulating the NIRP. This strategy has therefore 
secured the commitment and participation of public sector management in the ID process. 
b. Inclusion and Institutional Linkages 
The study again shows that stakeholder participation and cross-institutional linkages have 
been good in the NIRP implementation. These have afforded the NIRP with the required 
co-operation that it needs to see the programme implementation through. These 
imperatives, together with the NIRP methodology both at the policy formulation stage 
and the ongoing implementation stage has kept stakeholders opposition to the reforms at 
a minimum. That is, apart from the rejection of the salaries rationalization scheme and 
the maneuvers of certain individuals notably some middle and junior management staff of 
PSIs, there has been general acceptance of the policy. The NIRP must therefore take 
advantage of this level of acceptance to maximise the changes it intends to make in 
public sector performance. The study has argued that the interactive model of policy 
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implementation that has been adopted by NIRP has been useful in terms of inducing 
extensive participation and consensus building for the programme. 
c. The Implementation Structure 
Furthermore, a comprehensive but complex implementation structure has been set up to 
provide technical guidance and oversee the programme implementation. This complex 
NIRP implementation structure has been necessitated by the comprehensive nature of the 
programme. That is the various component programmes have their respective 
implementation structure and this has enabled the various sub-programmes to focus on 
implementing their respective mandates. This method is captured in systems analysis as 
a nestling process that has efficiency as its utility. The method also emphasise Thomas's 
(1996: 10) argument that each institution is different and that there is no one template to 
fit all institutions. 
It is however significant that membership of the various facets of the implementation 
structure especially the CDTs and the PITs is composed of senior officials from the 
various PSIs and this questions the adequacy of interactive processes involved in the 
NIRP implementation. This is a potential source of organised and un-organised 
opposition to the programme especially as the reforms involve re-location and re- 
structuring of some officials. 
d. Contradictions in the Policy Framework 
The study has shown however that two basic contradictions exist in the NIRP process. 
These contradictions relate to the orientation of the NIRP as a wholly "home-grown" 
product, and NIRP as a coordinator of the component programmes. The contradictions 
are that first, the various donor agencies such as the World Bank, the DFID and CIDA 
have made extensive inputs into the programme in terms of content, expertise and 
funding. Increasingly, these agencies are digging in deep for hold on the programme 
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because of the funding and other forms of support NIRP receives from them. These 
levels of donor-involvement in the NIRP process rid the programme off the wholly 
homegrown product classification. However, it is also very significant why these 
agencies especially, the World Bank do not want to be seen to be directly involved with 
the programme. Perhaps this is due to the blame for the failures of SAP-ERP in the 
1980s. 
The second contradiction is that the NIRP has not been effective at its coordinating role 
due to the same problem of donor funding. The individual donor agencies fund different 
components of the programme and all with different motives and expectations. In view 
of donor independence from one another and the rivalry that associate their activities in 
developing countries, it is impossible for the NIRP to co-ordinate their association with 
the component programmes in any meaningful way. This is irrespective of the fact that 
the new development management system is encouraging donor institutions to refrain 
from funding stand-alone programmes. Secondly, the phenomenon has also affected the 
ability of the N RP to co-ordinate the various sub-programmes. That is the NIRP is 
unable to effectively co-ordinate the implementation processes of its component 
programmes because these sub-programmes must abide by the directives and 
requirements of these agencies in order to continue receiving funding. Tinbergen (1958) 
has however warned that in order "to assure consistency and to avoid large-scale waste 
and disorganization, care should be taken that the component parts of the programme 
from a coherent and coordinated whole". 
e. Donor Activities and the Question of Sustainability 
These sources of funding (discussed above) questions the sustainability of the NIRP in 
terms of the conditions that normally associates donor funding and the life span of these 
resources. Already, the DFID funding for example is ending in August 2001 and it is 
very uncertain how the CSPIP will be sustained when the DFID funding ends. The study 
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has shown that the NIRP is putting up measures to systematically co-ordinate and 
manage donor contributions to the programme. However, the extent to which this can be 
done is uncertain because no matter what strategy NIRP adopts, these donors can easily 
withdraw funding once NIRP's prescriptions do not fall in line with donor policies. The 
extent of donor funding for the programme underpin the fact that the counterpart funding 
received from the GoG is not adequate. The success of the programme will therefore 
immensely depend on continuous flow of funds from donor agencies. This level of donor 
involvement with the NTRP also reflects the lack of indigenous capacity to implement the 
policy both in terms of financial and human resources. 
The study has further acknowledged the significance of the strategy under which the 
various component programmes used the same but separate methodology in the policy 
formulation processes. Whereas this may be understood in terms of the specific nature of 
the component programmes, it has also contributed to the co-ordination problems. This 
is due to the fact that the process of policy formulation plus the independent sources of 
funding gave the component programmes a sense of independence. 
The study also takes the view that although the NIRP is making use of local human 
resources which is useful for the programme in the sense that these experts are able to 
relate to the socio-cultural underpinnings of public sector inefficiencies, the extensive 
involvement of foreign experts is increasingly becoming an anathema to the NIRP. Thus, 
a sizable number of foreign consultants and experts have also been contracted to provide 
technical guidance to the reforms. It is imperative however, to blend the activities of the 
two sides well enough because if the inputs to the programme are skewed in favour of 
foreign experts, it will distort the capacity building exercise especially as these 
expatriates are unable to identify with the Ghanaian socio-cultural values. Besides, most 
of them are also known to introduce "pre-cooked" systems that have no direct relation to 
the local context of the reforms. Bologun (1997: 71) has emphasized that development is 
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not a mathematically precise, value-neutral and scientific concept that can be approached 
with a universal formula and an automatic technique. Jaycox (1993a: 3) has also noted 
that technical assistance is unable to solve African development problems. He stresses 
that technical assistance if anything at all is rather a systematic destructive force that 
undermines capacity development. Bologun (1997: 78) has added that a policy that relies 
on external advisers and managers is not consistent with the objectives of capacity 
building and of development. He therefore warns that such capacity building programme 
will not result in any substantial development until these external inputs are removed. 
Mutahaba et. al. (1992: 52) have advised that all aid or donations of any kind - be it 
material, human and technical - should be selected with discretion, and the process must 
above all put greater emphasis on self-reliance (see Mutahaba et. al., 1992: 20). It is 
important therefore to monitor the activities of expatriate consultants to ensure that they 
measure up to the requirements of the NIRP. 
The study has identified that the current approach of PSIs and the CPSCMAs to 
implementing the reform policy shows a general lack of commitment. This may be 
interpreted as a passive opposition to the reform policy. This attitude is a serious threat 
to the successful implementation of the NTRP and consequently the success of the Ghana- 
Vision 2020. 
f. The Implementation Time Schedules 
The study takes a view that that some uncertainty surrounds the utility of the NIRP's 
ability to manage the needed changes for Ghana-Vision 2020 implementation. As 
mentioned in chapters six and five respectively, the NIRP is intended to be implemented 
over a ten-year period whereas the Vision 2020 is a twenty-five year development policy 
that is intended to be completed by the year 2020. Significantly these two programmes 
are being run concurrently. However, if Ghana's PSIs are to build capacity for policy 
analysis and good governance to enhance the successful implementation of the Vision 
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2020, the chances are that by the time these institutions acquire the needed capacity on 
the NIRP's time table, the Vision 2020 will be left with approximately fifteen years to 
complete. Furthermore, the fact that PSIs did not have adequate capacity within the first 
ten years of the Vision 2020 implementation, the probabilities are that the foundations of 
the Vision 2020 implementation may not have been well established. This will therefore 
reduce the chances for a successful implementation of the Vision 2020 by the year 2020. 
This is even on the assumption that at the end of the ten years, the NIRP would have been 
successfully implemented and sufficient capacity would have been built to achieve the 
intended outcomes. Under such circumstances, the capacity built can be most useful to 
subsequent development policies. This is on condition that these new policies do not 
present new challenges of their own. 
These issues that have emerged from the study reinforces the thrust of the background 
theory (see chapter 2) that in order to remove the constraints on the development 
management process, it is useful and appropriate to build capacity through institutional 
development. However, the findings have also shown that it is not enough just to 
formulate and implement the capacity building policies. The NIRP's experience has 
shown that a lot of thought and planning has to go into the time framework for the 
capacity building policy vis-ä-vis the development policy. This will ensure that the built 
up capacity becomes relevant to the development process. This is the point where the 
findings of the study departs from the background theory and it emphasizes Ilargrove's 
(1975: 13) argument that policy makers understanding of issues surrounding policies is a 
very important element in the policy process. Bologun (1997: 80) has also warned that 
even though capacity building is no doubt essential to and could justifiably be deemed 
synonymous with development, efforts should be made to resist the temptation of 
regarding it as a magic wand or miracle cure for development. 
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8.4 Lessons from Ghana's Development Management Process 
The research makes some very significant contributions to the fundamental theory 
underlying the under-development and the development process of Ghana. These are: 
a. Strategic Planning 
Development policy formulation in most cases must go hand in hand with building 
institutional capacity to sustain the policy process. This capacity must relate to good 
governance, effective institutional networking and consultation, expertise, financial and 
other resources procurement, and the creation of a good implementation structure. 
However, this capacity building process must be planned strategically and implemented 
well in advance of the development policy implementation in order to make the capacity 
so built relevant. This will remove all uncertainties like those currently surrounding the 
NIRP and its usefulness for the Vision 2020 implementation. 
b. Sectional Interests 
Governments do not always put the national interest as a priority when it comes to 
national development. Personal and political interests come to play even in such serious 
matters as national development. The GoG's unconstitutional practice of making a 
government favourite the head of the development planning commission provides a 
lesson. Such practices cause co-operation and co-ordination problems in the 
development policy implementation process that may render the policy impossible to 
implement in the end. Therefore in the development policy process, unconstitutional 
behaviours must be avoided in order to increase participation and co-operation. 
c. Fragmentation of the Policy Process 
In spite of the call for donor agencies to re-consider their policy interventions in 
developing countries, these agencies are still perpetrating their old intervention strategies 
and therefore fragmenting the development efforts and policy processes of these 
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countries. This is shown in the CSPIP's use of a separate but same methodology as the 
NIRP's to plan the programme and it is evidence of division between the NIRP and some 
of its component programmes. 
d. Prescriptive Policies 
Although donor agencies' complimentary role in Ghana's development is very important, 
the study also advocates for a change in methodology namely; avoiding direct 
interference through the use of prescriptive policies and the issue of conditional loans and 
grants. The study has shown that the overall development policy as well as capacity 
building process must be predicated on the nation's needs and culture in order to make 
development sustainable. In line with this argument, Lopes (1994: 17) has noted that 
"the application of development models, as logical and appropriate as they may sound is 
bound to fail if they are not anchored in solid historical and cultural ground". Regarding 
the capacity building process, Lopes (1996: 54) has argued that this must be based on 
partnership through consultation and dialogue between donor and recipient on all aspects 
of project planning, design and implementation. The project ownership must however 
rest with the indigenous people. 
e. Monitoring Donor Activities 
Donor agencies are a part of the development problems in Ghana and therefore must also 
be part of the solution (see Stevens et. al., 1998: 98). However, donor activities must be 
closely monitored to ensure that donor policies will not again distort the development 
process. Donor funding and the "common basket" concept may be useful because this 
require donors to put their money in a common fund, and the use of this fund will be 
determined by the government on the basis of national development priorities. The 
monitoring framework must also ensure that any capacity building process is really being 
built for the purposes of those it is intended to benefit and not to serve the interests of 
donor agencies. Currently, it is uncertain as to whose capacity the NIRP is building. 
298 
This emphasizes Steven's et. al. 's (1995: 98) argument that a country's commitment is 
crucial to capacity building because any substantial reform depends in the final analysis 
on local demand for an accountable and responsive state. 
f. Institutional Cooperation 
It is important for the lead institutions in Ghana's development to co-operate and be 
strategic in method. The differences between the NDPC and the MoF as a result of 
institutional ego have made these two institutions incapable of bringing other PSIs 
together adequately enough to facilitate the smooth implementation of the Ghana-Vision 
2020. This is one important strategy for smothering co-operation and co-ordination 
problems among other institutions, and moving the development process ahead. 
g. Inclusion 
The study reinforces the argument for the usefulness in involving stakeholders in the 
policy process. The evidence is that the methodology used in formulating the Ghana- 
Vision 2020 and the NIRP namely; the increased participation of stakeholders has led to 
widespread acceptance and support for these policies. Essentially therefore, the 
interactive model of policy implementation has been shown by the study to be a useful 
tool for development policy implementation in Ghana. 
h. Consensus Building 
The study has refuted the popularly held idea that policy makers ought to exercise some 
level of direct and determined control over policy implementation. The study has rather 
shown that policy makers are not necessarily the providers of resources and under such 
circumstance, it is difficult for policy makers to impose their will on the providers of 
resources who are normally part of the implementation team. 
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i. Conflict Resolution Schemes 
It is important to build conflict resolution schemes in the policy implementation process 
in order to reduce the incidence of reactions that will render the policy impossible to 
implement. The study has shown that the incidence of organised opposition to the Vision 
2020 and NIRP policy implementation have generally been reduced due partly to the 
conflict resolution procedures that associate the policy process. 
j. Human Resource Development 
A nation's human resource endowment is the lever for national development, as well as 
for building the capacity of institutions that are responsible for managing that 
development. The study therefore emphasizes that in the development of nations, the 
human resource development component must be considered very vital. This position is 
underpinned by the argument that: 
"the human factor remains at the heart of the success of every reform cffort. Revising the 
legal framework to facilitate compliance is simply not enough and neither will the use of 
computers be. The design of a new system as well as the restructuring of the institutional 
roles and reporting relationships will do nothing more than help streamline the processes 
and make the system look nearly perfect, at least theoretically. Without a well-informed, 
and adequately trained cadre of enthusiastic professionals to operate the sub-systems, the 
expected successes would be very limited, if any at all-64. 
The above lessons have set the agenda for a new dynamism and fresh thinking on Third 
World Development and capacity building policies. First, the study has shown that it is 
not enough just to build institutional capacity as a panacea to development management 
problems. It is also equally important to plan the time framework involved in the two 
processes. This require a lot of thought and deep planning in order to make the two 
programmes relevant to the needs of the society they are seeking to serve. Secondly, 
these lessons are useful benchmarks for the development processes in developing 
64 A statement by Mr. Koft Opoku-Manu, Chief Director of it foF, at a workshop for Project Implemauatton 7 vns. betel at 
Akosombo, Ghana from December, 11 - 12,1997). 
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countries. They will enable these societies to avoid the problems identified in Ghana's 
development management process and to build on the strengths of this experience. 
8.5 Recommendations for Further Work 
The study encountered a number of problems that have also limited the scope of the 
outcome in various ways. Among these are: 
a. Methods 
Focus Group discussions, which was part of the research design was abandoned because 
the participants were intimidated by fear of recriminations. They were uncertain about 
the political persuasions of other participants. Most of the potential participants feared 
that the discussion might lead them to make some pronouncements that may cost them 
their jobs in the long run. This problem also made some officials decline the interviews. 
Those who responded are suspected to have withheld some vital information. Still others 
did not want their interviews to be referenced. It may be useful to engage a lot of 
interviews and focus group discussions in any further work on this subject because the 
NDC government has been voted out of office and people will not feel intimidated to talk 
or even participate in focus groups discussion. Perhaps the new set of data that is 
generated may be more revealing than those obtained for the current study. 
b. The Role of Private and Voluntary Sectors 
The study discounted private sector and NGO role in the development process in Ghana. 
It only examined the enabling role provided by the public sector for NGOs and the 
private sector in the development management process. But the private and voluntary 
sectors also play very important role in the process. That is, they are partners with the 
public sector in the development management process. However, the study did not 
explore whether at all these other partners have contributed in any way towards Ghana's 
under-development. It is important to also look at the role of the private and voluntary 
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sectors in the development process in Ghana. Such a study will present a complete 
picture of Ghana's development problems. Secondly, any future work on institutional 
development and capacity building may also focus on the private sector and NGOs in 
terms of what capacity building programme may be necessary to facilitate private sector- 
NGO roles. 
c. Role of Non-formal Institutions 
The research discovered that non-formal institutions such as community groups also 
affect the development process in two important ways. These are resource provision for 
policy implementation and participation in local decision-making. However, no data was 
collected from such groups to examine their effectiveness and what problems they face in 
the development process, and to determine what assistance they may require to enhance 
their performance. It may be useful to focus a study in the future on the roles of these 
non-formal institutions and how these roles may be enhanced for managing development. 
d. Outcomes of the Ghana-Vision 2020 and the NIRP 
The study could not assess the implementation outcomes of the Ghana-Vision 2020 and 
the NIRP because both programmes are ongoing and have a considerable amount of time 
ahead for completion. The study could therefore only make projections based on the 
dynamics of the implementation processes. As a result, any future research may need to 
examine what impact the policy analysis methodology has had on the outcomes of these 
two policies in the light of these emerging issues. 
e. Usefulness of the NIRP in relation to Vision 2020 Outcomes 
One more important work that is worth pursuing in the future relates to the extent to 
which the NIRP has contributed to the success of the Vision 2020. This future study may 
be done in the context of the overlapping schedules of both programmes. That is, the 
NIRP is being implemented concurrently within a ten-year period with the Vision 2020. 
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This new study must attempt to provide answers to the question that: `how would the 
capacity built well into the middle of the very development policy it is suppose to serve 
sustain the development policy? ' 
f. Sustainability of the Built-up Capacity after NIRP 
The interview at the NIRP Secretariat indicated that the NIRP has a strategy to ensure 
that the capacity building process in Ghana's PSIs becomes an ongoing process even 
after the NIRP's mandate expires. In that case the PSC will oversee the process. 
However, it is not exactly clear how the NIRP intends to make this possible. It will 
therefore be useful to focus a study on how the NIRP accomplished this objective, and 
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Appendix B 
Structure of Ghana's New Development Management System 
National Dav. 
Plan & Budget 
PRESIDENT 
PARLIAMENT 
Dev. directives National Plan R 
Approved Dev. Policy d Dev Policy 
Dcv. Strategy & Strategy Proposals Studies 
Finanaal Strategy National Plan 
MINISTRY OF 
FINANCE NDPC Nationally Co-ordinated Plan 
[ 








URBAN/TOWN/AREA & ZONAL COUNCILS 




NDPC: National Development Planning Commission 
RCC: Regional Co-ordinating Council 
RPCU: Regional Planning Co-ordinating Unit 
DPCU: District Planning Coordinating Unit 
MDAs: Ministries, Departments & Agencies 
Vision 2020: National Development Policy Framework 
b Development Plans 
Vision 2020 & Planning Guidelines 







Model Diagnostic Process 
In order to guide Chief Directors and their Capacity Development Teams, this section provides 
details of a model diagnostic process which is recommended for use during the workshops. It is 
envisaged that this process would involve four (4) stages as follows: 
i. Stage One Workshop: to introduce the diagnostic process and to define the group work 
in stage (ii) below. This could take one day. 
ii. Stage Two Group Work: whereby an in-house team works on the separate elements of 
the diagnostic process (see below for topics). It is envisaged that this stage will take 4-6 
weeks. 
iii. Stage Three Workshop: to receive the outputs of the Stage Two work groups for 
discussion, assimilation and synthesis for the development of problem identification, 
change-actions and performance improvement plan. This could take one day. 
iv. Stage Four Report Production: which summarises the output from the Stage (iii) 
workshop and includes a specific performance improvement plan. 
The process involves an analysis by the in-house working group of five fundamental categories of 
factors which influence organisational performance: 
a. The Environment, or context in which the MDAs operate. 
b. The Inputs made available to the MDAs. 
c. The Activities (Organisation, Processes and Systems) internal to the MDAs. 
d. The Outputs of the MDAs 
e. The National Policy Goals and Mission statements of the individual MDAs. 
The four key relationships to be explored are: 
* Environment and Inputs 
* Inputs and Activities 
* Activities and Outputs 
* Outputs and Goals 
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The key features of this process are that it helps to develop a form of constructive strategic 
thinking is not always present in the Civil Service. The process requires the Chief Director and his 
team (including consultants) and Heads of Departments and Agencies to work back from policy 
goals to outputs, from outputs back to activities, from activities back to inputs, and finally a 
review of the inputs and the Civil Service operating environment. Working backward from outputs 
to input constantly focuses attention on what the priorities are for achieving the desired results. 
The Stage One Workshop will be designed to open new horizons for the participants in order to 
give them fresh ways of understanding and addressing their management problems. It will be the 
starting point for an intensive MDA self-appraisal and capacity diagnosis to be undertaken by a 
working group in the weeks immediately to follow. In order to help facilitate and focus the 
discussions of your working group we indicate below various steps and issues which you are 
expected to work through during the diagnostic process. 
Please remember that we have made plans to provide you with the following assistance if you 
request it: 
a. Facilitators to help with conducting your workshops and to contribute to the 
deliberations of your working group 
b. Training sessions on topics related to the diagnostic work 
Checklist of Issues and Topics to be addressed by your Working Group 
In order to help facilitate and focus the discussions of your working group we list below some of 
the steps as issues which you are expected to work through during the review process: 
Stage One: Policy Goals and Missions 
* Read the legal statute which created the organisation and assess it current relevance. 
* Update the current mission statement in the light of the Ghana Vision 2020 
document and the NIRP policy goals 




* Review your organisation's machinery for policy formulation and evaluation. 
* List any issues and problems arising from the above 
Stage Two: Outputs 
* Define the outputs that will deliver your mission and objective 
* Prepare an initial specification for the levels of output which your organisation can 
realistically deliver given the resources likely to be available. 
* Take advantage of the beneficiary surveys to involve the users of your services and outputs 
in the process of setting acceptable performance standards and targets. 
* List issues and problems arising from the above 
Stage Three: Activities (Organisation, Processes and Systems) 
* Assess whether your existing organisational and functional structure is consistent with 
your updated mission statement and the outputs which your organisation seeks to deliver. 
* Undertake a fundamental review of your activities and functions with a view to 
recommending which activities might be: 
a. dispensed with 
b. privatised 
c. market-tested and /or contracted out 
d. undertaken by NGOs or communities themselves 
e. regrouped into a more compact or task-oriented form 
* List issues and problems arising from the above. 
Stage Four: Inputs 
* Given that your total inputs of human and financial resources are necessarily constrained 
within the overall budget, assess whether the balance between the cost of item one inputs 
and the cost of item two to five inputs are appropriate. 
* Given the total cost of your inputs, assess your overall productivity levels and consider 
whether your outputs are giving value for money to the taxpayer. 
* Assess the quality and quantity of the human resources inputs which your organization 
employs. 
* List issues and problems arising from the above 
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Stage Five: Operating Environment 
* Assess whether you have sufficient freedom to manage your resources effectively within 
the existing Civil Service rules and regulations 
* Review the terms and conditions which resources are made available to your 
organisation. 
* Review the sector monitoring arrangements applied by, or applied to, your 
organisation. 
* List any issues and problems arising from the environment in which your organisation 
operates. 
Summary of Issues and Problems 
As stated in the preface we are keen to assist you in removing capacity constraints particularly 
those relating to the freedom to manage your resources more effectively under the existing Civil 
Service rules and regulations. In view of this we anticipate that you will provide us with a written 
assessment of any system-wide constraints and impediments which hinder your operations and 
which can only be addressed collectively. 
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Appendix D 
Development of Your Performance Improvement Plan 
Following the analytical work undertaken by your working group and the identification of issues 
and problems, it is anticipated that your organisation would conduct a one-day workshop to 
develop a series of practical change-action to address the issues and problems which have been 
identified. 
These change-actions would then form the basis of a performance improvement plan with the 
following components: 
1. Change-action which relate to your organisation's machinery for developing and 
evaluating policy and updating your mission statements. 
2. Change-action which relate to your outputs, performance standards, and performance 
targets. 
3. Change-actions which relate to identifying efficiency gains through the fundamental 
review of your activities and functions. 
4. Change-actions which relate to inputs, particularly the inputs of human resources. 
5. Change-actions which relate to the environment in which your organisation 
operates. 
Your performance improvement plan should include an activity chart showing the dates when the 
proposed change-actions would be implemented. 
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Appendix E 
Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme 
Self-Appraisal Instrument 
Introduction 
This self-appraisal instrument is to assist you with reviewing your institutional capacity and 
preparing the ground for CSPIP Diagnostic Workshops to follow. The instrument is divided into 
two parts: 
a. the first part focuses on clarifying missions and goals, and 
b. the second part concentrates on issues relating to management, 
organization and systems. 
This self-appraisal instrument can be used in various ways, but we would suggest that, it is used 
for group work by the key managers of your institutions (led by you). In this respect, it is expected 
that the instrument -*-. ill facilitate group interaction leading to the summarising of the discussions 
into a report. The matters raised have been put in question format to encourage discussion. 
You may wish to contact the CSPIP Team at OHCS if you feel you need any advice or 
clarification. The CSPIP telephone Number is 665421 Ext. 2326 and you should ask for the 
Director. 
PART 1 
1. What is the current government policy relating to your mission? Is this policy 
documented? 
2. What is your current mission statement? 
3. Does the mission statement refer to target groups and if so, who are these target groups? 
4. Which other organisation, if any, has complementary goals and functions to those of your 
organisation, and if so, how do you synchronise your activities? 
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5. What was the national requirement or objective underlying the creation of your institution, 
and has that requirement changed in recent years or is it likely to be changed in the 
foreseeable future? 
6. What systems and processes should be put in place in order to ensure that your mission 
statement is regularly reviewed? 
7. Should a mission statement make adequate reference to issues such as efficiency, value for 
money, services and stakeholders interest? If not, how should these issues be addresses? 
PART II 
Institutional Accountabilities 
8. Which stakeholders have an interest in the performance of your institution? 
9. How is your institution's mission statement approved? 
10. What will be the methods by which the interests and opinions of stakeholders are elicited 
with regard to the performance of your institution? 
Organisation Structure 
11. Please attach a copy of your organisation structure. 
12. Do you have any plans to make it more compact or more effective? 
Definition of Programmes, Projects and Service Delivery Capacity 
13. Are your programmes, projects and service delivery activities clearly specified and linked 
directly to the mission statement? 
14. Have you clearly defined and documented the types of services and outputs which your 
institution provides and the target groups who benefit from these services and outputs? 
15. What will be your institution's mechanisms for and procedures for ensuring two-way 
communication between your institution and the recipients of your institution's output and 
services? 
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Efficiency of Your Institution 
16. How do you measure the efficiency of your organisation? 
17. If you do not have efficiency measures how will you put these 
in place? 
18. Is it possible to improve efficiency by: 
a. discounting nonessential activities? 
b. privatising some activities? 
c. market-testing and contracting out some activities? 
d. hiving off some activities to NGOs and the communities themselves? 
e. reorganising some functions into executive agencies? 
19. What are the arrangements for ensuring that efficiency gains are continuously sought by 
your organisation? 
Inter-Organisational Relationships 
20. Where there is a need for collaboration and Cupertino with other institutions, what 
mechanisms are in place to ensure that inter-institutional activities are adequately 
synchronised? 
Issues, Problems and Constraints 
21. What problems and constraints may impede your institution from achieving your mission, 
objectives and targets? 
22. Please divide these problems and constraints into those that can be addresses by your own 
institution and those that can only be resolved with the assistance of other institutions and 
agencies. 
23. Are there some problems which are caused by the administrative environment in which 
your institution is expected to operate e. g. centralised decision-making external to your 
organisation which may adversely affect your efficiency and effectiveness? 
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Appendix F 
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Sample of Questions used in the Interviews 
A. Institutions and the Development Process 
1. Can you describe the role played by your institution in managing the country's 
development? 
2. Please comment on your institution's capacity to perform this role. 
3. Please comment on the monitoring and regulatory processes that associate your 
institution's role in the development management process. 
4. Could you please comment on the dynamics of the national development management 
cycle? 
5. How would you rate the adequacy of the national development management process? 
6. How would you evaluate the following practices/values in your institution's role in the 
development management process: openness; transparency; accountability; cooperation 
and networking? 
7. What do you consider to be the impact of these values on your institution's performance? 
8. Can you describe the scope of managerial practices in your institution and how this 
impacts the development management process of this country? 
9. Given the opportunity what would you want to change or maintain in the managerial 
practices? 
10. How do you see the effects of the following values in this institution and on the 
development management process: cooperation; consultation, and networking? 
11. How best do you think these values can be improved or maintained? 
12. How does your institution encourage participation in policy issues of this institution and of 
the country's development? 
13. Can you please comment on your institution's readiness to accommodate the views of 
stakeholders in the policy process and regarding service delivery? 
14. Please comment on the manpower base or the skills available to your institutions. What 
has been the impact of this on the development process? 
15. What has been the level of staff inclusion and empowerment in this institution especially in 
relation to the development process? 
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16. In what way have diversity issues like gender and ethnicity reflected decisions on training 
and recruitment procedures of this institution? What has been the impact of this on human 
resource development? 
17. Generally can you describe some of the human resource issues that affect the performance 
of this institution? 
18. What aspects of the country's culture do you consider to have been influential in the way 
this institution operates? How have these impacted on development management in this 
country? 
19. Can you tell me about the scope of donor involvement in the activities of this institution? 
In what ways have these been useful? 
20. What do you see to be the impact of this level of donor involvement on the development 
process of this country? 
21. Please comment on the impact made on the development management process of this 
country by foreign values and cultures. Would you say this have been useful? 
B The Capacity Building Process 
1. Can you tell me about the background to the capacity building programme? 
2. What are the goals of the programme? 
3. Who conceived the programme? 
4. How do you see the balance between expatriate technical officers and local experts on the 
committee that drew up the programme? 
5. Please give an overview of the implementation process 
6. Can you please comment on the implementation structure, and resources available to the 
programme? 
7. What are the dynamics of the programme i. e. %%hat are the issues involved and what are the 
strategies being adopted to address these issues? 
8. To what extent has the programme incorporated Ghanaian values and culture? 
9. What impact does the programme envisages making on the development management 
process? 
10. How are the following values reflected on the programme: openness; transparency 
accountability and mass participation? 
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11. What has cooperation, consultation and networking processes been like in the policy 
formulation process? 
12. What has been the level of inclusion in the programme so far? 
13. Please comment on donor commitment to the programme? What has been their 
contribution so far to the programme? 
14. What is the relationship between this programme and other reform programmes currently 
being implemented in the public service? 
15. What has been the reaction of public sector workers to the reforms so far? 
P/S 
These questions were not asked in the order listed above. A lot of probes were used in the 
interview which meant the any of the question listed could follow any other one depending on the 
information being given at the point in time. 
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